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Abstract 
 
My thesis investigates the role of incentives for employees and the phenomenon of 
labour market hysteresis in driving productivity and employment in the labor market in 
the UK. Chapter 1 summarizes the thesis. 
 
The second chapter estimates the impact of introducing an explicit points-based system 
in favour of finding jobs for the disabled in a UK job placement agency. Using dynamic 
analysis, we find that in the long-run the policy improved disabled outflows by 6% and 
had an insignificant effect on JSA outflows. In the short-run, the policy had a negative 
impact on JSA outflows that declined by 2%. This is consistent with a model where 
information helps both groups, but incentives offset this for the able and reinforce it for 
the disabled. The third chapter studies how incentives are weakened in a public sector 
organization when rewards are based on team output rather than individual output. With 
the introduction of team rewards, employees are likely to free-ride on each other’s 
efforts. I find compelling evidence that this indeed occurs. Peer monitoring, may 
however, limit free-riding in teams. I formalize the impact under two benchmark models 
to ascertain the relative impact of peer monitoring and free-riding. Using difference-in-
differences estimators, I find that consistent with a degree of peer monitoring, the 
dilution effect is smaller when peer monitoring is easier. The fourth chapter models the 
phenomenon of labor market hysteresis in a macroeconomic model to determine its 
impact on macroeconomic outcomes. In particular, we study its role in determining the 
impact of the scale and timing of UK’s fiscal consolidation programme on output and 
unemployment in the UK. Finally, the last chapter studies employee incentives in the 
context of education. Motivated by a diagnosis of increasing inequality in UK’s 
educational attainment in secondary education, we recommend a flexible school system 
and improved school and teacher governance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the introduction, I summarize the chapters. In this thesis, the second chapter estimates 
the impact of introducing an explicit points-based system in favour of finding jobs for 
the disabled in a UK job placement agency. Disability rolls have escalated in developed 
nations over the last 40 years. But they stopped rising in the UK when a welfare reform 
was introduced that physically integrated the disability benefit (IB) with unemployment 
insurance. This policy reform improved job information and relatively sharpened 
bureaucratic incentives to find jobs for the disabled (relative to those on UI) by 
introducing a points-based system. The policy roll-out was staggered both 
geographically and across time in a quasi-random way that we exploit to evaluate the 
change falls in welfare rolls. In the long-run the policy improved disabled outflows by 
6% and had an (insignificant) 1% increase in UI outflows. In the short-run, the policy 
had a negative impact, particularly on the UI outflows that declined by 2%. This is 
consistent with a model where information helps both groups, but incentives offset this 
for the able and reinforce it for the disabled. A cost-benefit calculation is very supportive 
of the policy, but the costs of the organizational disruption implies that benefits take 5 
years to exceed costs making it unattractive for (myopic) politicians. This illustrates the 
difficult political economy of welfare reform. 
 
The third chapter explores the impact of introducing team based rewards in a public 
sector organization. In my context, the new rewards switch from being individually 
based to being based in a team at the district level. Districts are organized into spatially 
dispersed sub-teams (i.e. offices within districts). In this setting, I explore whether it is 
really the case that incentives are weakened when rewards are based on team output 
rather than individual output. I find compelling evidence that this indeed occurs. With 
the introduction of team rewards, employees are more likely to free-ride on each other’s 
efforts in large teams. I find support for team size determining the degree to which 
incentives are weakened. Peer monitoring, may, however, limit free-riding in teams. I 
formalize the impact on output under two benchmark models to ascertain the relative 
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impact of peer monitoring and free-riding. To investigate the model’s predictions 
empirically, I exploit the national rollout of a incentive structure in the UK public 
employment service (Jobcentre Plus) in the mid-2000s. Using difference-in-differences 
estimators, I find that the team based measures dilute incentives. Consistent with a 
degree of peer monitoring, however, the dilution effect is smaller when peer monitoring 
is easier (as captured by the concentration of teams across offices within a district). 
 
The fourth chapter models the phenomenon of labor market hysteresis in a 
macroeconomic model. In 2009-10, the UK's budget deficit was about 11 per cent of 
GDP. A credible plan for fiscal consolidation was introduced in the UK over the fiscal 
years 2011-12 to 2016-17. In this chapter, we assess the impact of the scale and timing 
of this fiscal consolidation programme on output and unemployment in the UK. During 
a prolonged period of depression when unemployment is well above most estimates of 
the NAIRU, the impact of fiscal tightening may be different from that in normal times. 
We contrast three scenarios: the consolidation plan implemented during a depression; 
the same plan, but with implementation delayed for three years when the economy has 
recovered; and no consolidation at all. The modelling confirms that doing nothing was 
not an option and would have led to unsustainable debt ratios. Under both our 
"immediate consolidation" scenario and the "delayed consolidation", the necessary 
increases in taxes and reductions in spending reduce growth and increase 
unemployment, as expected. But our estimates indicate that the impact would have been 
substantially less, and less long-lasting, if consolidation had been delayed until more 
normal times. The impact is partly driven by the heightened magnitude of fiscal 
multipliers, and exacerbated by the prolongation of their impact due to hysteresis effects. 
The cumulative loss of output over the period 2011-21 amounts to about £239 billion in 
2010 prices, or about 16 per cent of 2010 GDP. And unemployment is considerably 
higher for longer - still 1 percentage point higher even in 2019.  
 
Finally, the last chapter studies employee incentives in the context of education. 
Economic theory and evidence shows that in the long-run human capital is the critical 
input for growth. While indicators of average educational outcomes at the secondary 
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level, in the UK, tend to show significant improvements over time, they mask the fact 
that the UK has a long tail of poor (secondary) education performance compared to other 
countries. This holds back growth and social mobility. The incentives for schools to 
focus on the performance of children from disadvantaged backgrounds are weak. 
Dissemination of high quality teaching through the school system depends 
fundamentally on school incentives - performance measures, autonomy and competition. 
We propose a flexible system for education, which gives schools greater autonomy and 
the ability to grow within a national accountability framework that places a premium on 
radically raising the standards of the bottom ability group. Together with improved 
choice for parents, better quality information (across the entire distribution of 
achievement) and more effective incentives for teachers and schools, this will improve 
the quality of teaching. 
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Chapter 2: Can helping the sick hurt the able? - 
Incentives, Information and Disruption in a 
Welfare to Work reform 
 
 
 
Abstract: Disability rolls have escalated in developed nations over the last 40 years. But 
they stopped rising in the UK when a welfare reform was introduced that physically 
integrated the disability benefit (IB) with unemployment insurance. This policy reform 
improved job information and relatively sharpened bureaucratic incentives to find jobs 
for the disabled (relative to those on UI) by introducing a points-based system. The 
policy roll-out was staggered both geographically and across time in a quasi-random 
way that we exploit to evaluate the change falls in welfare rolls. In the long-run the 
policy improved disabled outflows by 6% and had an (insignificant) 1% increase in UI 
outflows. In the short-run, the policy had a negative impact, particularly on the UI 
outflows that declined by 2%. This is consistent with a model where information helps 
both groups, but incentives offset this for the able and reinforce it for the disabled. A 
cost-benefit calculation is very supportive of the policy, but the costs of the 
organizational disruption implies that benefits take 5 years to exceed costs making it 
unattractive for (myopic) politicians. This illustrates the difficult political economy of 
welfare reform. 
 
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank the ESRC for funding this research 
through the Centre for Economic Performance. IFS generously provided some of the 
estimates of benefit receipt. 
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1 Introduction  
Disability rolls have risen almost inexorably in the US and other advanced nations in the 
last forty years (Autor and Duggan, 2003). In the US, Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) cash transfers have tripled from $40bn in 1979 to $124bn in 2010. Its 
share of total social security payments rose from 10% in 1988 to 20% in 2009 (Autor, 
2012). Figure 1 shows that the numbers on the equivalent UK scheme, Incapacity 
Benefit (IB) also rose spectacularly: from 400,000 in 1977 to 2m in 2009. Unlike the 
US, however, the increase seemed to stop from the early 2000s. In 2001, a major policy 
reform was introduced which was designed to address the large numbers on IB. The 
agencies responsible for welfare benefits for working age people were merged into one, 
“Job Centre Plus”. The aim was to give a much greater focus on getting those on IB and 
other benefits back into jobs. The main other group, by numbers, were those on 
unemployment insurance, called Job Seekers’ Allowance (JSA).  
The reform physically integrated the offices where welfare claimants go to have 
work-focused interviews, collect checks and look for jobs. It simultaneously increased 
information and changed bureaucratic incentives (the formal system for receipt of 
welfare was unchanged). Information was improved for all groups by a major new IT 
system and new buildings. The people in charge of helping welfare claimants find jobs 
had changed incentives with an explicit points system introduced with three times as 
many points given for placing a disabled person into a job than for the unemployed. 
Points fed into career progression.  
In our empirical analysis we exploit the policy roll-out that was staggered over 
time and across geographical areas (we use quarterly administrative data based on 
districts, similar to US counties1, over a 9 year period). We identify the policy impact by 
comparing the change in exit rates for disability and unemployment benefit claimants in 
districts treated at a point in time to that in districts treated at an earlier or later date. 
Information on benefit claimants at the district level is provided by the Department for 
Work and Pensions, and we use quarterly series for stocks, inflows and outflows for 
                                                 
1
 The average population of a district was 120,000 in the 2001 census. In comparison, the average 
population of a US county is 100,000 people.  
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various categories of welfare benefits, disaggregated by age and district, and, for the 
case of JSA claims, disaggregated by destination (e.g. to job vs. non-participation).  
  We find two main results. First, there were significant organizational disruption 
costs from the policy, with outflows from disability and unemployment benefits initially 
declining after the introduction of the policy, and more markedly so for JSA than IB 
recipients. Second, in the long-run there were significant positive effects of disabled 
outflows, whereas unemployment outflows, although positive, are small and 
insignificant. These patterns are consistent with a simple model whereby bureaucratic 
efforts to reduce disabled increased, but efforts to reduce unemployment rolls decreased. 
However, lain over this there was a long-term positive effect on both groups from better 
information but a short-run negative effect from adjustment costs due to organizational 
disruption. 
Using our results we present a cost-benefit analysis showing that the policy has a 
large welfare gain. However, the presence of significant short-run costs from disruption 
and sunk set-up costs highlights why such welfare changes are hard to implement. We 
estimate it takes five years for the reform to break even, which is beyond the time 
horizon of even benign policy-makers.  
This chapter links to several literatures. First, the issue of welfare reform has 
come to the fore with the Great Recession of 2008-2009. The rise in unemployment has 
been much less than expected in the UK2 and Germany, and both countries experienced 
significant welfare reforms prior to the crisis. Second, a growing literature has 
highlighted how incentive systems can be used to improve efficiency, particularly in the 
public sector (see Besley and Ghatak, 2005 on theory; Meyer, 1995, for a survey of 
findings from social experiments or Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011, for a general 
survey). For example, Heckman et al. (2011) found bureaucrats rewards affected cream 
skimming and showed significant differences between short-run and long-run 
programme impacts. We contribute to this literature by emphasizing the multitasking 
aspects in the provision of effort in government organizations. A body of work in this 
literature has studied the effects of financial incentives to benefit recipients on the 
                                                 
2
 On the UK case see Blundell, Crawford and Jin (2013); Gregg, Machin and Salgade (2013) and Pessoa 
and Van Reenen (2013). 
18 
 
duration of unemployment (see Lalive et al. 2007 for recent evidence), while the role of 
explicit incentives in the provision of job placement services is to date largely 
unexplored.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the institutional 
framework in the UK and the hypotheses we test, in section 3 we outline the data used in 
the empirical analysis, while in section 4 we report the analysis and results of how the 
treatment impacts inflow into and outflow from different benefit categories. In section 5 
we examine the robustness of our results to different specifications and in section 6 we 
perform a simple cost-benefit evaluation of Jobcentre Plus.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 The Institutional Framework 
2.1 The Jobcentre Plus system 
There were major infrastructure changes in the delivery of public employment and 
benefits services in the UK between 2001 and 2008. The change was part of a wider 
policy emphasis on Welfare-to-Work initiatives3 that sought to increase labour market 
activity. In March 2000, the Prime Minister announced the establishment of Jobcentre 
Plus that would deal with people of working age, to deliver a single, work-focused, 
integrated service to both employers and benefit claimants of working age in UK. Since 
October 2001, the Employment Services (ES) and Benefits Agency (BA) were 
integrated into one organization. The new organization which combined benefit advice 
with job placement services was called Jobcentre Plus. The integration took place in six 
waves between 2001 and 2008. 
There were two broad changes as a result of the Jobcentre Plus policy relating 
broadly to information and incentives. On information, the physical organization of 
offices as the two types of services (help with finding jobs and giving out welfare 
checks) were now delivered under one roof. There was a massive investment in 
improved information technology (IT) systems and organizational restructuring. The 
average size of an office was increased as buildings were combined, re-built and offices 
refurbished. Aggregate floor space decreased by 20% as did the total number of staff 
                                                 
3
 The guiding principle of welfare reform was “work for those who can and security for those who cannot” 
(Hyde et al., 2002). 
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even though operating costs per square meter by 12% because of high quality 
infrastructure and locations. Overall annual administrative costs per year were reduced 
by £240m although (separate) the sunk costs of re-organization for around £1.8bn 
(National Audit Office, 2008).   
The second major change was the introduction of explicit performance targets called 
Job Entry Targets (JET). As opposed to the previous system of national-level targets for 
the number of beneficiaries to place into jobs, under the new regime every benefit 
officer who helped a benefit claimant into a job was awarded a certain number of 
explicit Job Entry Target points varying by the category of the benefit claimant. In 
addition, there was a district-level target in terms of the number of points to achieve 
each quarter. These performance standards acted like a performance benchmark for the 
managers and mattered for the career prospects of the benefit officers.4 
 
2.2 Framework 
Theoretically, we distinguish between three different effects on benefit officers’ job 
placement activity as a result of the introduction of the Jobcentre Plus. Firstly, the 
physical reorganization, installation of new IT systems and estate rationalization would 
have an immediate disruptive effect, as the provision of services would have been 
disrupted and unavailable for some periods of time during the initial phase of the 
introduction of Jobcentre Plus. This would lead to a reduction in the productivity of the 
officers in the short-run. We expect the disruption effect to be broadly similar across all 
benefit groups. This effect should decay over time as officers settle into the new system.  
We distinguish this from the second hypothesis about the long-run effect of system 
restructuring and modern IT systems on efficiency. Benefit officers are now able to use 
the new IT systems which facilitate various manual tasks such as recording job entries 
and keeping records of beneficiaries. Increased automation of services would improve 
the speed and accuracy with which benefits applications were processed. This reduces 
                                                 
4
 The UK welfare system had introduced performance benchmarking since the early 1980s (Propper and 
Wilson 2003; Bagaria et al, 2013). They have been designed according to targets embodied in the Public 
Service Arrangements (PSAs) of different government agencies. Makinson (2000) describes the 
performance standards in the Employment Service, The Benefits Agency, HM Customs and Excise and 
Inland Revenue. These mostly consisted of national-level targets for the number of beneficiaries to place 
into jobs, without explicit rewards at the individual or local level.  
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operating costs as well as the time officers spend on these back office functions and 
enables them to focus on conducting more client-facing job finding interviews. Thus, in 
the long run, we expect an increase in job placements for all benefit groups as the 
provision of welfare services becomes more efficient. Again, this effect should be 
broadly similar across all benefit recipients. 
Thirdly, the effect of the JET implies a shift in bureaucratic incentives in favour of 
Incapacity Benefit claimants. Before the introduction of Jobcentre Plus, there were broad 
national level targets for job placements and sub-targets for different benefit categories. 
For example, in 2001 there was a national target to place 1.36m jobless people into work 
accompanied by a sub-target to place 275,000 disadvantaged5  into work. The explicit 
award points under the new JET system were designed to reflect organizational priorities 
towards the Incapacity Benefit claimants. As shown in Table A1, a benefit officer was 
awarded fifty per cent more points if he/she placed a person on Incapacity Benefit6 into a 
job than a long-term JSA beneficiary, and three times more points relative to a short-
term JSA beneficiary. Given that the benefit officers had to achieve a quarterly target 
number of points, this should incentivize them to focus on placing the IB claimants.  
Consider a multi-tasking model with fixed inputs along the lines of Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1991). Assume that the Jobcentre officers have a given stock of “inputs”. 
They can apply different amounts of this “input” to different individual clients (benefit 
claimants). These inputs affect the outcomes experienced by claimants. In our context, 
the input variable represents staff time for interviews and the direct costs of the services 
provided. After the introduction of the explicit weighting system, we expect them to re-
organize the manner in which they allocate their efforts7. They would now focus more 
on and increase effort in placing Incapacity Benefit claimants. Given a fixed stock of 
inputs, this should adversely affect the job placement efforts and outcomes for those on 
Job Seeker’s Allowance claimants. Thus, Jobcentre Plus is likely to have a larger impact 
on IB recipients than JSA recipients.  
                                                 
5
 This included those with disabilities, participants in New Deal for Lone Parents, partners of continuously 
unemployed for 26 weeks, homeless people and qualifying ex-offenders. 
6
 We discuss the other group, Lone Parents in Section 6. 
7
 Unfortunately, we are not able to measure staff inputs, but we can observe participant outcomes. So, in a 
sense this is a reduced form estimation. 
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2.3 Identification 
We exploit the staggered roll-out of the Jobcentre Plus offices across Local Authority 
Districts in the UK to identify the causal impact of the policy. The switch to Jobcentre 
Plus was phased in over six waves, as illustrated in Figure 2. The figure shows the 
additional districts covered under each wave. The first wave begun on 1st October 2001 
in 32 districts, the second wave began in October 2002 with 27 more districts and by the 
first quarter of 2008, almost 100% of the country was covered. Figure 2 presents a map 
of the policy roll out, showing no obvious patterns of geographic clusters that adopted 
the policy at the same time.  
We consider treatment as the “go live” for a district. One concern is that districts 
selected into treatment were not randomly assigned into treatment. To examine this, we 
check for differences in pre-trends between the treated and non-treated for various 
benefit categories (see section 4).  
There are multiple offices in a district (between 32 and 171) and we also 
considered using the penetration across offices within a district. However, we found that 
although observables could not predict which districts were treated, there did appear to 
be a systematic component of which offices within a district were treated. It is likely that 
a district treated the offices with a higher benefit outflow rate to begin first (Table A2). 8  
Further, the points system was formally at the district level.  
We use a difference-in-differences framework to identify the causal impact of 
Jobcentre Plus. Since all districts are treated eventually, effectively we are comparing 
districts which are treated in a particular year and quarter to those who are treated at a 
later stage. Our main outcomes are the number of exits from disability and 
unemployment benefits in each quarter in each district. We further disaggregate outflows 
by age groups - young and old. The young are defined as being aged between 18 to 24 
years and the older group consists of people aged 25-59 years.9  
                                                 
8
 National Audit Office (2008) states that “Whilst an overall vision of the service improvements was 
successfully communicated from the centre, the detailed planning of the roll-out was delegated to the 
districts…. Implementation of Jobcentre Plus was a locally driven process” and that “Localised planning 
allowed Jobcentre Plus to make early progress with the roll-out, as the districts which were ready first 
could be scheduled for early roll-out”. 
9
 We also examine other age splits as robustness checks (Table A6). 
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One potential concern is that jobseekers may be manipulating the benefit 
category that they apply to, thus affecting the composition of the claimant stock in each 
clients’ group and the corresponding outflow rate from benefits. For instance, benefit 
applicants may choose to enter the caseload as a disabled person rather than under Job 
Seeker’s Allowance. In the UK context, it is rather difficult to be classified as disabled 
to claim Incapacity Benefit since it requires a medical certificate and the conditions 
required to qualify for receiving Incapacity Benefit have been made stricter over time.10 
A related concern is that the introduction of Jobcentre Plus may affect jobseekers’ 
decisions whether to sign-on at all for benefits. To examine this further, we also analyse 
the impact of the Jobcentre Plus on the inflows into the different categories in section 4.  
 
3 Data 
We use administrative panel provided by the UK Department of Work and Pensions 
that cover the welfare population. The Job Seeker’s Allowance database contains 
monthly information from 1983 on the stocks, inflows and outflows of recipients’ 
unemployment benefits. The data is available at the Local Authority District across 
Great Britain and there are 406 districts defined on a consistent basis.11 The data can be 
disaggregated in various ways, and we focus on cuts by age.  
The second dataset contains quarterly data from 1999Q3 at the district level on 
other welfare benefits including the key disability benefit, Incapacity Benefit (IB). To be 
consistent across the two datasets, we aggregate the monthly JSA data to the quarterly 
level, but use the monthly information as a robustness check. We estimate all our 
                                                 
10
 For instance, in 1999, the Welfare Reform and Pensions Bill introduced ‘continuing assessment of 
possibility of returning to work’ (Burchardt, 1999). While the criteria for benefit receipt remained 
unaltered, the significant change was the collection of additional information focussing on the abilities of 
the claimant at intervals and the allocation of a personal adviser to oversee each claim. New claimants 
were also required to attend an interview at the beginning of the claim, and any time thereafter, to discuss 
possibilities for returning to work. More recently, applicants to IB will have to go to a Work Capability 
Assessment during the first 13 weeks of IB. This was aimed to see if the illness or disability affected the 
claimant’s ability to work.  
11
 Local government in England operates under either a single-tier system of unitary authorities and 
London boroughs, or a two-tier system of counties and district councils. The spatial units in our analysis 
include the unitary authorities, London boroughs and districts within counties. There are 352 such units in 
England. Local government in Scotland is organized through 32 unitary authorities. Since 1 April 1996, 
local government in Wales is organized through 22 single-tier principal areas. The Scottish and Welsh unit 
areas are also included in our sample. 
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specifications on a consistent time period of nine years (36 quarters) 1999Q3 to 2008Q2, 
the quarter before the collapse of Lehman’s, which triggered the Great Recession and a 
huge upsurge of unemployment.  
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Columns (1) and (2) refer to 
national aggregates per quarter, and columns (3) and (4) refer to (unweighted) averages 
across districts, age groups and quarters. The aggregate outflow rate from JSA is 70% 
consisting of an average outflow of 653,819 per quarter and a stock of 939,267 per 
quarter in the country as a whole. Inflows were a bit lower than this (648,957 per 
quarter) as unemployment was falling over the sample period. Outflow rates for IB were 
much lower at 3% per quarter: as is well known far fewer people leave the stock of 
disability rolls than unemployment. 
 
3.1 Jobcentre Plus and Benefit Flows 
We estimate benefit outflow equations in a difference-in-differences framework. We 
start by estimating a static model to estimate the average effect over time arising from 
the change in bureaucratic incentives. The specification is:  
 ln  = 	
 +  ln +  ln  +  +  +           (1) 
 
where   is the number of people in age group a leaving the benefit register B (JSA or 
IB) in district i at time t (quarter). 
 denotes a treatment dummy which turns on in the 
quarter when the first office in district i is treated. The coefficient is identified by the 
fact that the policy was rolled out in six waves with different districts being treated in 
each wave. One robustness test we consider is to allow 	 being different in each wave 
and showing that the effect looks remarkably similar across waves when the post-wave 
window is kept fixed. As noted above, we found that the timing of when a district was 
treated appeared to be unrelated to observables. 
We include as controls the stock of claimants of benefit B at the end of the 
previous quarter for the own age group,   as well as other age groups, a’ 
(old/young respectively in the baseline specification). Our preferred specifications 
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include a full set of fixed effects (district by age group) and age by time dummies, but 
we also show more restrictive specifications just including separate district, age and time 
effects. We cluster the standard errors at the district level, which is the level at which the 
policy is defined. 
In equation (1) the treatment effect is summarized by the coefficient 	 which is 
an average over all the post-treatment quarters. Our adjustment cost theory, however, 
suggests that there should be a distinct dynamic pattern of change with the positive 
policy effects being dampened at first by organizational disruption. Hence, we allow the 
policy effect to be different depending on how many quarters have elapsed since the 
policy. 
 ln  = ∑ 	
 + 	 
 +  ln  +  ln  +  +  +     (2) 
 
The 
 term is broken down by period after the policy begins so 
 is the quarter 
when the policy is turned on, 
 is the first quarter after the policy is in effect and so on. 
 is the “long-run”, defined as 8 quarters or more after the policy is in place. Since the 
last district to have the policy was Wave 6 in 2006Q3 we have at least two years of post-
policy experience for all districts. Ending the dynamics after two years is somewhat 
arbitrary, but the coefficients seem stable afterwards and we show that the qualitative 
results are robust to alternative dynamic specifications (e.g. Table A4) 
The disruption hypothesis suggests that the 	 > 		> 	 and so on. In other 
words, the initial negative disruption effects unwind as the new organizational structure 
settles down. The incentives hypothesis suggests that the positive effects on IB should 
be greater than JSA i.e. 	 > 	 !.  
 
4 Results 
In this section we present both average impact of Jobcentre Plus on the outflow from 
benefits, as well as its dynamic evolution, and then turn to examining its effect on 
inflows.  
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4.1 Basic Results on Outflows from benefits 
In column (1) of Table 2 we estimate equation (1) where the dependent variable is the ln 
(total outflow) from unemployment (JSA claimants). Our controls include the stock of 
unemployed claimants at the end of the previous quarter by age group, time (quarter by 
year), age and district dummies. The coefficient on the post-policy dummy is negative 
and significant with a value of -0.0153 suggesting that a treated district on average, a 
1.5% decrease in unemployment outflows. Given the average unemployment outflow of 
about 650,000 per quarter this implies just under 10,000 more people staying on 
unemployment benefits. This overall impact is consistent with the idea of disruption 
effects and/or that the job entry point system gave incentives for benefit officers to 
substitute effort away from the unemployed and towards the disabled. The lagged stock 
of own age unemployed claimants enters with a significant positive coefficient as 
expected (the larger stock the larger the flow, all else equal). The coefficient on the stock 
of the other age group is negative, suggesting job competition effects across age groups. 
In column (2), we include a full set of fixed effects (district by age dummies) and again 
find a significant negative coefficient on the post-policy variable and this result remains 
basically unchanged when we also include age interacted with time effects in column 
(3). 
We repeat the same specifications in columns (4)-(6) of Table 2 for the (log) 
outflow from IB, and condition on the lagged IB stocks on the right hand side. In 
column (4) we estimate the specification analogous to column (1) and find a positive and 
weakly significant coefficient of 0.0166 on the post-policy dummy. This suggests about 
a 1.7% increase in total outflows, which given a sample average outflow of 56,000 
people means an additional 1,000 fewer people off the IB register. In column (5), we 
include a full set of fixed effects and in column (6) we include age*time dummies. The 
treatment effect falls slightly to 0.0151, broadly equal and opposite to the policy 
coefficient in the unemployment outflow equation.12 
The specifications in Table 2 just look at the post-policy period as a whole 
without examining the dynamics of the policy effect. To assess short-run effects arising 
                                                 
12
 The results are robust to conditioning on stocks (by age group) of other benefit recipients (i.e. IB and 
lone parent stocks in JSA outflow equations, JSA and lone parent stocks in IB outflow equations). 
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from organizational disruption, Table 3 probes the dynamics more carefully, allowing a 
differential effect in each of the quarters after the policy switches on (up to the eighth 
quarter after introduction) as in equation (2).  
Interestingly, the coefficients show a consistent dynamic pattern, being negative 
in the quarter immediately after the policy’s introduction, but then becoming more 
positive over time. We detect negative impacts on JSA outflows for the first 5 quarters, 
but these cease to be significant by quarters 6 and 7 and actually turn positive for quarter 
8 and beyond. This suggests that after two years there is a positive effect of 1.2% on 
outflows due to the policy, although this effect is not significantly different from zero. In 
contrast, for IB outflows, although we find a negative effect in the first quarter after the 
policy is introduced, this turns positive by the second quarter. This positive effect 
gradually becomes larger and more significant until in the long-run it suggests 6.1% 
more disabled people left the register in our most general specification of column (6). 
These dynamic responses are presented graphically in Figure 4 and highlight our 
two main findings. First, the long-run effect is positive for both forms of welfare, but it 
is clearly much stronger for disability benefits (Panel B) than unemployment benefits 
(Panel A). Second, there is initially a negative effect for both benefits of the policy 
change, but this is much stronger for unemployment than disability benefits. 
The interpretation of our results is that the more positive effect of the policy on 
disability compared to unemployment is driven by the new incentive system, such that 
officers devote more effort to helping the disabled into new jobs than the unemployed 
after the policy change. Overlaid on this, however, is an initial disruption effect as 
buildings and new systems bed down and a generally positive effect on both groups 
from improved information. This depresses all outflows and is an adjustment cost of the 
policy. 
An alternative explanation would be that incentives do not matter but somehow 
the information treatment had a disproportionately larger effect on IB claimants than the 
unemployed. It is not obvious why this should be, but we will look at a more refined test 
of the incentives hypothesis involving a third group of welfare recipients (lone parents) 
where bureaucratic incentives are somewhere in-between those for the other two groups. 
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We find results again consistent with the incentive hypothesis when looking at outflows 
from benefits for this third group (see Section 6). 
 
4.2 Pre-policy trends? 
An identification threat to any difference-in-differences estimation is the existence 
of differential pre-policy trends. For example, if districts initially selected for treatment 
were those in which IB outflows were already increasing (and/or JSA outflows 
decreasing), we would estimate a positive (respectively, negative) impact of treatment 
even in the case in which the policy had no real effect. To investigate this we look at 
pre-treatment trends by estimating the following augmented specification of equation 
(1): 
 ln	 = ∑ 	"
"#" + 	
 +  ln  +  ln +  +  +       (3) 
 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (3), ∑ 	"
"#"  allows for pre-
policy trends. The results are reported in Table 4. Column (1) replicates our baseline 
specification for JSA outflows (column (3) of Table 2) for comparison. In column (2) we 
include four pre-treatment lags and note that the coefficients on the pre-treatment 
dummies are jointly insignificant (F-test =1.88). We perform the same specifications for 
IB in columns (3) and (4) and again find no evidence of pre-treatment effects. 
Although this is reassuring, one caveat is that the individual dummy for the quarter 
immediately prior to treatment is significant at the 10% level for JSA in column (2). 
This could be due to the fact that our treatment indicator is based on the true “go live” 
date of Jobcentre Plus and there is likely to be some organizational disruption in advance 
of that date, which could spill into the previous quarter.13 This would reduce the benefits 
of the policy.  
 
                                                 
13
 National Audit Office (2008) states that “It introduces a radical shift from the former impersonal 
surroundings of the Jobcentre and Social Security offices to a modern retail-style environment and has a 
major impact on the way in which staff interact with customers and hence the quality of service provided.”  
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4.3 Inflow Rates 
Our analysis focuses on the intended Jobcentre Plus outcome to increase the 
outflow rates from benefits, but a possible side effect is that the inflow rate into benefits 
also changes as a consequence of the policy change.  For example, individuals may have 
an incentive to apply for IB rather than JSA if they perceive the new regime as 
“tougher” for JSA claimants, thereby inducing a change in size and composition of IB 
and JSA stocks and in the corresponding outflow rates. The resulting bias in the 
estimated policy effect is hard to sign. One would expect an upward bias in the 
estimated effect of the policy on the JSA outflow (and a downward bias for the IB 
outflow) if the dissuaded individuals were less motivated in their job search and more 
weakly attached to the labour force – and vice versa.  
To examine this issue directly we analyse the impact of the Jobcentre Plus on 
inflows into JSA and IB. We estimate a specification similar to equation (1) but use the 
inflow into each benefit category as the dependent variable instead of the outflow:  
 ln$%&'()* + = ∑ 	
, + 	 
 + - ln./0 +  +  +        (4) 
 
In the outflow equation we controlled for the stock of existing benefit claimants, 
and the corresponding stock in the inflow equations is the age-specific population 
(./0+. Ideally, as inflows (mostly) consist of people flowing from employment to 
unemployment, one should control for local employment on the right-hand side. But in 
the absence of high-frequency employment data at the district level we use the 
population figures as a proxy.14  
In column (1) of Table 5 we show that, on average, Jobcentre Plus had no 
significant effect on the inflows into JSA. Along similar lines, column (3) shows no 
evidence of significant average effects on inflows into IB benefits. However, when we 
look at the dynamic impact on inflows in columns (2) and (4), we find that the policy 
                                                 
14
 We assign the mid-year population estimate from www.nomisweb.com (taken on the 30th of June each 
year) to all the quarters in the year. Using interpolated quarterly population estimates (from the mid-year 
estimates) does not change our results. 
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had initially a negative and significant impact on inflows into both benefits, although 
these become positive and insignificant in the long-run.  
To address whether this could be a concern for our results because of changing 
selection, we repeat outflow regressions controlling for various lags of the 
corresponding inflows. The results are reported in Table 6, where all specifications 
include fixed effects for both district*age and age*time interactions.15 Columns (1)-(3) 
refer to JSA outflows. Although the coefficients on the inflow variables, whether one or 
four lags, are positive and significant as one would expect (since more recent welfare 
recipients are more likely to leave), our main results are robust to their inclusion. To see 
this, in column (3) we report our baseline equation (2) on the same sample as column 
(2), as some observations are lost when we condition on lagged inflows. The long-run 
effects in columns (1) and (2) are almost identical to those in our baseline specification 
of column (3), and the dynamic effects only slightly muted by the inclusion of inflows. 
Columns (3)-(6) refer to IB outflows, and all coefficients measuring the impact of policy 
are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar across specifications. In particular, the 
long-run positive effect of the policy on IB is still significant and only falls slightly from 
0.0547 (column (6)) to 0.0503 in column (5).  Hence, despite some effects in inflows, 
any change in composition arising from this does not appear to substantially affect our 
results. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate this graphically. 
 
4.4 Outflows to employment vs. other destinations 
The JSA (but not the IB) database allows us to disaggregate the outflows into alternative 
destinations, and in particular to look at outflows into work separately from outflows 
into other states (such as different benefits, training, inactivity, etc.) The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 7, where columns (1) and (2) refer to outflows into work, 
while columns (3) and (4) refer to other destinations. The broad pattern for either 
destination looks similar to the overall outflow results, although the estimated effects 
appear stronger especially in the short run when looking at outflows into work rather 
than other destinations.  
                                                 
15
 In alternative specifications, we explicitly control for the duration composition of the stock of benefit 
claimants at the end of the previous quarter, and find that the baseline outflow results are robust. 
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Negative effects on JSA outflows into both work and non-work can be 
rationalized if one takes into account the “stick” (job search monitoring) and “carrot” 
(search effort assistance) components of the interactions between JSA claimants and 
dedicated staff at Job Centres. The change in the incentive structure implied that JSA 
claimants would receive less assistance with the job search process than before, thus 
lowering their job finding rates, at least in the short run. But insofar as poorer job search 
assistance also implied less frequent contact with JSA claimants, one may expect looser 
monitoring and fewer transitions off benefits due to sanctions or discouragement (see 
also Manning, 2009, and Petrongolo, 2009, for the effects of monitoring on the time 
spent on JSA benefits). 
Another interesting point to be noted about columns (1) and (3) is that the 
congestion effect stemming from job competition by jobseekers from other age groups is 
clearly not present in the JSA outflow into other destinations, as the other age group 
could be competing for jobs in the labour market, but not for other destinations.  
Overall, the results in both specifications in Table 7 are comparable to the earlier 
results on total outflow in Table 2. This reinforces the validity of using total outflow as 
our dependent variable to proxy for outflow to work.  
 
5 Cost-benefit evaluation 
We perform a simple cost-benefit analysis. First, we consider the immediate introduction 
of the policy as the staggered roll-out would not offer much general insight into costs 
and benefits of similar hypothetical policies. We conduct two thought experiments. First, 
we assume away the transitional disruption costs and consider reaching the steady state 
immediately. This is a best case benchmark. Second, we explicitly incorporate the 
dynamic effects estimated in Figure 3 and calculate social welfare. This produces lower 
benefits because (i) there are the disruption effects causing an initial increase in the 
welfare rolls and (ii) these costs and the sunk set up costs are borne in the short-run 
whereas the benefits are in the longer-run, so discounting will further reduce the social 
present value of the policy.  
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In performing the cost-benefit we take into account (i) the savings in 
administration costs implied by the reorganization of the welfare system; (ii) the 
increase in output implied by the impact of the policy on job finding; (iii) the net 
exchequer savings which enter into welfare through a lower deadweight loss taxation 
(the rest simply being transfers); (iv) the sunk set-up costs. We abstract away from the 
leisure gains of those on welfare.  
 
5.1 Long-run Cost Benefit Analysis 
The results of the steady-state analysis are represented in Table 8. According to audit 
reports the annual running costs post-policy were £3.3bn, about £240m lower than pre-
policy as shown in rows 1-3. However, the sunk set up cost was estimated at £1.8bn 
(row 9). The steady-state impact of Jobcentre Plus on job creation is obtained from the 
long-run estimates reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3.  
Conservatively, we assume that the long-run policy impact on unemployment 
outflows is zero, as although the point estimate is positive (0.012), it is insignificantly 
different from zero. We set the long-term impact on IB exits at 0.061. Using this 
estimate, we obtain the implied steady-state fall in the IB rate (IB stock over 
population), according to a flow model of IB entry and exit, as shown in Appendix B. 
Not all of these exits will be to jobs. Using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) quarterly 
panel data 1998Q2-2002Q2 (pre-policy) we observe that 30% of IB exists are to jobs, 
while 70% of terminations transit into other benefits or out of the labour force. We 
assume these non-employment exits would be to other benefits with cost on average 
equivalent to IB. This implies that IB spells that do not terminate into employment do 
not contribute to either job creation or to benefit savings and is again a conservative 
estimate of policy benefits, as many IB exits will be to zero welfare.  
We consider three possible wage outcomes (our proxy for additional output) for 
individuals finding employment after a spell on IB: the minimum wage, the empirical 
mean wage for individuals ending a benefit spell (again from LFS), and the median 
wage in the overall wage distribution (from the ASHE 1% sample of taxpayers). The 
middle case seems the most realistic but the minimum wage and median wage scenarios 
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provide useful lower and upper bounds, respectively. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 8 
correspond to the three alternative wage outcomes considered. Row 4 reports weekly 
earnings for each wage outcome, and row 5 reports the increase in GDP obtained by 
combining wage levels with job creation resulting from IB exits. The overall GDP gains 
range between £0.5bn and £1.6bn p.a.  
Row 6 reports the net gain resulting from a reduced deadweight cost of taxation. 
This is set to 40%16 of the lower net exchequer cost arising from increased tax revenues 
and lower benefit payments. The mean IB payment in 2000 was £74.71 per week. When 
an IB recipient finds a job, this benefit saving is accompanied by a change in the tax 
revenue that depends on the earnings and the household composition of the recipient. 
We used the IFS TAXBEN17 simulation model to approximate these additional taxes 
and benefits for the 30% of IB exits who found jobs.18 Combining these elements 
produces a benefit from a lower deadweight loss between £85m and £90m.  
The sum of the three components reported in rows 3, 5 and 6 of Table 8 
represents the total annual benefit of the policy in steady state. This implies an annual 
net benefit of £900m-£2bn. This benefit needs to be compared to the sunk set-up cost of 
£1.9bn. It is clear that the policy covers the sunk costs of programme introduction in just 
over 2 years even on conservative assumptions. If we use the 3.5% social discount rate 
used by the UK government (HM Treasury, 2003) our cost-benefit analysis implies a net 
benefit of Jobcentre Plus in excess of £20bn, even on the most conservative assumptions 
(row 10). 
 
5.2 Cost Benefit Analysis with transitional dynamics 
The previous calculations are unrealistic as we are ignoring the transitional dynamics. 
We use all estimates of the dynamic effects of policy from columns (3) and (6) of Table 
3, for each quarter since the policy change. However, we cannot impose the steady-
                                                 
16
 This follows Gruber (2011). 
17
 Estimates were provided by Barra Roantree of the Institute for Fiscal Studies using the IFS tax and 
benefit micro-simulation model, TAXBEN. 
18
 We consider two household types, a single adult and a couple with two dependent children, and obtain 
the associated tax payments. We assume that two thirds of IB exits are represented by single adults, while 
the remaining third is represented by members of couples with two children consistent with our estimates 
from the LFS 1998Q2-2002Q2. 
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assumptions used to computer the steady-state rise in the number of jobs, as this would 
be equivalent to assuming that the JSA and the IB rates reach their steady state levels 
within a quarter. We thus simply obtain the out-of-steady-state number of jobs created as 
the predicted change in the benefit outflow in the relevant quarter, net of job separations 
during that quarter. With labour market churning, some of the workers who find jobs 
separate in subsequent quarters. We estimate these flows from the (pre-policy) LFS 
panel.19 For individuals who were on JSA and found jobs 2.3% lost them in the next 
quarter and for IB the number was 0.5%.20 
The three earnings scenarios, as well as the running costs, are the same as those 
considered for the steady state analysis of Table 8. However, we now need to track GDP 
and net exchequer gains or losses for each quarter since the policy change, for both JSA 
and IB recipients. With discounting, this will reduce the present value of the policy 
change because the losses are front-loaded. We maintain all other assumptions on job 
finding rates for IB and again use the empirical data in the LFS that shows that for JSA 
recipients, 70% of exits where to jobs.21  
The evolution of costs and benefits over time is represented in Figure 7. The flat, 
solid line represents the set-up costs, while the three dashed lines represent cumulative 
benefits since the quarter in which the policy turns on, for the three different levels of 
earnings. Regardless of the earnings assumptions, flow social benefits eventually exceed 
the costs so although incorporating dynamics substantially dampens down the net 
benefits (by almost an order of magnitude), it does not reverse the earlier positive 
assessment of the program. The present value of the net benefit of the reform is about 
£3-£5bn which outweighs the £2bn sunk cost. 
It is important that in the baseline case (middle dashed line in Figure 7), it takes a 
full five years after policy introduction for net benefits to exceed set-up costs. This is 
mainly because of declines in unemployment outflows during the first two years of the 
                                                 
19
 The job separation rate is obtained as the ratio of inflows into IB (JSA) to the employed population of 
working age.  
20
 These quantitative results are very similar to an analytical approximation of the change in employment 
rates during the transition to a new steady state (see Appendix B2).  
21
 For the benefit and tax simulation we assume that 70% of JSA exits who find jobs live alone, while 30% 
live in a couple with two children. For IB, about 67% of those who find jobs live alone, while 33% live in 
a couple with two children. 
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new regime. Only after five years are job entry gains sufficient to compensate both the 
initial job entry losses and the set-up cost. 
So although this is a policy which clearly passes the cost-benefit test, even a 
benign policy maker will not cover the costs of introduction for five years. 
Constitutionally, UK general elections have to be held at least once every five years (it is 
typically four years) and the tenure of a minister is usually only two years. These form 
of welfare policies are like classic investment decisions. Since a politician’s discount 
rate will be much higher than the social discount rate we should expect systematic 
under-investment, which is what we indeed generally see (e.g. Aghion et al, 2013).  
Given this, how is welfare reform ever possible? Sometimes a crisis hits, forcing 
radical reforms. But perhaps the large majorities enjoyed by Prime Minister Tony Blair 
in 1997 and 2001 enabled the government to pursue longer run policies, at least in 
welfare reform where there is substantial cross-party consensus. 
 
6 Robustness and Extensions 
6.1 Disaggregating the treatment effect by wave 
As discussed above, the roll out of the policy was introduced in six staggered waves 
across the country. Our baseline estimates exploit all waves for identification, but an 
important issue is whether there is any heterogeneity in the treatment effect across 
different waves. For example, a legitimate worry could be that the dynamic effects that 
we identify in Figure 3 may be instead due to averaging over different effects in earlier 
and later waves. 
To investigate this we estimated equation (1) separately for each wave of the 
policy roll-out. In order to avoid conflating the dynamics with wave effects we kept to a 
fixed post treatment window of one year. The results are reported in Table 9. Although 
the standard errors are larger as the number of observations is substantially reduced, the 
estimated treatment effect is remarkably stable across the different waves. Panel A refers 
to JSA outflows. Compared to the pooled effect we estimated in Table 2 of -0.015, 
wave-specific estimates range from -0.10 (wave 5) to -0.20 (wave 1) which is a 
reasonably tight bound. IB estimates in Panel B are generally higher (a range of 0.011 to 
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0.32) than the pooled estimate of 0.015, suggesting, if anything, that we might be 
underestimating the positive effect of the programme using the parsimonious 
specification of equation (1). 
We also considered alternative specifications such as restricting the comparison 
areas to those that had not been treated (Table A3), which lead to similar results. 
 
6.2 Lone Parents’ Benefits 
Besides JSA and IB, Lone Parents (single moms) on income support (LP) are the third 
big category on welfare rolls. From Table A1 we see that the introduction of job entry 
points increased bureaucratic incentives to place IB recipients into work and reduced the 
incentives to place JSA recipients into work. However, we also see that the points 
awarded to placing a lone parent in a job is the same as placing some on IB. Hence, 
might expect to see this group responding in similar ways to the policy as the IB group. 
The lone parent groups were not subject to the same pressures to look for jobs as 
the other two groups, however, so this means the policy treatment may be weaker. There 
were also a raft of other policies aimed at lone parents during the same time period 
including a large increase in the generosity of in-work benefits for lone parents (similar 
to EITC) and a voluntary job assistance programme ( “New Deal for Lone Parents”). 
These changes may contaminate our tests.  
In column (1) of Table 10 we estimate equation (1) for welfare outflows for lone 
parents and obtain an average decrease of about 1.3% after the policy, only slightly 
below the 1.5% for IB. However, when testing for the presence of pre-trends in column 
(2) based on the analogue of equation (3), we find that the joint F-test rejects the 
hypothesis of no pre-policy trends (F=3.894). Whereas we did not find evidence of 
differential pre-treatment trends for the unemployed or disabled (Table 4). We attempt to 
control for these pre-trends by including district-specific trends in column (3) and the 
joint F-test for pre-trends is now insignificant. Similar to the unemployment and 
disability results, however, we do find a negative effect one quarter before treatment, 
consistent with the impact of organizational restructuring which impedes service 
delivery even before the true “go live” date. When pre-treatment dummies are dropped 
in column (4), the coefficient on the policy variable is -0.001 and insignificant. This 
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value falls about half way between the IB and JSA effects. In column (5) we estimate a 
dynamic specification, and find an initial negative impact, which becomes positive by 
quarter 6 and is significantly positive in the long run. The long-run effect of 2.5% is 
smaller than the long-run IB effect of 6.1% but larger than the JSA effect of 1.2% 
(Figure 8).  
Overall, the treatment effects on LP appear to lie between the effects of JSA and 
IB. Just like the other benefits there appears to be an initial negative effect which we 
interpret as an organizational disruption effect. However, in the long-run there is a 
positive improvement consistent with an improvement in incentives.  Given the evidence 
of pre-policy effects, we place less weight on these results than for the other two groups, 
but the results do seem broadly supportive of our general story. 
 
6.3 Spillover Effects 
One concern with these estimates is that, in common with standard difference in 
difference approaches we do not look at general equilibrium effects of the policy. For 
example, Crepon et al. (2012) find that there can be unintended negative externalities of 
active labour market policies as the higher outflows from one benefit group take jobs at 
the expense of others, especially in depressed labour markets. We examine this idea by 
looking at outflows in neighbours to treated districts. For example, we estimated: 
 ln  = 	
 + 1&23 +  ln  +  ln  +  +  +        (5) 
 
We capture spill overs using a dummy (NBR) that is unity in the quarter when a 
district’s neighbours is treated and zero otherwise. The associated effect is captured by 
the parameter 1 and is identified by the fact that different districts’ had their first 
neighbour treated in different quarters. We define neighbouring districts as those with 
centroids within 10 km of the centroid of the main district.  
The results are shown in Table 11. The sample size decreases due to the fact that 
the estimation is based on the first five waves since all neighbours are anyway treated by 
the sixth wave. Some of them have neighbours further away. The baseline impacts on 
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JSA and IB hold true even in this sample as seen in columns (1) and (3). In column (2), 
the coefficient on &23 is positive, consistent with spillover as the unemployed find it 
easier to get jobs due to lower JSA outflows in the treated areas. The coefficient is 
statistically insignificant, however. Similarly, in column (4), the coefficient on  &23 is 
positive but insignificant.  
We investigated a large number of other specifications to examine such congestion 
effects such as looking at other bandwidths than 10km, examining the proportion of 
treated neighbours rather than a discrete dummy, weighting by distance, interacting the 
policy and spillover effects with measures of labor market rightness (using vacancy 
rates), interacting the policy effects with lagged stocks of benefit claimants, etc. In no 
case could we find evidence that the policy had significant effects on other groups.  
 
6.4 Other Robustness Tests  
We have subjected our results to many other robustness tests, some of which we note 
here. 
 
Alternative dynamic specifications. Other dynamic patterns reported in Table A4 again 
confirm the robustness of our main specifications.  
 
Weighting. A worry is that our results could be driven by a few small districts. To 
address this concern, we weight observations by the district level age-specific benefit 
caseload in a pre-policy period (1999Q3). Table A5 reports the results for equation (1) 
using this weighting system. Column (1) has a coefficient for JSA of 2.5% Dynamic 
effects reported in column (2) are instead very similar to those of Table 3. For IB, the 
average effect reported in column (3) for IB is now lower than in the unweighted 
regression. We interpret this result as showing that smaller districts seemed to be more 
affected by the treatment for IB. The short and long run effects of the treatment are 
however very similar to those from the unweighted regression. 
 
Estimates at Monthly Frequency. We are able to estimate JSA (but not IB) outflow 
equations at the monthly, rather than quarterly, frequency. The dependent variable is 
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now the monthly outflow from JSA, having included the stock at the end of the previous 
month as a control. Column (1) in Table A7 shows a policy coefficient unemployment 
outflows of -1.6%, which is very close to the baseline 1.5%. The dynamic results in 
column (2) are also similar to the baseline.  
 
Heterogeneity of the policy Effect. We investigated whether the treatment effects were 
heterogeneous in interesting ways across different groups. For example we looked at 
whether the coefficients in Table 3 columns (3) and (6) were different for welfare 
recipients of different ages, benefit durations, regions (e.g. London vs. others), and so 
on. What was surprising was that we did not find evidence for much systematic 
heterogeneity across these groups. 
 
7 Conclusions  
The UK embarked on a major change in the administration of welfare benefits for the 
unemployed and the disabled in 2001 with the introduction of Jobcentre Plus. 
Bureaucratic incentives to place the disabled into jobs were sharpened and offices were 
re-organised to be more efficient (e.g. in their use of IT). At the same time, the growth of 
the stock of those on disability benefits (IB) which had been rising for 30 years (like the 
US and other advanced countries) stopped increasing. We evaluate this policy in the 
light of a model with incentives, information and adjustment costs. We show that there 
are potentially two unintended consequences of the change. First, the relative incentives 
to place the unemployed (JSA claimants) into jobs fell. Second, the re-organization of 
the job centres can be expected to have disruption costs which reduce outflow rates 
temporarily and are an additional (and generally ignored) cost of such changes.   
We found several striking results that are consistent with the existence of 
incentive and organization effects. First, we find an increase in the outflow rates of the 
disabled and unemployed in the long-run (after two years), but the effects are much 
larger and only significant for the disabled. In the long-run outflows from disability 
benefits were 6.1% higher (and this was statistically significant) and JSA outflows 1.2% 
higher (and this was statistically insignificant). Second, there is evidence of important 
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disruption effects with outflow rates falling after policy introductions, especially for the 
unemployed. 
A quantitative simulation of the policy suggests that the short-run costs are easily 
outweighed by long-run benefits. However, the benefits of the program do take some 
time to be visible and this poses a problem for policy-makers whose time horizons may 
be much shorter than a social planner. This reveals the political economy problem at the 
heart of welfare reform: changes to the administration of the benefit system that have 
long-run benefits have significant short-run costs and this makes it hard to build up a 
coalition for change.  
There are many directions we want to take this work. To what extent does the 
increased labour supply lead to lower equilibrium wages (not just due to compositional 
changes)? Can we unbundle further some of the elements of the policy to distinguish 
incentives effects from information (which conceivably could be more important for the 
disabled)? These are areas we are actively engaged in exploring. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Incapacity Claimants of working age – 1963 -2009  
 
Source: Beatty and Fothergill (2009) 
 
Figure 2: The Staggered Roll-out of the “Jobcentre Plus” Policy 
Notes: The vertical lines indicate the six waves of the roll-out of the policy (at the start of each wave at 
least one office switched to the new regime in a district). In Wave 1 there were 32 districts, in Wave 2 
there were 27 districts, in Wave 3 there were 36 districts, in Wave 4 there were 28 districts, in Wave 5 
there were 135 districts and in Wave 6 there were 148 districts. The line shows the proportion of JSA 
claimants who were affected by the policy (i.e. each office is weighted by the stock of JSA claimants in 
the quarter that the policy was turned on. Source: Riley et al (2011) 
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Figure 3: Spatial Map of Diffusion, by Wave 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The maps show the additional districts covered under each wave. The treated districts are shaded in 
black. The first wave begun on 1st October 2001. In Wave 1 there were 32 districts, in Wave 2 there were 
27 districts, in Wave 3 there were 36 districts, in Wave 4 there were 28 districts, in Wave 5 there were 135 
districts and in Wave 6 there were 148 districts. By the first quarter of 2008, almost 100% of the country 
was covered. 
 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 
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Figure 4 Panel A: Dynamic Effects on JSA Outflow 
 
Notes: The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The dependent variable is ln 
(outflow) for JSA. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The middle line denotes the estimated 
coefficients for the dynamic specification in equation (2). The top and bottom lines denote the 95% 
confidence intervals.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 Panel B: Dynamic Effects on IB Outflow 
 
Notes: The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The dependent variable is ln 
(outflow) for IB. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The middle line denotes the estimated 
coefficients for the dynamic specification in equation (2). The top and bottom lines denote the 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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Figure 5: Dynamic Effects on JSA Outflows, with and without JSA inflow controls 
 
Panel A: No controls for JSA Inflows 
 
 
 
B: Controlling for a fourth order distributed lag of JSA Inflows 
 
Notes: These are the coefficients in Table 6 column (2) and column (3). The dependent variable is ln 
(outflow) for JSA. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The middle line denotes the estimated 
coefficients and the top and bottom dashed lines denote the 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 6: Dynamic Effects on IB Outflows, with and without IB inflow controls 
 
Panel A: No controls for IB Inflows 
 
 
 
Panel B: Controlling for a fourth order distributed lag of IB Inflows 
 
 
Notes: These are the coefficients in Table 6 column (5) and column (6). The dependent variable is ln 
(outflow) for IB. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The middle line denotes the estimated 
coefficients and the top and bottom dashed lines denote the 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 7: Cost-benefit analysis of Jobcentre Plus: Dynamic evaluation 
 
Notes: We consider an immediate roll-out of the policy. The solid horizontal line represents set-up costs 
of the policy. The dashed lines represent the cumulative benefit of the policy each in each quarter 
(increase in wage bill, lower deadweight costs of taxation and lower administrative running costs). See 
text for details. 
 
Figure 8: Comparing Dynamic Effects on IB, JSA and LP Outflow 
 
Notes: The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The dependent variable is ln 
(outflow) for IB for the top line. The middle line represents ln (outflow) for LP and the bottom line for 
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JSA. The three lines denote the estimated coefficients for the dynamic specification in equation (2), 
plotted together for comparison across the three. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Quarterly Aggregate 
Unweighted average across all 
 district-age-quarter cells 
Mean SD Mean SD Obs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
JSA Outflow 653,819 78,049 805 860 29,232 
JSA Stock (t-1) 939,267 115,578 1,156 1,650 29,232 
JSA Outflow rate  
(outflow(t)/stock(t-1)) 0.698 0.057 0.871 0.266 29,232 
JSA Inflow 648,957 58,156 799 843 29,232 
JSA Outflow to Work 288,037 61,225 353 384 29,343 
  
IB Outflow 56,166 11,267 70 106 29,232 
IB Stock (t-1) 2,045,210 356,417 2,567 4,259 29,232 
IB Outflow rate  
(outflow(t)/stock(t-1)) 0.028 0.0027 0.048 0.043 29,232 
IB Inflow 148,318 12,125 181 241 29,232 
Notes: These are descriptive statistics across all districts in our sample for the UK over the period 
1999Q3- 
2008Q2. The first two columns aggregate stocks and flows to the year-quarter level and then average 
over the 36 quarters in our sample. The last 3 columns present the unweighted average of the district-
age-quarter unit of observations used in our analysis. JSA= Job Seekers Allowance (unemployment 
insurance in the UK); IB=Incapacity Benefit, main form of disability benefit in UK. 
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Table 2: Policy Effects on outflow from unemployment (JSA) and disability (IB) benefits 
Log(Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Benefit: JSA JSA JSA IB IB IB 456787  -0.0153*** -0.0152*** -0.0152*** 0.0166* 0.0158* 0.0151* 
(0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0089) (0.0087) (0.0087) 9:;<87=  0.7249*** 0.6355*** 0.6323*** 0.2495*** 0.1462*** 0.3475*** 
(0.0095) (0.0085) (0.0100) (0.0290) (0.0195) (0.0314) 9:;<′87=  -0.0820*** 0.0072 0.0105 0.1705*** 0.2251*** 0.0502* 
  (0.0102) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0246) (0.0196) (0.0256) 
Observations 29,168 29,168 29,168 26,450 26,450 26,450 
District*Age FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Age*Time FE NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Notes: Each column estimates equation (1) with the dependent variable as the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-quarter. All regressions 
control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2 and two age groups (18-25 and 26-60). In 
columns 1, 2 and 3, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In columns 4, 5 and 6, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. Standard errors 
are clustered at the district level. “Post” is a dummy equal to 1 in the post policy period and zero otherwise.  is the lagged stock of individuals on 
benefits in the same age group (and ′ the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Effects of policy allowing for dynamics  
Dependent Variable: Log(Total Outflow) 
Quarters after (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Policy intro JSA JSA JSA IB IB IB 4567=  (t+1) -0.0234*** -0.0229*** -0.0230*** -0.0203* -0.0154 -0.0162 
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0117) 4567>  (t+2) -0.0230*** -0.0230*** -0.0230*** 0.0052 0.0047 0.0044 
 
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0115) 4567?  (t+3) -0.0249*** -0.0249*** -0.0249*** 0.0112 0.0115 0.0101 
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139) 4567@ (t+4) -0.0208*** -0.0208*** -0.0208*** 0.0254* 0.0223* 0.0220* 
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0131) 4567A (t+5) -0.0166** -0.0166** -0.0166** 0.0044 0.0045 0.0044 
 
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0143) (0.0139) (0.0139) 4567B (t+6) -0.0066 -0.0067 -0.0067 0.0370** 0.0309** 0.0298** 
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0144) (0.0138) (0.0138) 4567C (t+7) -0.0077 -0.0076 -0.0076 0.0430*** 0.0415*** 0.0403*** 
(0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0149) 4567D (t>7) 0.0117 0.0117 0.0117 0.0646*** 0.0622*** 0.0612*** 
(0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0150) (0.0144) (0.0145) 9:;<87=  0.7237*** 0.6344*** 0.6312*** 0.2589*** 0.1552*** 0.3572*** 
(0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0100) (0.0288) (0.0189) (0.0308) 9:;<87=  -0.0832*** 0.0060 0.0092 0.1808*** 0.2351*** 0.0595** 
  (0.0101) (0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0239) (0.0191) (0.0255) 
Observations 29,168 29,168 29,168 26,450 26,450 26,450 
District*Age FE NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Age*Time FE NO NO YES NO NO YES 
F Test 4.5560 4.4980 4.4920 4.6310 4.3260 4.2410 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
Notes: Post indicates the treatment effect each quarter after the policy is introduced). Each column estimates equation (2) with the dependent variable as the log of the outflow from 
benefit during a year-quarter. All regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In columns 1, 2 and 3, the 
dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In columns 4, 5 and 6, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. The last row contains the p-value of the F test for the joint significance of 
the post-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and ′ the same for the 
other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Pre-treatment Trends in Benefit Outflow 
Log(Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
JSA JSA IB IB 4567@    0.0013   0.0162 
(0.0065) (0.0109) 4567?  0.0039 -0.0135 
(0.0063) (0.0114) 4567>  -0.0021 0.0053 
(0.0068) (0.0119) 4567=  -0.0134* -0.0010 
(0.0079) (0.0123) 456787  -0.0152*** -0.0168** 0.0151* 0.0160 
(0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0087) (0.0100) 9:;<87=  0.6323*** 0.6323*** 0.3475*** 0.3473*** 
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0314) (0.0314) 9:;<′87=  0.0105 0.0105 0.0502* 0.0502* 
  (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0256) (0.0256) 
Observations 29,168 29,168 26,450 26,450 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES 
F Test   1.8830   1.3560 
p-value   0.1130   0.2480 
Notes: Post indicates the treatment effect each quarter before the policy is introduced. Each column 
estimates equation (3) with the dependent variable as the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-
quarter. All regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 
districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In 
columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. The last row contains the p-value of the F 
test for the joint significance of the pre-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district 
level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and ′ the same for 
the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Analysis of Benefit Inflows 
Log(Total Inflow) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  JSA JSA IB IB 4567  -0.0063 -0.0054 
(0.0085) (0.0072) 4567=  -0.0155* -0.0175** 
(0.0081) (0.0080) 4567>  -0.0327*** -0.0179* 
(0.0081) (0.0094) 4567?  -0.0170** -0.0068 
(0.0086) (0.0088) 4567@  -0.0267*** -0.0064 
(0.0086) (0.0093) 4567AEF  0.0164 0.0043 
(0.0129) (0.0094) 
Ln(population) 0.1441 0.1340 -0.0072 -0.0134 
(0.1278) (0.1254) (0.0610) (0.0609) 
Observations 29,096 29,096 26,727 26,727 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: All columns estimate equation (4) with the dependent variable as the inflow into benefits during a 
year-quarter. All regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 
districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In columns 1-4, the dependent variable is ln (inflow). Standard errors 
are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Dynamic Policy Effects on JSA and IB Outflows controlling for inflows 
Log(Total Outflow) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  JSA JSA JSA IB IB IB 4567=  -0.0235*** -0.0267*** -0.0254*** -0.0156 -0.0174 -0.0191 
(0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0061) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0119) 4567>  -0.0149*** -0.0176*** -0.0256*** 0.006 0.0048 0.0014 
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0068) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0119) 4567?  -0.0145*** -0.0178*** -0.0278*** 0.0089 0.0074 0.0039 
 
(0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0064) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139) 4567@  -0.0131*** -0.0119** -0.0237*** 0.0291** 0.0283** 0.0255* 
(0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0062) (0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0134) 4567A  -0.0073 -0.006 -0.0196*** 0.0075 0.0062 0.0036 
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0141) 4567B  -0.0021 0.0022 -0.0098 0.0334** 0.0312** 0.0293** 
 
(0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0140) 4567C  -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0123 0.0401*** 0.0362** 0.0363** 
(0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0099) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0152) 
4567D  0.0064 0.0028 0.0062 0.0589*** 0.0503*** 0.0547*** 
  (0.0068) (0.0057) (0.0103) (0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0145) 9:$G:H95I+=  0.4252*** 0.3765*** 
 
(0.0244) (0.0286) (0.0285) 
(0.0200) (0.0147) 
 
0.0863*** 0.0764*** 
 9:$G:H95I+>  
 
0.0773*** 
 
(0.0133) (0.0132) 
   
 
(0.0109) 
  
0.0544*** 
 9:$G:H95I+?  
 
0.0457*** 
  
(0.0130) 
   
 
(0.0137) 
  
0.0344*** 
 9:$G:H95I+@  
 
0.0827*** 
  
(0.0119) 
   
 
(0.0108) 
  
0.0359*** 
 9:;<87=  0.3679*** 0.3323*** 0.6350*** 
 
(0.0121) 
 
(0.0149) (0.0117) (0.0105) 0.3312*** 0.2775*** 
0.3761**
* 9:;<87=  0.0069 -0.0109* 0.0033 (0.0307) (0.0344) (0.0328) 
  (0.0069) (0.0059) (0.0092) 0.0493** 0.0231 0.0346 
Observations 28352 25915 25915 24402 22304 22304 
District*Age 
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: All columns estimate equation (2) with the dependent variable as the outflow from benefits during a 
year-quarter. All regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 
districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA and the 
dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the ln (outflow) for IB. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and ′ the same for the other 
age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 7: Dynamic Effects on the Outflow to Work 
Log(Outflow by destination)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  To Work To work Not to work Not to work 4567  -0.0244*** -0.0169*** 
(0.0065) (0.0065) 4567=  -0.0320*** -0.0402*** 
(0.0074) (0.0118) 4567>  -0.0163** -0.0386*** 
(0.0078) (0.0125) 4567?  -0.0375*** -0.0355*** 
(0.0090) (0.0120) 4567@  -0.0218** -0.0403*** 
(0.0090) (0.0119) 4567A  -0.0351*** -0.0253** 
(0.0107) (0.0125) 4567B  -0.0139 -0.0238* 
(0.0095) (0.0130) 4567C  -0.0187* -0.0122 
(0.0107) (0.0154) 4567D  -0.0082 0.0084 
(0.0107) (0.0145) 9:;<87=  0.6213*** 0.6262*** 0.6305*** 0.5488*** 
(0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0121) (0.0215) 9:;<87=  -0.0313** -0.0278** 0.0240** 0.0319* 
(0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0110) (0.0193) 
Observations 28,019 28,019 28,075 28,075 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Column 1 estimates equation (1) and column 2 estimates equation (2), both with the dependent 
variable as the log of the outflow from benefit to work during a year-quarter. All regressions control for 
district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In 
columns 1, 2 and 3, the dependent variable is log (outflow to work) for JSA. The last row contains the p-
value of the F test for the joint significance of the post-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at 
the district level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and ′ the 
same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Cost-benefit analysis: Steady-state evaluation 
 Re-employment earnings 
 Lower bound 
(min wage) 
Mean re-employment 
earnings after benefits 
Upper Bound 
(median wage) 
1. Administration cost in old regime (£m) 3552 3552 3552 
2. Administration cost in new regime (£m) 3314 3314 3314 
3. Annual saving in administrative costs (£m) 238 238 238 
4.   Weekly earnings (ASHE 2000) 122.00 250.0 360.0 
5.   Increase in GDP from wage income (£m) 552.17 1131.50 1629.37 
6.   Deadweight gain (£m) 113.68 204.34 121.79 
      (30% net exchequer saving)    
7.   Annual social benefit (£m) 903.85 1573.84 1989.16 
8.   PDV of social benefit (£m) 25824.34 44966.84 56833.08 
9.   Total JCP Setup Cost (£m) 1859 1859 1859 
10. Net benefit (£m) 23965.34 43107.84 54974.08 
Notes: This is a cost benefit analysis where we assume that the policy in introduced nationally and we immediately jump to the steady state effects (i.e. we ignore 
transitional dynamics). The administrative costs are from NAO (2008) and the benefits based on our econometric analysis discussed in the text.  
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Table 9: Treatment effect in individual waves 
WAVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 Baseline 
  Panel A: Log(Total Outflow) from JSA 456787 -0.0196 -0.0162* -0.0147* -0.0121 -0.0103 -0.0107* -0.0152*** 
  (0.0135) (0.0093) (0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0073) (0.0062) (0.0055) 9:;<87=  0.3253*** 0.3407*** 0.3602*** 0.3835*** 0.3916*** 0.3949*** 0.6323*** 
(0.0182) (0.0188) (0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0100) 9:;<87=  0.3373*** 0.2825*** 0.2594*** 0.2272*** 0.2248*** 0.2219*** 0.0105 
  (0.0195) (0.0187) (0.0180) (0.0210) (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0097) 
Observations 9727 12967 16207 19448 22688 25928 29168 
  Panel B: Log(Total Outflow) from IB 456787 0.0114 0.0319 0.0315** 0.0295** 0.0254** 0.0171* 0.0151* 
  (0.0279) (0.0202) (0.0159) (0.0124) (0.0108) (0.0096) (0.0087) 9:;<87=  0.2221*** 0.1511*** 0.1800*** 0.1624*** 0.1534*** 0.1626*** 0.3475*** 
(0.0493) (0.0407) (0.0355) (0.0320) (0.0308) (0.0284) (0.0314) 9:;<87=  1.1741*** 0.7325*** 0.3921*** 0.4031*** 0.4081*** 0.3202*** 0.0502* 
  (0.2219) -0.1647 (0.1307) (0.1118) (0.0980) (0.0836) (0.0256) 
Observations 7635 10435 13256 16070 18844 21637 26450 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-quarter. All regressions control for interacted district-age and interacted age-time 
fixed effects. The regressions restrict the post-treatment period to 4 quarters after each wave. The sample is a panel of 406 districts for each wave. In the upper panel 
the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In the lower panel, the dependent variable is the ln (outflow) from IB. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and ′ the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for 
each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Treatment Effect on Lone Parents 
Log(Total Outflow) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  LP LP LP LP LP 4567@  -0.0120 0.0014 
(0.0112) (0.0111) 4567?  -0.0302*** -0.0166 
(0.0103) (0.0106) 4567>  -0.0140 -0.0003 
(0.0119) (0.0117) 4567=  -0.0401*** -0.0255** 
(0.0119) (0.0121) 456787  -0.0131* -0.0270*** -0.0159* -0.0096 
(0.0067) (0.0087) (0.0095) (0.0073) 4567=  -0.0265** 
(0.0110) 4567>  -0.0067 
(0.0116) 4567?  -0.0016 
(0.0107) 4567@  -0.0020 
(0.0118) 4567A  -0.0166 
(0.0131) 4567B  0.0083 
(0.0115) 4567C  0.0211 
(0.0143) 4567D  0.0247** 
(0.0122) 9:;<87=  0.4819*** 0.4845*** 0.5529*** 0.5523*** 0.5535*** 
(0.0634) (0.0632) (0.0895) (0.0895) (0.0898) 9:;<′87=  -0.1921*** -0.1907*** -0.1304* -0.1307* -0.1302 
(0.0553) (0.0550) (0.0790) (0.0790) (0.0793) 
Observations 26,378 26,378 26,378 26,378 26,378 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES YES 
District Trend NO NO YES YES YES 
F-Test   3.894 1.757   2.137 
P-value   0.00408 0.137   0.0389 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-quarter. All regressions 
control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 
2008Q2. The dependent variable is ln (outflow) for LP. The last row contains the p-value of the F test for 
the joint significance of the pre-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and ′ the same for the 
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other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 11: Spillover effects of the policy into neighbouring districts 
Log (Total Outflows) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  JSA JSA IB IB 456787  -0.0113 -0.0123* 0.0323*** 0.0311*** 
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0106) (0.0106) JKF87  0.0150 0.0146 
(0.0092) (0.0126) 9:;<87=  0.6262*** 0.6242*** 0.3514*** 0.3522*** 
(0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0383) (0.0383) 9:;<87=  0.0099 0.0079 0.0673** 0.0683** 
(0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0297) (0.0297) 
Observations 22,688 22,688 20,374 20,374 
Notes: Each column estimates equation (5) with the dependent variable as the log of the outflow from 
benefit during a year-quarter. All regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is 
a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2006Q2. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is ln 
(outflow) for JSA. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. Standard errors are 
clustered at the district level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group 
(and ′ the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by 
year pair.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
A. Appendix Tables and Figures 
Figure A1: Dynamic Effects on JSA Outflow to Work 
 
Notes: The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The dependent variable is ln 
(outflow to work) for JSA. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. The middle line denotes the 
estimated coefficients for the dynamic specification in Table 7 Column (2). The top and bottom lines 
denote the 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
Table A1: Job Entry Target points (2002-03) 
Client Group Points Awarded 
Disabled People and inactive benefits (IB) 12 
Lone Parents (LP) 12 
New Deal 50+, 25+, Young People 8 
Other long term JSA 8 
Short term unemployed JSA 4 
Employed job-entries 1 
Area-based points 1 
Notes: The second column lists the number of points awarded to a benefit officer for placing a claimant 
from the corresponding benefit category in column (1) into jobs. 
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Table A2: Policy Effects on the JSA and IB Outflows from Offices 
Log(Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) 
JSA JSA 4567@    -0.0025 
(0.0070) 4567?  -0.0134* 
(0.0079) 4567>  -0.0182** 
(0.0086) 4567=  -0.0550*** 
(0.0099) 456787  -0.0545*** -0.0710*** 
(0.0056) (0.0117) 9:;<87=  0.7410*** 0.7413*** 
(0.0144) (0.0155) 9:;<′87=  0.1418*** 0.1421*** 
  (0.0167) (0.0227) 
Observations 48,351 48,351 
District*Age FE YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES 
F Test   17.8300 
p-value   0.0000 
Notes: The above table is limited to the JSA due to data availability. The first column estimates equation 
(1) and column (2) estimates equation (3) with the dependent variable as the log of the outflow at the 
office level from JSA during a year-quarter. All regressions control for district, time and age fixed effects. 
The sample is a panel of 695 offices districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. The last row contains the p-value 
of the F test for the joint significance of the pre-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the 
district level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and ′ the 
same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3: Treatment effect in Individual waves (dropping previous waves) 
WAVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 Stacked 
  Panel A: Log(Total Outflow) from JSA 456787 -0.0196 -0.0314 -0.024 -0.0234 -0.0373 -0.0323 -0.0333 
  (0.0135) (0.0200) (0.0129) (0.0183) (0.0129) (0.0185) (0.0073) 9:;<87=  0.3253 0.341 0.3688 0.388 0.3924 0.387 0.3816 
(0.0182) (0.0199) (0.0160) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0159) 9:;<87=  0.3373 0.2838 0.2582 0.2219 0.2127 0.205 0.2182 
  (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0174) (0.0188) (0.0194) (0.0202) (0.0181) 
Observations 9727 11943 13848 14889 15801 15817 20216 
  Panel B: Log(Total Outflow) from IB 456787 0.0114 -0.0336 -0.0015 -0.0073 -0.0052 -0.0288 -0.0118 
  (0.0279) (0.0376) (0.0245) (0.0202) (0.0228) (0.0213) (0.0137) 9:;<87=  0.2221 0.1464 0.1601 0.1575 0.132 0.1214 0.1593 
(0.0493) (0.0419) (0.0384) (0.0361) (0.0364) (0.0354) (0.0331) 9:;<87=  1.1741 0.5537 0.356 0.4087 0.4283 0.4151 0.3894 
  (0.2219) (0.1658) (0.1341) (0.1219) (0.1203) (0.1072) (0.1055) 
Observations 7635 9556 11209 12016 12594 12331 16533 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-quarter. All regressions 
control for interacted district-age and interacted age-time fixed effects. The regressions restrict the post-
treatment period to 4 quarters after each wave and drop districts treated in previous waves. In the upper panel 
the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In the lower panel, the dependent variable is the ln (outflow) 
from IB. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits 
in the same age group (and ′ the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for 
each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Specification test for dynamic structure 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-quarter. All regressions control for 
district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2008Q2. In columns 1, 2 
and 3, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In columns 4, 5 and 6, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for 
IB. The last row contains the p-value of the F test for the joint significance of the post-treatment dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Log(Total Outflow from Benefit) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
JSA JSA JSA IB IB IB 4567=  -0.0274*** -0.0260*** -0.0238*** -0.0209* -0.0190* -0.0144 
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0115) 4567>  -0.0282*** -0.0265*** -0.0240*** -0.0041 -0.0019 0.0033 
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) 4567?  -0.0308*** -0.0289*** -0.0261*** -0.0027 -0.0002 0.0058 
(0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0133) 4567@  -0.0255*** -0.0222*** 0.0079 0.0147 
(0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0121) (0.0123) 4567A  -0.0182*** 0.0011 
(0.0068) (0.0138) 4567B  -0.0085 0.0286** 
(0.0065) (0.0134) 4567L  -0.0044 0.0353*** 
(0.0066) (0.0105) 4567M  0.0001 0.0413*** 
(0.0073) (0.0113) 4567  0.0078 0.0576*** 
(0.0089) (0.0127) 9:;<87=  0.6474*** 0.6473*** 0.6469*** 0.1511*** 0.1521*** 0.1547*** 
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0177) 9:;<′87=  -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0019 0.2198*** 0.2209*** 0.2239*** 
(0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0183) 
Observations 30,788 30,788 30,788 28,074 28,074 28,074 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 
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Table A5: Robustness to Weighting by District Level Benefit Caseload 
  Log(Total Outflow from Benefit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  JSA JSA IB IB 456787  -0.0251*** 0.0091 
(0.0060) (0.0088) 4567=  -0.0288*** -0.0074 
(0.0077) (0.0089) 4567>  -0.0317*** 0.0029 
(0.0079) (0.0116) 4567?  -0.0340*** -0.0096 
(0.0080) (0.0107) 4567@  -0.0280*** 0.0188 
(0.0067) (0.0132) 4567A  -0.0283*** -0.0100 
(0.0065) (0.0128) 4567B  -0.0203*** 0.0316** 
(0.0067) (0.0140) 4567C  -0.0243** 0.0240 
(0.0095) (0.0167) 4567D  0.0031 0.0592*** 
(0.0087) (0.0148) 9:;<87=  0.5940*** 0.5898*** 0.4055*** 0.3950*** 
(0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0522) (0.0502) 9:;<′87=  0.0560*** 0.0561*** 0.0106 0.0384 
(0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0265) (0.0239) 
Observations 29,159 29,159 26,450 26,450 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES 
P-value   0.0002   0.0000 
Notes: Columns 1&3 estimate equation (1) and columns 2&4 estimate equation (2), both with the dependent 
variable as the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-quarter. All regressions are weighted by the 
particular benefit caseload in the district-age group in 1999Q3 (prior to treatment). All estimations control for 
district, time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2007Q4. In columns 1 
and 2 the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) 
for IB. The last row contains the p-value of the F test for the joint significance of the post-treatment dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the 
same age group (and ′ the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each 
quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6: Robustness to Different Age Groups (18-54 year olds instead of 18-59) 
  Log(Total Outflow from Benefit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  JSA JSA IB IB 456787  -0.0155*** 0.0143* 
(0.0056) (0.0087) 4567=  -0.0223*** -0.0109 
(0.0062) (0.0118) 4567>  -0.0241*** 0.0081 
(0.0070) (0.0119) 4567?  -0.0265*** 0.0068 
(0.0064) (0.0134) 4567@  -0.0210*** 0.0177 
(0.0062) (0.0125) 4567A  -0.0166** 0.0044 
(0.0070) (0.0140) 4567B  -0.0069 0.0276* 
(0.0067) (0.0141) 4567C  -0.0078 0.0434*** 
(0.0100) (0.0155) 4567D  0.0123 0.0515*** 
(0.0106) (0.0176) 9:;<87=  0.6303*** 0.6291*** 0.3474*** 0.3554*** 
(0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0314) (0.0309) 9:;<′87=  0.0112 0.0099 0.0502* 0.0581** 
(0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0256) (0.0256) 
Observations 29,159 29,159 26,450 26,450 
District*Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES YES YES 
P-value   0.0000   0.0094 
Notes: Columns 1&3 estimate equation (1) and columns 2&4 estimate equation (2), both with the 
dependent variable as the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-quarter. The age groups 
considered in these regressions are young (18-24) and old (25-54) as opposed to the definition of the older 
group as 25-59 year olds in all previous tables. All estimations control for district, time and age fixed 
effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from 1999Q3 to 2007Q4. In columns 1 and 2 the dependent 
variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is ln (outflow) for IB. The 
last row contains the p-value of the F test for the joint significance of the post-treatment dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level.  is the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in 
the same age group (and ′ the same for the other age groups). Time effects are a separate dummy 
for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7: Treatment effects on Monthly Outflows from JSA 
Log(Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) 
  JSA JSA 456787  -0.0162*** 
(0.0056) 4567=  -0.0251*** 
(0.0067) 4567>  -0.0205*** 
(0.0072) 4567?  -0.0215*** 
(0.0068) 4567@  -0.0187*** 
(0.0063) 4567A  -0.0217*** 
(0.0076) 4567B  -0.0064 
(0.0070) 4567C  -0.0061 
(0.0088) 4567D  0.0067 
(0.0097) 9:;<87=  0.7099*** 0.7090*** 
(0.0108) (0.0109) 9:;<87=  -0.0620*** -0.0629*** 
(0.0103) (0.0102) 
Observations 84,202 84,202 
District*Age FE YES YES 
Age*Time FE YES YES 
Notes: Column 1 estimates equation (1) and column 2 estimates equation (2), both with the dependent 
variable as the log of the outflow from benefit during a year-month. All regressions control for district, 
time and age fixed effects. The sample is a panel of 406 districts from January 1999 to December 2008. 
The dependent variable is ln (outflow) for JSA. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.  is 
the lagged stock of individuals on benefits in the same age group (and ′ the same for the other age 
groups). Time effects are a separate dummy for each quarter by year pair. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A: Data Description 
The empirics are based on three primary sources of data. First, the design of the 
policy and the list of districts covered under each wave of the rollout was provided by 
the Department of Work and Pensions. Second, data on other welfare benefits including 
the key disability benefit, Incapacity Benefit (IB) was sourced directly from the 
Department of Work and Pensions Tabulation Tool – www.tabulation-
tool.dwp.gov.uk/WorkProg/tabtool.html. This provides only quarterly data on the stocks, 
inflows and outflows of benefit recipients. The data is available for Great Britain (i.e. 
including England, Wales and Scotland) at the Local Authority Districts level from 1999 
Q3 onwards only. The 4 quarters in the dataset are defined as February-April, May-July, 
August-October and November-January. The data can be disaggregated by age and 
duration. 
The second dataset, the Job Seeker’s Allowance database was downloaded from 
www.nomisweb.co.uk. It provides monthly information from 1983 on the stocks, 
inflows and outflows of recipients’ unemployment benefits. The data is available at 
various geographical levels. We use the data at the Local Authority Districts across 
Great Britain and there are 406 districts defined on a consistent basis. The data can be 
disaggregated by age, duration as well as both.  
To be consistent across the two datasets, the monthly JSA information is 
aggregated to the quarterly level. The quarters are defined as February-April, May-July, 
August-October and November-January. In order to create a quarterly dataset using the 
monthly information, the flows of each month in a quarter were added up to get the total 
flows in a quarter. The stocks at the end of a quarter are measured as the stock in the last 
month of the quarter.  
In addition, we use the quarterly micro individual-level panel of the UK Labour 
Force Survey from 1998 to 2008 to get estimates on the household composition of 
benefit claimants, mean wages, origins of benefit inflows and destination of benefit 
leavers. The data is securely provided by the UK Data Service under Special Access 
License. The quartiles of the weekly earnings distribution were taken from the 2000 
New Earnings Survey. 
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We used digitized boundary datasets and geographic look-up tables 
corresponding to the census geography of Great Britain, provided by the UK Data 
Service. We used the boundary data in ArcGIS to illustrate the policy rollout and to 
define the neighbours of districts. 
Finally, the IFS had generously provided benefits estimates using the IFS tax and 
benefit micro-simulation model, TAXBEN. In order to estimate the net exchequer cost 
of benefit claimants, their estimates assumed that the house rent is £44 per week (the 
average among families receiving income support, jobseeker's allowance or incapacity 
benefit) and that all disposable income is spent on items subject to the standard rate of 
VAT and no excise duties. 
 
Appendix B  
B1. Steady-state change in the IB rate for the Cost-benefit analysis 
In the cost-benefit analysis we have to consider translating our estimates of flow changes 
into changes in unemployment and welfare stocks. We obtain the steady state change in 
the IB rate, based on permanent changes in the IB outflow rate following the 
introduction of Jobcentre Plus.  
Assume there are only two states, employment and IB, and denote by s the 
inflow rate from employment into IB, and by f the outflow rate from IB into 
employment. In steady state the IB rate is constant, and flow equilibrium implies that the 
IB rate (as a fraction of the total population) is given by:  
N = OO + P 
The policy has an impact on f, leaving s unaffected. The resulting change in the (log) IB 
rate is given by  Q ln N = −$1 − N+Q ln P. 
 
The implied change in the number of jobs in steady state is given by: 
 ∆V = −N	Q ln N = N$1 − N+Q ln P     (B1) 
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According to our estimates, Q ln P = 	 − $1 − W+Q ln N, where 	 is the treatment effect 
estimated by diffs-in-diff, and W is the coefficient on the log IB stock. The terms in N on 
the right-hand side of (B1) are evaluated using the actual IB rate in the pre-policy 
period. 
 
B2. Off steady-state approximation 
At each point in time the unemployment rate evolves according to  
 QNQX = O$1 − N+ − PN.																						$B2+ 
 
Solving (B2) forward one period gives:  
 N = N∗ + $1 − +N,																		$B3+ 
 
where N∗ denotes steady state unemployment and  denotes the rate of convergence to 
it:  = 1 − exp$P + O+. 
 
Using a log-linear approximation to (B3) it can be shown that:  
 Q ln N =− $1 − N∗ +Q ln P, 
 
where, as above, Q ln P = 	 − $1 − W+Q ln N, N is evaluated using the actual IB rate in 
the previous quarter and N∗ is evaluated using the (constant) pre-policy inflow rate into 
benefits obtained from the Labour Force Survey and  the time varying outflow rate from 
benefits as obtained from our estimates.  
While the steady-state result stated above is only used for IB predictions (as the 
steady-state impact of policy on the JSA outflow is close to zero), the off-steady state 
results are used to obtain predictions for both the IB and JSA rate during the transition to 
a new steady state.  
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Chapter 3: Team Incentives in the Public Sector 
 
 
 
Abstract: This chapter explores the impact of introducing team based rewards in a 
public sector organization. In my context, the new rewards switch from being 
individually based to being based in a team at the district level. Districts are organized 
into spatially dispersed sub-teams (i.e. offices within districts). In this setting, I explore 
whether it is really the case that incentives are weakened when rewards are based on 
team output rather than individual output. I find compelling evidence that this indeed 
occurs. With the introduction of team rewards, employees are more likely to free-ride on 
each other’s efforts in large teams. I find support for team size determining the degree to 
which incentives are weakened. Peer monitoring, may, however, limit free-riding in 
teams. I formalize the impact on output under two benchmark models to ascertain the 
relative impact of peer monitoring and free-riding. To investigate the model’s 
predictions empirically, I exploit the national rollout of an incentive structure in the UK 
public employment service (Jobcentre Plus) in the mid-2000s. Using difference-in-
differences estimators, I find that the team based measures dilute incentives. Consistent 
with a degree of peer monitoring, however, the dilution effect is smaller when peer 
monitoring is easier (as captured by the concentration of teams across offices within a 
district). 
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1 Introduction  
The economic theory of team incentives states that the effectiveness of group rewards 
depends on the type of the organization where it’s implemented and the characteristics 
of its production process (Dixit, 2002). The measurability of performance, the size of the 
team, the multi-dimensional nature of tasks are all elements that need to be considered in 
designing the optimal incentive structure. This chapter contributes to the literature by 
specifically examining team incentives in a public sector organization with a unique 
production process. The production in the organization is divided among teams. Each 
team is further comprised of sub-groups (or sub-teams) and each sub-group is in a 
different geographical location. The team dynamics within and across sub-teams is 
explicitly modelled. The production process is similar to a decentralized manufacturing 
process and thus is likely to have wider relevance.  
In the empirics, I study the incentives in Jobcentres in the UK. Jobcentres deliver 
active labor market programs in the UK and are part of the Department of Work and 
Pensions. The main “output” of the Jobcentres is job placements of benefit claimants. I 
investigate the effects of redesigning performance measurement from individual based 
to team based achievements in the Jobcentres. In January 2005, “Job Outcome Targets” 
were introduced. The introduction of the Job Outcome Targets (JOT) was a major shift 
in the existing explicit performance standards structure. Since 2005, the JOT scheme 
rewarded benefit officers according to job placements achieved by their team which is 
the district, in contrast to being previously based on their individual placement record. 
The unique feature of this scheme is that while the team was defined at the district level, 
each district had spatially dispersed offices in which employees worked.  
Under the new scheme, employees could potentially free-ride and the new 
incentive scheme would dilute pre-existing incentives. However, members working in 
the same location/office could also monitor each other. Such peer pressure would 
counterbalance the impact of free-riding. I formalize the degree to which peer 
monitoring affects the impact of JOT on output under two benchmark models of perfect 
monitoring and no peer monitoring, to ascertain the relative impact of monitoring and 
free-riding. 
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For identification, I exploit the staggered roll-out of Job Outcome Targets across UK 
districts and offices. I identify the policy impact by comparing the change in exit rates 
for benefit claimants in districts treated at a point in time to that in districts treated at an 
earlier or later date. Information on benefit claimants at the district and office level is 
provided by the Department for Work and Pensions.  
Empirically, I find support for the presence of peer monitoring in teams. I find 
three main results. First, and most striking, the shift from individual to team based 
incentives does dilute pre-existing incentives. This suggests that front line staff free-ride 
on their team members’ efforts. Second, the degree to which incentives are unraveled 
depends on the size of the district (aka the team size). The larger the number of district 
employees, the more the initial policy is diluted. Lastly, conditional on a district of a 
given team size, the dilution is absent in districts with employees concentrated in a few 
large offices. This effect of the concentration of employees is the result of peer 
monitoring among employees.  
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. First, the literature on team 
incentives is ambiguous as to the net effect of introducing team contracts. Holmstrom’s 
(1982) seminal contribution shows that when there are complementarities in production 
and if all the output of the team is shared among team members, team members are 
induced to free-ride. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) also show that employees have more 
incentive to shirk while working as part of a team since only a small percentage of the 
losses from shirking is borne by them.  
However, there are contexts in which individual incentives could lead to perverse 
results compared to team incentives. Individuals have less incentive to share common 
working knowledge in the absence of team incentives and reduce productivity. 
Teamwork can also help reduce individuals’ exposure to the risk of poor outcomes 
beyond their control by pooling risk at the team level and as such performance will be 
better under team contracts. Further, as Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue, team based 
incentives facilitate informal peer monitoring and pressure from colleagues to perform. 
When reward contracts are individual based, this type of external monitoring is less 
likely.  
75 
 
This chapter extends this literature by incorporating the scenario where a team 
comprises of sub-teams and monitoring is complex across sub-teams. I build a simple 
model to disentangle the effect of free-riding and peer monitoring on output. Using a 
simple functional form, I show how the marginal effect of the team based incentives on 
output varies by whether or not I allow for the presence of peer monitoring.  
Secondly, this chapter relates closely with empirical papers that have studied 
agency issues in groups such as Burgess et al (2010). They find that even in quite large 
teams, a team based incentive scheme in the UK Customs and Excise can raise the 
productivity of agency workers. In addition to free-riding, Encinosa, Gaynor and 
Rebitzer (2007) highlight how employees engage in non-contractual and informal 
interactions while working in groups. The presence of this peer monitoring 
counterbalances the free-riding effect. Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) also find 
support for mutual team learning that outweighs free-riding. This chapter addresses a 
gap in understanding public sector employee behaviour - How do nuanced features of 
the production process affect the answer to whether it is always the case that incentives 
are weakened when rewards are based on team output rather than individual output? 
Finally, this chapter contributes to a growing empirical literature that has 
highlighted how incentive systems in the public sector have aimed to align staff 
behaviour to organizational goals and to achieve higher efficiency in employee 
performance (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011, for a survey). Heckman et al (2011) 
investigate incentive structures in the US that reward officers based on measured 
outcomes to find that these systems lead to cream-skimming of program participants. 
One mechanism for these impacts has been front line staff altering their behaviour in 
response to incentive structures and performance measures. An incentives system could 
lead front line staff in government agencies to re-allocate resources which may be 
socially suboptimal (Bagaria et al, 2014). 
In section 2, I describe the institutional framework in the UK. In sections 3 and 
4, I discuss the hypotheses to test and the empirical approach. I outline the data used in 
the empirical analysis in section 5. I report the results of how the treatment impacts 
outflow from different benefit categories in section 6. I examine the robustness of my 
results to different specifications in section 7 and conclude in section 8.  
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2 Institutional Framework 
The UK has, historically, introduced performance benchmarking and linking targets to 
resources allocation since early 1980s (Propper and Wilson 2003; Bagaria et al, 2014). 
They had been designed to relate to targets embodied in the Public Service 
Arrangements (PSAs) of different government agencies22. During 2001-2008, there were 
major infrastructure changes in the delivery of public employment and benefits services. 
The change was part of the policy emphasis towards welfare-to-work initiatives23 that 
sought to make sure that those on unemployment benefits were active in the labor 
market. To ensure that they were actively seeking job opportunities and had not dropped 
out of the labor market, the government introduced conditionalities to benefit payments 
since the mid-1900s. 
As part of the organizational restructuring, since October 2001, the public job 
placement services (formerly run by the Employment Service) and benefit services (run 
by the Benefits Agency) were integrated into one single organization called the 
Jobcentre Plus. It became the key provider of job placement services and benefit advice 
in the UK. Final output in Jobcentre Plus consisted of putting people into jobs.  
A Jobcentre office provides support for people of working age in the UK by 
helping them in their job search and in claiming for benefits. A wide variety of 
customers approach Jobcentres, with different needs: young people, lone parents, 
disabled people. Different programs and activities have to be undertaken in order to 
match their different needs. Jobcentre staff are engaged in multiple activities, which are 
very difficult to measure. There is not a single indicator of overall performance 
comparable to profit in a private company. Assessing performance is thus complicated 
and requires that all the different activities undertaken are taken into consideration. In 
addition to this multi-tasking feature, lags in information availability can also exacerbate 
output measurement.  
                                                 
22
 Makinson (2000) describes the performance standards in the Employment Service, The Benefits 
Agency, HM Customs and Excise, and, Inland Revenue.  
23
 The guiding principle of welfare reform was “work for those who can and security for those who 
cannot” - DWP. 
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A striking change, as part of the Jobcentre Plus package in 2001, was the 
introduction of explicit performance targets called Job Entry Targets. Since October 
2001, Jobcentre Plus officers faced a regime called Job Entry Targets in which every 
benefit officer who helped a benefit claimant into a job was awarded a certain number of 
explicit Job Entry Target points. As opposed to the previous system of national-level 
targets for the number of job placements, under the regime of Job Entry Targets, every 
bureaucrat who placed a benefit claimant into a job was awarded a certain number of 
explicit Job Entry Target (JET) points varying by the category of the benefit claimant. 
They were designed to reflect organizational priorities towards the disabled i.e. 
Incapacity Benefit claimants against the unemployed Jobseeker Allowance claimants. 
These performance standards acted like a performance benchmark for the managers and 
mattered for the career prospects of the officers (Bagaria et al, 2014). 
Thereafter, in January 2005, Job Outcome Targets (JOT) was introduced to 
replace the JET (see Figure 2). JOT marked a clear shift in Jobcentre Plus’ approach to 
performance management and was used by managers to monitor and reward 
performance. Most importantly, as opposed to the existing JET points which were 
attributed to individual staff members on a daily basis, under JOT reward points were 
only measurable at the aggregated team level and with a lag of up to six months24. 
Reward points could no longer be attributed to individual staff. With free-riding at play, 
employees had lower incentives to help the priority group of disabled/incapacity 
claimants and higher incentives to free-ride by helping the easy-to-help Jobseekers 
Allowance claimants.  
Teams were defined at the district level. Each district comprised of multiple 
offices in different locations with different catchment areas. Figure 1 illustrates the 
structure of the Jobcentres. At the helm was the Department of Work and Pensions that 
set the mandates and targets of the Jobcentres. Below them, Jobcentres were operated by 
districts. These districts were the effective “team” for JOT reporting purposes. Each 
team comprised of multiple sub-teams or offices in different locations and of different 
                                                 
24
 The DWP Benefits system was now linked to the tax administration, HMRC, databases. This resulted in 
a lag of six months in obtaining information on benefit outflows to work due to the six month window of 
setting up a tax account upon entering employment.  
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sizes. Finally, at the lowest level, employees worked in a particular office. While the 
effort of all the employees in a district mattered for team performance, the office 
manager as well as any employee could only monitor employees and peers in his/her 
own office. For example, the office manager is more aligned to the district manager and 
has greater ability to monitor his/her own employees. Monitoring across offices was 
unfeasible. It is this feature of the production process that calls for a new theoretical 
model.  
The JOT represented a stark shift in performance measurement and management. 
The relationship between inputs and outcomes became less clear due to the team 
aggregation as well as the information lags. It is important to highlight that the 
aggregation was not a matter of administrative reporting alone. For instance, it was not 
the case that individual points were still available on the system but reported to the 
district managers at the team level. The information system changed such that individual 
level data no longer existed. Thus, while my identification strategy relies on a quasi-
experiment, this change in the very existence of information allays concerns of 
information manipulation or informal information transfers. 
Anecdotal evidence25 suggests that the JOT impacted employee motivation and 
behaviour. One District Manager described the situation as “It’s really hard with regards 
to JOT, we haven’t got a clue; we used to know with JET because you had your daily 
placing list which detailed each placement inputted the day before and you knew how 
many points each customer is worth and so you knew where you were in terms of your 
target. [..] As a manager trying to manage performance it’s really difficult.”  
 
3 Model 
Based on Holmstrom’s model (1982), the baseline marginal effect of moving from 
individual based to team based incentives in Jobcentre Plus offices is that pre-existing 
incentives will be diluted after the introduction of team based incentives. This effect 
will, in turn, depend on the team size as well as the degree of monitoring taking place.  
                                                 
25
 Based on interviews in “Qualitative assessment of Jobcentre Plus Delivery of Jobseeker’s Allowance 
and New Deal Interventions”, DWP Research Report 445. 
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Theoretically, I distinguish between two opposing factors determining the effect 
of moving from individual based to team based incentives in Jobcentre Plus. Firstly, 
team based incentives increase the probability of free-riding in a team environment. In a 
setting where team members depend on each other to produce final output, if all the 
output of the team is shared among team members, team members are induced to free-
ride. Larger the number of team members, greater is the incentive to free-ride. 
However, counteracting this is a facilitation of communication and peer 
monitoring in teams. If members of a team work in the same location and the 
organization of work is such that they are able to observe each other and if their reward 
is linked to the team performance, they are more inclined to monitor how their peers are 
performing. This can help in enforcing proper levels of effort and tackle the free-rider 
problem. The effect would be to reinforce the baseline incentives and not dilute 
incentives in an environment where peers can monitor each other. It is akin to an 
internalization of incentives. This counterbalances the free-riding effect.  
The opposing forces described above will determine the marginal effect of JOT. 
To disentangle the two effects described above, I model employee behaviour formally in 
the next subsection. I lay out the theoretical predictions to test in section 3.2 and I 
describe the empirical strategy in section 4. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Model 
I construct two models based on the extreme assumptions of no peer monitoring and 
perfect monitoring. In the first model, I assume that there is no peer monitoring in teams. 
This is the simply the Holmstrom (1982) model. Each agent works independently. In the 
second model, I assume there is perfect monitoring among workers in the same location 
i.e. same office, but not across offices within a district. The idea is similar to Mas and 
Morreti’s (2009) results where they find peer effects only among workers who can see 
each other even within the same supermarket. Under the extreme assumption of perfect 
monitoring within an office, the model describes each office to be acting like a single 
agent.  
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In reality, the truth will sit somewhere in between the two extremes. While there 
is likely to be peer monitoring only within offices, not across, the effectiveness of 
monitoring is unlikely to be the same in all offices. Larger offices may have scale 
economies of monitoring such that monitoring is stronger in large offices. The contrary 
could also be true – large offices may face increasing costs of monitoring. Thus, the 
assumption of equal and perfect monitoring in offices is only a theoretical benchmark. I 
describe the two models below along with their theoretical predictions.  
 
3.1.1 Model A: No Peer Monitoring  
The first model is intuitively based on the incentive to free-ride in teams and is exactly 
Holmstrom (1982)’s a problem. Each employee b acts like a single agent when choosing 
effort V. As Holmstrom showed, in this benchmark case, the private marginal benefit 
(ca) will be less than the social marginal benefit () since the reward is shared among all 
members of the team.  
Thus, the level of effort chosen by the individual will be lower than the Pareto 
efficient level. The chosen effort will depend inversely on the number of reward-sharers 
i.e. the total team size, a , where N is comprised of sub-teams of size &, &…&e	such 
that & = & + &…+&e. Total team output also, thus, only depends on total team size. 
Larger teams have lower output due to a higher incentive to free-ride. All employees in a 
district choose the same level of effort, irrespective of the size of the office they work in. 
There is no peer monitoring at all. 
Empirically, this model implies that the total team size i.e. the number of 
employees in a district matters in determining the impact of JOT on output (job 
placements). The JOT policy effect will vary by district size measured in terms of 
number of employees. The larger a district, the stronger are incentives to free-ride and 
hence greater dilution of incentives in the event of introduction of team incentives. The 
distribution of teams across sub-teams does not matter in this case. And, the size of 
one’s immediate office also does not matter in determining effort. 
 
3.1.2 Perfect Peer Monitoring 
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At the other end of the spectrum, I assume there is perfect and costless peer monitoring 
within an office. Monitoring is easier within an office than between offices. Intuitively, 
imagine there is an office-specific monitoring fixed cost. This upfront fixed cost of 
monitoring another office prevents employees from monitoring across offices. This fixed 
cost could simply be the telephony technology of contacting and monitoring another 
office or the transport cost of being physically present to monitor. This structure of 
monitoring implies that the employees in any office choose effort as if an office-level 
social planner was maximizing at the office level. Each office in a district, thus, acts like 
a single agent. 
 
For simplicity, I assume a standard concave production function in the district (or team) 
i.e. P$V+ = fVg 
where e is the effort chosen by team members, 0 < W < 1 and A is a positive constant 
representing technology. The only input into the production function is the effort of the 
N employees in the team; V = ∑ Vjaj . There is a cost to putting in effort. The cost is 
represented by a quadratic function: klVjm = nop .  
 
Consider a district with S benefit offices in its jurisdiction. Each office has a different 
number of employees, given by &, &… .&e. The total number of employees across the 
S offices is N i.e. & = & +&… .+&e . In other words, the total team size in the district 
is N. 
 
The equilibrium effort of an employee in office k with &" employees is a solution to the 
office social planner’s maximization problem given by (see Appendix B for details): 
qrsntu ,ntp….ntvt 	&"& fwxV"
at
 + x xV
ay

 
ay ,,z"
{
g
−xV"2
at
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The office planner’s output is the proportion of total output that is allocated to his/her 
whole office, not to its individual employees. Each employee in an office makes a 
symmetric choice of effort in equilibrium. Finally, the planner faces a cost equal to the 
total cost of effort of all its employees.  
 
The solution to the above problem (see Appendix B for details) is an effort level chosen 
by all employees in an office k given by: 
V"∗ = &" |fW& }
g $& + & +⋯ .+&e+gg 
And, the equilibrium total output in the district is: 
P$V∗+ = & +& +⋯ .+&e& 
gg f g 	W gg 
It depends positively on A, W and the ratio aupapp⋯.apa . This ratio is nothing but a 
measure of the concentration of office sizes in the district. The ratio  aupapp⋯.apa = & ∗% where HI is the Herfindahl index of office size concentration in the district.  
This suggests that output in a district is positively correlated with the 
concentration of office sizes. In fact, $n+at ≥ 0	if	&" ≥ a . In other words, conditional on 
a district team size, the marginal effect of JOT decreases if the employees in a big office 
are increased, rather than being evenly spread across all the S offices. (See Appendix B 
for solution with one, two and multiple offices). 
Intuitively, in this model, the office social planner is the decision-maker and 
hence, an office completely internalizes the negative externality of free-riding within an 
office by implementing perfect monitoring. Thus, the more concentrated a district, the 
lower is the dilution of incentives.  
Figure 1 helps illustrate how the concentration of employees matters using the 
case of two districts. Both districts depicted in the figure have the same average size 1 = 4. However, Team A (or District A) has two identical sized sub-teams (or offices), 
each with 4 employees. Team B (or District B) has one large sub-team (or office) with 7 
employees and two small sub-teams (or offices), such that the mean team size is still 4 
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employees. According to the perfect peer monitoring model, the equilibrium output will 
be higher in the case of Team B with its unequally distributed sub-teams. The workings 
are also shown in Appendix B.2.  
 
3.2 Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis, based on the prediction of the effects of moving from individual 
based to team based incentives in Jobcentre Plus offices, is that pre-existing incentives 
will be diluted after the introduction of team based incentives (JOT). As highlighted, this 
effect will depend on both the team size and the degree of peer monitoring.  
To estimate the degree to which free-riding and peer monitoring affect the 
marginal impact of JOT, the next two hypotheses are based on the models that allow for 
the presence and absence of peer monitoring. The second hypothesis which is based on 
the model of pure free-riding predicts that the total size of the team will drive a 
differential impact of the JOT policy. Districts with a greater number of total employees 
will face larger incentive dilution than districts with a small number of employees. The 
baseline effect of JOT will, thus, be reinforced in districts with more employees.  
The third hypothesis, based on the assumption of perfect and costless monitoring 
within an office, is that the distribution of employees in a team across the sub-teams 
matters for JOT’s impact on output. As the model shows, a district with a higher 
Herfindahl index of team concentration will internalize the negative externality of free-
riding to a greater extent.  The third hypothesis, thus, tests the differential impact of the 
policy by team size distribution. In more concentrated teams, the pre-existing incentives 
will be intact. 
In an earlier paper, Bagaria, Petrongolo and Van Reenen (2014) find that the 
introduction of JET earlier in 2001 incentivized the front line staff to focus on placing 
Incapacity Benefit (IB, henceforth) claimants, as was the objective of the policy. The 
reader can skip the next two paragraphs if they have already read Bagaria et al (2014). 
The authors highlight the effect of an introduction of explicit incentives for 
Jobcentre employees to move certain targeted welfare recipients into jobs and the 
consequent unintended substitution effects due to multi-tasking when employees 
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substitute effort away from less targeted groups.  They examine the impacts before and 
after a major UK policy change (“Job Centre Plus”) that shifted relative incentives of 
benefit officers to place disabled people into jobs compared with the unemployed.  
The officers in charge of helping welfare claimants find jobs had changed 
incentives with an explicit points system (illustrated in Table A1) introduced with three 
times as many points given for placing a disabled person into a job than for the 
unemployed26. Points fed into career progression. Bagaria et al find that the policy 
significantly increased outflows from disability benefits (IB), but reduced the outflow 
from unemployment benefits in the short run. In the long-run, however, both groups 
benefit but the disabled outflows rose by more (6%) than for the unemployed (1%). 
These patterns are consistent with a simple model where, given a quarterly target 
number of points and a fixed stock of inputs, the points adversely affect the job 
placement efforts and outcomes for those on Job Seeker’s Allowance claimants. Thus, 
JET is likely to have a larger impact on IB recipients than JSA recipients. Note that JOT 
was introduced in offices that were already treated with JET. 
In this chapter, I find similar policy effects of JET in section 6.1. My first 
hypothesis can thus be restated as –the introduction of JOT should have a positive 
impact on JSA and a negative effect on IB claimants. The second hypothesis is that the 
effect on JSA will increase as team size increases and vice versa for IB. Finally, the third 
hypothesis states that the JOT effect on JSA will decrease as team concentration 
increases and vice versa for IB. 
 
4 Empirical Strategy 
After describing the empirical strategy used to test the hypothesis in this section, I describe the 
data sources in section 5. I summarize my findings from this analysis for job placements in 
section 6.   
                                                 
26
 As shown in Table A1, a benefit officer was awarded fifty per cent more points if he/she placed a 
person on Incapacity Benefit into a job than a long-term JSA beneficiary, and three times more points 
relative to a short-term JSA beneficiary. 
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4.1 Identification 
I exploit the staggered roll-out of the Job Outcome Targets (JOT) across Local Authority 
Districts27 across the UK to identify its causal impact. It was phased-in in 2 staggered 
waves. The first wave was started on 10th January, 2005 in 50 offices across 18 districts. 
The second wave began in April 2006 when it was introduced in the remaining offices 
and local authority districts. Figure 2 shows a clear timeline of the introduction of JET 
as well as JOT.  
I use a difference-in-differences framework to identify the causal impact of the 
Job Outcome Targets (JOT) incentive structure. Since all districts are treated eventually, 
effectively I am comparing districts which are treated with JOT in a particular year and 
quarter to those who are treated at a later stage. Of course one concern is that districts 
were selected into treatment and were not randomly assigned into treatment. This would 
confound my causal interpretation. To examine this, I check for the robustness of my 
results to differences in pre-trends between the treated and non-treated, as discussed 
further in section 7.1.  
In my empirical analysis, I measure performance outcomes by the number of 
exits from each benefits register each quarter in each district, for the 2 benefit registers – 
Incapacity Benefit (IB) and Job Seekers Allowance (JSA). I control for the past stock of 
benefit recipients so the analysis is effectively looking at changes in the outflow rate. To 
measure the impact of JOT, I estimate standard benefit outflow equations for these two 
key groups: IB and JSA. I disaggregate this further by age groups - young and old. The 
young are defined as being aged between 18 to 24 years. The older group consists of 
people aged 25-59 years28. 
 
                                                 
27
 For local government, England is divided into areas with a two-tier structure of counties and districts 
governed by two Local Authorities, and unitary authority areas where there is one local authority. In 
England, local authorities are divided into single-tier and two-tier authorities. The Local Authorities that I 
use includes the numerous districts within counties, Greater London as well as the unitary authorities. Due 
to missing information on office sizes, I base my analysis on 338 Local Authority districts. 
28
 The specification is robust to a re-classification of age groups into 18-24 and 25-54 years.  
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4.2 Job Outcome Targets and Benefit Outflows 
I estimate standard benefit outflow equations in a difference-in-differences framework. I 
start by estimating the effect of introducing team based employee incentives in a district. 
The baseline specification is pooled across age groups and is given by equation (1): 
 
ln$+ = Wen + 	en ∗  +  +  +  +  +  +                                                (1) 
 
where  is the output measure in terms of the number of people in age group a 
leaving the benefit register in district d at time t (which is a quarter-year). I estimate 
equation (1) separately for each benefit category – IB and JSA.  en 	 denotes a treatment dummy which turns on in the quarter when the district 
had introduced Jobcentre Plus (JET). This effect has also been analysed in Bagaria et al 
(2014) and forms the pre-existing scenario. They found W was positive and significant 
for IB claimants and significantly negative for JSA.  
I compare this to the marginal effect of JOT, 	. 	 is identified by comparing 
districts which are treated with JOT, conditional on being treated with JET, in a 
particular time period to those who are treated at a later stage. In other words, 
	 = ln	$+ y 
 
My first hypothesis relates to the dilution of existing incentives due to the introduction 
of team based contracts. The hypothesis translates into 		being in the opposite direction 
of W. In other words, 	 should be negative for IB and positive for JSA. 
I include as controls the stock of people claiming benefit in age group a 
(young/old) at the end of the previous quarter,  as well as the stock of people in 
the other age group, a’ (old/young respectively), claiming benefit at the end of the 
previous quarter. This enables me to account for substitution effects between job 
applicants in the two age groups in the labor market. To control for district specific 
demographic, economic and scale factors, I include district by age fixed effects. I control 
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for time fixed effects which are quarter by year29 to eliminate any time specific factors 
that may affect the outflow from benefits. Because I have multiple age groups per local 
authority district, I also cluster standard errors at the district level. 
I estimate equation (1) for district level outcomes since the entire district was 
described as the team. The district output is, however, in essence an aggregation of 
outputs from individual offices.  To check the robustness of the findings at the district 
level, I re-estimate equation (1) for JSA30 at the office level with office fixed effects in 
section 6.4. 
It is, however, plausible that the results are driven by district managers 
endogenously choosing optimal office sizes after the policy. To address this in my 
estimations, I fix the size of teams at the pre-policy level of June 2004. However, using 
annual data on the size for the years 2004 and 2007, I check whether there is any policy 
effect on the size of an office post policy (see Section 7.3), but do not find any effects.  
 
5 Data 
I use two sources of data. The first is a rich and detailed dataset containing 
information on the number of employees in every Jobcentre office and the number of 
offices in a local authority district. The information is available for the years 2004 and 
2007 and provides rich data on local administrative units. This is proprietary data of the 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) and was obtained for research purposes.  
The second database is a set of administrative datasets provided publicly by the 
DWP. Two different panel datasets from the Department are used. The first is the 
Incapacity Benefits dataset that provides panel data on quarterly stocks and flows only at 
the Local Authority level from 1999 quarter 3 onwards. Ideally, the outcome measure 
should be job placements. But, the dataset does not contain any information on the 
reasons for leaving the benefit register. Benefit claimants could leave a particular 
caseload register for various reasons. These include finding work, increasing work hours 
                                                 
29
 For instance, there is a control dummy for the first quarter of 2000 as well as separate dummies for the 
three other quarters of 2000. Similarly for 1999-2007. 
30
 Information on IB outflows at office level is not made available by the DWP. 
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beyond 16 hours per week, claiming a different benefit, entering full time education, 
joining training programmes, defective claims and failure to sign. I expect Jobcentre 
Plus to impact the outflow to work, but, due to data limitations, I use total outflow from 
Incapacity Benefits, irrespective of destination.  
The second panel provides information on the monthly stocks and flows for those 
on Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA, henceforth) at the Local Authority as well as office 
level. It contains information at the monthly level from 1995. To be consistent across the 
two datasets, I aggregate the monthly JSA data to the quarterly level. I use the monthly 
information as a robustness check in Table A2. Due to the limited data availability, the 
period of analysis is from the fourth quarter of 1999 to the last quarter of 2007 (before 
the Great Recession set in). I have the total outflow and total stock for each of the 
benefit registers and office information in 338 local authority districts and 33 quarters in 
the final panel.  
Due to data limitations, office level analysis can only be conducted for the JSA 
group. Outflows data on IB is not available at a disaggregated level of the office.  
 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics for the outcome variable i.e. total outflow from both benefit 
categories- IB and JSA- are reported in Table 1 Panel A. The differences-in-differences 
analysis is based on data from 851 offices across 338 districts. The summary statistic of 
the district employment and office sizes is reported in Panel B of Table 1.  
 Alternatively, one can visually see the distribution of the number of offices in a 
district in Figure 1. While the full distribution is shown in the Appendix (Figure A1), 
Figure 3 plots the region below the 95th percentile of the distribution (i.e. 10 offices per 
district or less) to get a clearer picture without the extreme values. The mode is at 1 
office per district and the average is 3.97. About 25.45% of the districts have just one 
office while 24% have 2 offices.  
 To get a better understanding of the distribution of the number of employees 
across the 338 districts, Figure 4 plots the distribution of employees across districts. The 
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plot is for the number of employees below the 95th percentile i.e. 607 employees. There 
is considerable variation in the number of employees or the team size across districts. 
 Each district is made up of several offices. Figure 5 plots the histogram of the 
office sizes in the 851 offices, in terms of the number of employees in an office. Again, 
while the full distribution is shown in the Appendix (Figure A3), Figure 3 plots the 
region below the 95th percentile of the distribution i.e. 252 employees to get a clearer 
sense of the distribution. There is considerable variation in the number of employees in 
an office as well. The mean of the distribution is 68.38 while the median is about 40 
employees.  
 
6 Main Results 
In the first section below, I present the estimated marginal impact of the JOT policy on 
the outflow from benefits, and then turn to examining the effect based on team size and 
distribution. 
 
6.1 Baseline 
In Table 2 column (1) I start by estimating the pre-existing scenario, with 	 set to zero, 
where the dependent variable is the log (total outflow) from JSA with controls for JSA 
caseloads last period. All estimations in this table include district by age fixed effects as 
well as age by time period (quarter by year) fixed effects.  
I find a significant coefficient of -0.0101 for the previous JET policy impact on 
JSA, very similar31 to Bagaria et al (2014), suggesting that a district treated with the 
Jobcentre Plus experiences, on average, about a 1% decrease in total outflow from JSA 
caseload, compared to the non-treated districts.  
In Table 2 column (2) I present the first major new result. The estimated 
marginal effect of introducing team incentives under JOT on the log (total outflow) from 
JSA is positive and highly significant. It is in the opposite direction of W	(which is -
                                                 
31
 The estimate is exactly not the same in magnitude due to a slightly smaller sample because of missing 
information on office sizes. 
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0.118). This seems to support the first hypothesis that conditional on individual 
incentives under JET ( en = 1) which led to a fall in JSA outflows, the introduction 
of team incentives ( = 1) reverses this32. This is consistent with the idea that team 
incentives dilute individual incentives. 
Similarly, in column (3) of Table 2, I estimate the pre-existing scenario for the 
log (total outflow) from IB and find a coefficient of 0.143, though not significant33. 
Column (4) now includes the policy dummy for JOT. The estimated coefficient		 is 
now negative, just as expected from a dilution of baseline incentives (though it is not 
significantly different from zero). This suggests that JOT is harmful for IB claimants and 
a treated district experiences, on average, approx. 1% decrease in total outflow from IB 
as a result of introducing JOT. 
Hence, in summary I find strong evidence in Table 2 that the introduction of 
team based rewards leads to a weakening of incentives. After the introduction of JOT, 
employees had higher incentives to free-ride by helping the easy-to-help JSA.   
 
6.2 Team Size 
Next, based on the no peer monitoring model’s prediction that the number of employees 
in a district determines the marginal effect of JOT, I estimate the effect of total team size 
on benefit outflows. To test this hypothesis, I estimate: 
 ln$+ = 	[en ∗  ∗ ln	$+]+	len ∗ m + Wen + W$en ∗ln	$++ +  +  +  +  +  +             (2) 
 
where  represents the total number of employees in district d. Again, I estimate 
equation (2) for both benefit categories – IB and JSA at the district level. The key 
hypothesis is that 	, the coefficient on the triple interaction is positive for JSA and 
negative for IB. The idea is that the dilution effect of team incentives (compared to 
individual incentives) is particularly strong when district employment is larger (i.e. more 
                                                 
32
 The extent to which JOT unravels the effect of JET is discussed in the robustness section 7.5. 
33
 The estimate is exactly not the same in magnitude due to a slightly smaller sample because of missing 
information on office sizes. 
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benefit officers, so easier free-riding). Thus, IB outflows will fall by more in large 
districts and JSA outflows will increase by more. 
In Table 3, I estimate the coefficient on the interaction term,		. All estimations 
include district by age fixed effects as well as age by time (quarter by year) fixed effects, 
in addition to district, age and time dummies.  
Columns (1) and (3) replicate columns (2) and (4) of Table 2, respectively, for 
comparison. In column (2) of Table 3, the coefficient,	, is estimated to be positive (as 
predicted) and highly statistically significant. The introduction of JOT increased the 
outflow from JSA, presumably because individual incentives were diluted when group 
incentives where introduced.  
The estimate suggests that the effect of JOT on JSA increases with the team size 
in the district. Larger offices face a greater dilution of incentives. For example, for a 
district with 210 employees (the mean of the distribution of the number of employees), 
the introduction of JOT increased the outflow of JSA by 3.4%.  
By contrast, the effect of JOT in districts where there was a smaller team size 
(and hence more peer monitoring), the effect of JOT was more muted. My estimates 
suggest that in a district with 96 employees (median) the rise in JSA outflows after JOT 
was only 2.2%. The JOT policy effect, thus, increases monotonically with team size and 
becomes positive overall in teams with more than 20 employees (Figure 6A). Districts 
with team sizes less than 20 employees account for only 17% of districts and only 4.8% 
of the pre-policy (i.e. 1999 quarter 3) stock of JSA benefit claimants.  
I plot the marginal change in JSA and IB outflows when moving to team based 
JOT by office size, conditional on already being treated with JET (i.e. en = 1) in 
Figures 6A and 6B, respectively. Comparing the two, we can see that the effect of 
increasing team size is the opposite for JSA and IB.  
Column (4) of Table 3 estimates the policy effect of JOT by team size on IB 
outflows. The estimate of the coefficient 	 is negative and significant at the 5% level. It 
goes in the direction suggested by the second hypothesis. After JOT was introduced, 
outflows from IB decreased, probably because pre-existing individual incentives were 
diluted. For instance, for a district with 210 employees (mean), the introduction of JOT 
reduced the IB outflow by 1.7%.  
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By contrast, the effect of JOT in districts with a smaller team size was less 
harmful. In a district with 96 employees (median) the fall in IB outflows was only 0.8%. 
As Figures 6B and 4 show, the marginal effect of JOT on IB continues to decline with 
team size and is negative for more than two-thirds of the districts. Districts in the far left 
of the distribution where JOT preserves the baseline positive effect of JET (i.e. districts 
less than 47 employees) account for only one-third of all districts and for just 12 % of 
the pre-policy (i.e. 1999 quarter 3) IB caseload. The evidence that team incentives under 
JOT could replicate (or even add to) the positive effect of the individual incentives under 
JET for small districts (<47 employees) may suggest the emergence of information 
sharing or even risk pooling in teams under JOT. In large teams, the net effect is 
however governed by the perverse a problem (Holmstrom, 1982). 
The above estimates support the presence of free-riding in teams, confirming the 
second hypothesis. Further, I find that W i.e. the baseline JET effect by team size is not 
only statistically insignificant in columns (2) and (4), but it is also in the opposite 
direction of 	. This reconfirms that my estimates are not merely picking up scale 
effects.  
 
6.3 Team Size Distribution 
I now investigate the third hypothesis which is based on the model with perfect peer 
monitoring. To test the third hypothesis that the pre-existing incentives are intact i.e. the 
impact of JOT is lower in highly concentrated teams, I estimate the following 
specification: 
 
ln$+ = 	[en ∗  ∗ ln	$ ∗ +] +		$en ∗ + + Wen +	W[en ∗ ln	$ ∗ +] +  +  +  +  +  +  	          (3) 
 
The policy is now interacted with the product of the district size, , and its Herfindahl 
index, . This effect is captured by 		in equation (3). And the third hypothesis can be 
restated as 	 is positive (negative) if W is positive (negative).  
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The results are shown in Table 4. Columns (1) and (4) replicate columns (2) and (4) 
of Table 3 for comparison. In column (2), the effect of the distribution of the team is in 
the first row, given by the coefficient on en ∗  ∗ ln	$ ∗ +. The estimate for 
JSA shows that the effect of the team size concentration is the absence of any dilution of 
incentives. The coefficient is negative and significant. It is in the same direction as the 
baseline – negative for JSA. This is evidence in support of the third hypothesis and 
suggests that there is peer monitoring going on at the office level. It is difficult to say 
with certainty whether this is the minimum level of dilution possible. In other words, if 
there is perfect monitoring, whether this is the maximum level of output achievable. 
Even if there is lower than the maximum level of monitoring going on, the result 
definitely suggests that there is peer monitoring taking place in offices. And there is 
sufficient peer monitoring going on to preserve the pre-existing incentives such that the 
total effect of JOT is in the same direction as the negative effect of JET. Also note that 
there is no effect of team size concentration on the pre-existing JET policy. 
An equivalent specification is to separately interact the policy with the Herfindahl 
Index and the district size. This is equivalent to equation (3) since the log of the product 
is equal to the log of each separately. The result for this equivalent specification is 
shown in column (3). Though the two coefficients are no longer significant, they (-
0.0332, -0.0581) are in the same direction as the effect of -0.0117 in column (2).  
Surprisingly, comparing columns (1) and (3), the coefficient on the total district size 
reverses. It becomes negative in column (3) while it was positive in column (1). This 
suggests that the total district size and the Herfindahl index are negatively correlated and 
that the Herfindahl index is an omitted variable in column (1). Thus, the estimates 
obtained in column (1) are upwardly biased. In summary, this is evidence in support of 
the second model of the presence of peer monitoring and the strength of peer monitoring 
in preserving baseline incentives even when moving to a team based rewards system.  
In column (5), the estimated coefficient on  en ∗  ∗ ln	$ ∗ + for IB 
shows that the effect of the team size concentration is the absence of any dilution of 
incentives. The coefficient is positive and in the same direction as the pre-existing JET 
(0.0121). It is also statistically different from zero at the 10% level of significance. This 
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supports the third hypothesis and suggests that there is peer monitoring going on within 
offices.  
The equivalent specification is estimated in column (6). The estimated coefficients 
on district size and Herfindahl Index are no longer significant. Similar to the bias in the 
estimates for JSA, the estimates obtained in column (4) are upwardly biased (-0.0115 in 
column 4 compared to -0.0360 in column 6). Thus, including the Herfindahl Index is 
essential to get unbiased estimates. Peer monitoring is present and drives the marginal 
impact of JOT on team output. 
 
6.4 Extension: Office Level Regressions 
This section considers office level output. The district output is in essence an 
aggregation of outputs from individual offices.  To check the robustness of the findings 
at the district level in section 6.1 and 6.2, I re-estimate equations (1) and (2) for office 
level outcomes34. To account for common shocks or unobservables across all offices in a 
district, I cluster standard errors at the district level for the office level specifications. 
Column (1) of Table 5 estimates the pre-existing scenario when JET was in place 
(i.e. en = 1), for the log (total outflow) from an office for JSA. I find a highly 
significant negative coefficient of -0.137, similar to the district level coefficients. More 
interestingly, in column (2), I find the estimated marginal effect of JOT on the total 
outflow from JSA is positive and highly significant. The effect is almost double the 
district level effect. This again is evidence in support of the first hypothesis that the 
introduction of team incentives dilutes initial incentives. 
Next, I translate the second hypothesis to the office level. The model predicts 
that the size of one’s own office should not affect policy impacts, only the total team 
size in the district should affect incentives and output. I estimate the following equation 
at the office level for JSA: 
 
                                                 
34
 Information on IB outflows at office level is not made available by the DWP. 
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ln$+ = 	[en ∗  ∗ ln	$+] +		[en ∗  ∗ ln	$+] + 	$en ∗+ +	Wen + Wen ∗ ln	$+ + Wen ∗ ln	$+ +  + +  +  +  +                                                                    (4) 
 
where  represents the total number of employees in district d and  represents the 
total number of employees in office o. The second hypothesis states that 	 be positive 
and significant, while 	 is insignificant. 
Table 6 reports the estimates of equation (4). Column (1) replicates column (2) 
of Table 5 for comparison. Column (2) shows that the estimate of the coefficient,	, is 
positive and highly significant. This suggests that the size of the district team size 
matters even for office level outcomes. The magnitude is slightly higher than the district 
level estimates in Table 3. I also find that  W is in the opposite direction of 	. This 
suggests that my estimates are not merely picking up scale effects.  
Column (3) adds the policy interaction with the own office size  i.e. the 
number of employees in one’s immediate office. I find that after controlling for the 
district team size, own office size does not matter. This confirms the second hypothesis 
and suggests that there is perfect monitoring wherein officers in a particular office act 
symmetrically. They only take the size of other offices as given controls in their decision 
making. The result at the office level reinforces the evidence in favour of the presence of 
peer monitoring. 
 
7 Robustness 
In this section, I show different specifications to check the robustness of my baseline 
results on the marginal impact of JOT. I start by testing for pre-treatment effects that 
may be confounding the causal interpretation of my estimates. 
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7.1 Pre-trends 
I include pre-treatment dummies in the basic specification of equation (1) to test for 
the presence of selection into treatment. I estimate the following outflow equation for 
districts: 
 
ln$+ = Wen + 	en ∗  ++∑ 	en ∗ L +  + +  +  +  +              (5)       
 
For simplicity, I include four pre-dummies, but the results are robust across other pre-
dummies. In Table 7, I report the coefficients of interest 	  of equation (5) for JSA and 
IB. (The office level equivalent is reported in Table A3 of Appendix A35). Columns (1) 
and (3) replicate the baseline results for comparison.  
 In column (2), I estimate the total outflow from JSA at the district level and see 
that the coefficients on pre-treatment dummies indicate the absence of any significant 
pre-policy effects in the JOT treated districts. The p-value for the F-test of the joint 
significance of the pre-treatment dummies shows that they are jointly insignificant as 
well. Similarly, for outflows from IB, I can reject the joint significance of the pre-
treatment dummies in column (4). The estimated coefficients on the policy effect are 
slightly smaller than baseline but are in the same direction. 
 Hence, a robust result from Table 7 is that moving from individual reward 
contracts to incentive structures based on team output leads to a dilution of initial 
incentives, even after controlling for any pre-policy differences across districts.  
 
                                                 
35
 In the office level outcome specifications in Table A3, the pre-treatment dummies are significantly 
negative for the year before the policy. The pre-treatment dummies are jointly insignificant however. Most 
importantly, the estimated baseline specifications are very robust even after I control for these pre-
treatment differences in columns (2) and (4).  
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7.2 Robustness to Monthly Frequency Data 
Given data constraints, I am also able to estimate outflow equations at the monthly, 
rather than quarterly, frequency only for JSA. The dependent variable in Table A2 is 
now the monthly outflow from JSA, having included the JSA stock at the end of the 
previous month as a control. Column (2) in Table A2 shows a marginal effect of the JOT 
policy on outflows of 5.4%, which is almost double of the quarterly impact of 2.5%. The 
results for the effect of team size are also similar to the quarterly estimations in Table 3.  
 
7.3 Endogeneity of Office Size  
So far in the analysis, the size of an office and district has been fixed at the pre-policy 
level of June 2004. One concern is that an Office Manager could endogenously choose 
the size of the office under the new incentive structure. This could confound some of the 
results. To test this, I use annual data on the size of each office in the years 2004 and 
2007 to check whether there is any policy effect on the size of an office post policy.  
 Results reported in Table 8 are based on a pooled regression of the logs as well 
as levels of the office employee numbers in the years 2004 and 2007. It re-estimates 
equation (1) at the annual, rather than quarterly level, with the outcome as employee 
numbers. It includes district fixed effects as well as year fixed effects. 
 Column (2) shows that the JOT policy did not have any impact on the total 
number of employees in an office after the policy in 2007. When using the natural log of 
the number of employees in an office as the dependent variable as in columns (3) and 
(4), I again find an absence of any policy effect on the office employee numbers. This 
suggests that the size of an office is not driven by the JOT policy but is determined by 
other factors such as the size of population or density in a district. I explore this in the 
next section. 
 
7.4 Determinants of Team Size 
What determines the size of a district’s team? The answer to this matters since one could 
argue that while team size is not effected by the policy, it is fundamentally determined 
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by certain characteristics of the district. And, my estimations of the marginal effect of 
JOT are simply picking up the effect of these district characteristics.  
To test this, I first determine what characteristics of a district are correlated with 
the team size in a district. Based on data from the 2001 census in England, Wales and 
Scotland, Table 9 estimates the correlation between team size and district characteristics 
such as the size of working age population, the number of lone parent families, 
economic activity, population density, gender composition and historical benefit 
caseloads. I looked at various other characteristics of a district such as historical benefit 
exit rates, size of the student population and family composition. But, they were not 
significantly correlated with team size and have been omitted only for brevity.  
The dependent variable in column (1) of Table 9 is the absolute team size in a 
district while in column (2) it is the log of the team size – the variable that I use in 
baseline estimations. Among the variables presented in Table 9, the percentage of the 
population that is of working age is positively and significantly correlated with average 
office size in both columns. Districts with a larger working age population tend to have 
larger offices. Similarly, districts with a higher percentage of economically active labor 
force have bigger offices. The greater the share of unemployed people and smaller the 
share of self-employed people in the labor force, the district has more officers in benefit 
offices. This is intuitive as this implies a greater number of benefit claimants and job 
searchers to help. Finally, the higher the historical36 caseload of IB claimants in a 
district, the larger is the team.  
Next, I explore the robustness of the baseline results to the inclusion of the 
district characteristics. The above results suggest that the size of the working age 
population, economically active labor force, unemployment, self-employment and 
historical IB caseload in a district are correlated with the size of offices in a district. One 
concern is, however, that my estimate of the team size effect in Table 3 is not really the 
effect of the team size but the effect of the demographics in a district. If this were the 
case, my estimates would vanish if I include the interaction of the policy with these 
demographic variables. To test this, I estimate equation (2) adding the demographic 
correlates interacted with the policy. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 10 replicate columns 
                                                 
36
 The number of historical claimants is measured as the average caseload in a district before 2001. 
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(2) and (4) of Table 3 for comparison. Estimates presented in columns (2) and (4) of 
Table 10 show that the baseline results of Table 3 are robust to the inclusion of 
demographic variables.  
 
7.5 Total Policy Effect - JET and JOT 
A question that may arise is to what degree JOT reverses the pre-existing JET effect in 
large offices i.e. whether the two effects are statistically equal. The p-value for the F-test 
of equality of the two sets of coefficients $	 + 	+ versus $W + W+ in equations (2) 
and (3), is reported in the third to last row in Tables 3 and 4. In most cases, even after 
accounting for team size (Table 3), the p-value suggests that the two effects are equal for 
both JSA as well as for IB. This reinforces the baseline prediction that the marginal 
effect of JOT just overturns the pre-existing JET effects and is statistically equivalent in 
magnitude. It suggests that the JOT policy completely setbacks the incentive boost 
provided by JET to help the disabled.  
 
8 Conclusions 
I estimate the marginal effect of introducing team based performance contracts in the job 
placement services of the UK. The new system marked a major shift in the performance 
measurement and benchmarking processes. The first striking result in my empirical 
analysis is that a dilution of incentives takes places if performance measurement is based 
at the team level, instead of the individual level. Employees shift effort towards easier 
tasks and free-ride on their peers’ efforts. Thus, I see a decrease in benefit outflows from 
IB but an increase in the easy-to-help JSA outflows.  
Second, the degree to which the dilution takes place depends on the incentives to 
free-ride and monitor peers. My results show that the marginal impact of JOT depends 
on the size of the district team. The larger the team size, the greater is the incentive to 
free-ride. But, most surprisingly, the distribution of the team size across spatially 
separated sub-teams also determines policy impact. I find support for the presence of 
peer monitoring when team based rewards are introduced. In more concentrated teams 
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(across sub-teams), peer monitoring allows some of the negative externalities to be 
internalized. This counterbalances the free-riding incentives and preserves the baseline 
incentives. While it is difficult to say with certainty whether this is the minimum level of 
dilution possible, the results definitely suggest that there is peer monitoring taking place 
in offices. And there is sufficient peer monitoring going on to preserve the pre-existing 
incentives such that the total effect of JOT is in the same direction as the negative effect 
of JET. These results are robust to a wide range of controls including fixed effects and 
using different specifications.  
This chapter highlights that when a weaker incentive scheme is used in the public 
sector, output can decrease due to the incentives to free-ride in teams. In my context, the 
new team based contracts are unique in the way that multiple sub-teams combine to 
form the relevant team and the sub-teams are spatially dispersed. In this unique setting, I 
find that despite free-riding in teams, if there is sufficient peer monitoring going on 
within sub-teams then weaker incentive schemes could increase output even though 
rewards are based on team output rather than individual output.  
While this unique feature of the policy is the starting point for the model and 
analysis, the production process is similar to a decentralized manufacturing process and 
is likely to have wider relevance beyond the public sector. An example of an analogous 
set-up is of a car manufacturer that has distribution agents (for example, car distributors) 
for each region of the market and who compete against each other to achieve a certain 
benchmark (or target). Each distributor, in turn, has many local dealers working for him 
towards the target. Thus, the model as well as the analysis may be generalizable to other 
public sector as well as private sector production contexts. In summary, nuanced 
features of the production process such as the spatial organization of teams can affect the 
power of incentives, ceteris paribus.  
There are many directions I want to take this work. In particular, I am concerned 
about the general equilibrium impacts of the JOT policy on the labor market. To what 
extent does the lower labor supply lead to higher equilibrium wages? How does the 
composition of the benefit caseloads impact public finance? These are areas I am 
actively engaged in exploring. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Jobcentre Hierarchy  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Rollout of the Job Entry Target (JET) and Job Outcome Target (JOT) 
Points 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Offices in Districts 
 
Note: This histogram plots the distribution of the number of offices per district in the 338 districts. The 
upper bound used is the 95th percentile of the distribution i.e. 10 offices. 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Employees in Districts 
 
Note: This histogram plots the distribution of the number of employees per district in the 338 districts. 
The upper bound used is the 95th percentile of the distribution i.e. 607 employees. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of number of employees across Offices 
 
Note: This histogram plots the distribution of the number of employees per office in the 851 offices. The 
upper bound used is the 95th percentile of the distribution i.e. 252 employees. 
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Figure 6A: Marginal Policy Effect of JOT on JSA 
 
Note: The graph plots the marginal effect of the JOT policy on outflow rates from JSA. The 
effect is based on regression estimates of column 2, Table 3. The upper bound of team size 
used is the 99th percentile of the distribution i.e. 607 employees. 
 
 
Figure 6B: Marginal Policy Effect of JOT on IB 
 
Note: The graph plots the marginal effect of the JOT policy on outflow rates from IB. The 
effect is based on regression estimates of column 4, Table 3. The upper bound of team size 
used is the 99th percentile of the distribution i.e. 607 employees. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Outcome variables - Quarterly Aggregate 
  
Mean SD 
 
(1) (2) 
JSA Outflow 653,819 78,049 
JSA Stock* 939,267 115,578 
JSA Outflow rate  0.698 0.057 
  
IB Outflow 56,166 11,267 
IB Stock* 2,045,210 356,417 
IB Outflow rate  0.028 0.0027 
* Based on the stock at the end of the previous quarter. 
 
Panel B: Office Size variables 
  Districts = 338 Offices = 851 
  No. of Employees  No. of Offices No. of Employees  
Mean 210.41 3.97 68.38 
Standard Deviation 459.94 7.33 85.4 
Median 96 3 40 
Mode 14 1 1 
25th Percentile 31 1 15 
95th Percentile 607 10 252 
99th Percentile 1992 30 392 
Average per Office 45.40     
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Table 2: Baseline effects of JOT on JSA and IB 
Dependent Variable: Log (Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  JSA JSA IB IB 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡   0.0258**  -0.0104 
(Marginal effect of JOT policy)  (0.0103)  (0.0132) 
     7<6  -0.0101* -0.0118* 0.0143 0.0161 
(Baseline JET policy effect) (0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0099) (0.0098) 
     9:;<7=  0.6383*** 0.6379*** 0.3542*** 0.3546*** 
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0344) (0.0345) 9:;<′7=  0.0252** 0.0247** 0.0375 0.0379 
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0262) (0.0261) 
N 22,109 22,109 20,416 20,416 
p-value   0.0061   0.118 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a quarter-year. All regressions control for 
district by age fixed effects and age by time fixed effects. en  is a dummy which switches on in a district when the 
previous JET policy was introduced. en ∗   is a dummy that switches on in a district when JOT was 
introduced (this was introduced only in those areas that had switched to JET and at a later time period). The sample is 
a panel of 338 districts from 1999Q4 to 2007Q4. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is log (outflow) for JSA 
in an age group and district in a particular quarter t. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is log (outflow) for 
IB in an age group and district in a particular quarter t. The p-value row contains the p-value of the F test for the 
equality between the effect of JET and marginal JOT effect. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Effects of Team Size on JSA and IB 
Dependent Variable: Log (Total Outflow) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  JSA JSA IB IB 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤+   0.0145***  -0.0115** 
(Marginal effect of JOT 
policy by team size)  (0.0052)  (0.0057) 
     7<6 ∗ 7 ¡  0.0258** -0.0436* -0.0104 0.0444 
(Marginal effect of JOT 
policy) (0.0103) (0.0248) (0.0132) (0.0300) 
     7<6  -0.0118* -0.0103 0.0161 0.0060 
(Baseline JET policy effect) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0098) (0.0355) 
     7<6 ∗ ¢£	$¤+   -0.0004  0.0019 
(Baseline JET policy effect 
by team size)  (0.0029)  (0.0067) 
     7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤+  0.0031  0.0037 
  (0.0029)  (0.0035) 
N 22,109 22,109 20,416 20,416 
p-value 0.0061 0.429 0.118 0.603 
Note: The size variable, , used in these regressions is the total number of employees in a district. The dependent 
variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a quarter-year. All regressions control for district by age fixed 
effects and age by time fixed effects. en  is a dummy which switches on in a district when the previous JET policy 
was introduced. en ∗  is a dummy that switches on in a district when JOT was introduced (this was introduced 
only in those areas that had switched to JET and at a later time period). The sample is a panel of 338 districts from 
1999Q4 to 2007Q4. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is log (outflow) for JSA in an age group and district in 
a particular quarter t and includes controls for the stock of JSA in the previous quarter. In columns 3 and 4, the 
dependent variable is log (outflow) for IB in an age group and district in a particular quarter t and includes controls for 
the stock of IB in the previous quarter. The p-value row contains the p-value of the F test for the equality between the 
effect of JET and total effect of JOT. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Effects of Team Distribution on JSA and IB 
Note: The size variable, Q, is the 
total number of employees in a 
district and Q is the Herfindahl 
index of team size distribution in a 
district. All regressions control for 
district by age fixed effects and 
age by time fixed effects. en  is 
a dummy which switches on in a 
district when the previous JET 
policy was introduced. en ∗  is a dummy that switches on 
in a district when JOT was 
introduced (this was introduced 
only in those areas that had 
switched to JET and at a later time 
period). The sample is a panel of 
338 districts from 1999Q4 to 
2007Q4. In columns 1-3, the 
dependent variable is log (outflow) 
for JSA in an age group and 
district in a particular quarter t and 
includes controls for the stock of 
JSA in the previous quarter. In 
columns 4-6,the dependent 
variable is log (outflow) for IB in 
an age group and district in a 
particular quarter t and includes 
controls for the stock of IB in the 
previous quarter. The p-value row 
contains the p-value of the F test 
for the equality between the effect 
of JET and total effect of JOT.  
Standard errors are clustered at the 
district level.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: Log (Total Outflow) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  JSA JSA JSA IB IB IB 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤ ∗ ¥+  -0.0117** 0.0074* 
(Marginal effect of JOT policy by team 
distribution) (0.0047) (0.0043) 
 
      7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¥+  -0.0332 -0.0150 
(Marginal effect of JOT policy by Herfindahl 
index) (0.0232) (0.0152) 
 
      7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤+  0.0145*** -0.0581 -0.0115** -0.0360 
(Marginal effect of JOT policy by team size) (0.0052) (0.0498) (0.0057) (0.0349) 
 
      7<6 ∗ 7 ¡  -0.0436* -0.0371 -0.0354* 0.0444 0.0291 0.0280 
(Marginal effect of JOT policy) (0.0248) (0.0258) (0.0187) (0.0300) (0.0273) (0.0335) 
 
      7<6  -0.0103 -0.0102 -0.0098 0.0060 0.0121 0.0050 
(Baseline JET policy effect) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0355) (0.0307) (0.0356) 7<6 ∗ ¢£	$¤ ∗ ¥+  0.0008 -0.0006 
(0.0025) (0.0049) 7<6 ∗ ¢£	$¥+  0.0232 0.0045** 
(0.0181) (0.0020) 7<6 ∗ ¢£	$¤+  -0.0004 0.0494 0.0019 0.0017 
(0.0029) (0.0391) (0.0067) (0.0067) 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤ ∗ ¥+  -0.0025 -0.0030 
(0.0026) (0.0029) 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¥+  0.0190 0.0324 
(0.0222) (0.0295) 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤+  0.0031 0.0444 0.0037 0.0786 
(0.0029) (0.0476) (0.0035) (0.0655) 
N 22,109 22,109 22,109 20,416 20,416 20,416 
p-value 0.429 0.243 0.0779 0.603 0.674 0.583 
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Table 5: Effects of JOT on JSA – outflow from offices 
Dependent Variable: Log (Total Outflow) 
(1) (2) 
  JSA JSA 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡   0.0444** 
(Marginal effect of JOT 
policy)  (0.0187) 
 
  7<6  -0.0137** -0.0172*** 
(Baseline JET policy effect) (0.0067) (0.0066) 
 
  9:;<57=  0.8045*** 0.8039*** 
(0.0233) (0.0232) 9:;<′57=  0.1326*** 0.1322*** 
(0.0217) (0.0217) 
N 53,729 53,729 
Dist.*Age FE YES YES 
Age * Time FE YES YES 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a quarter-year in an office. All 
regressions control for office by age fixed effects and age by time fixed effects. en  is a dummy which 
switches on in a district when the previous JET policy was introduced. en ∗   is a dummy that 
switches on in a district when JOT was introduced (this was introduced only in those areas that had 
switched to JET and at a later time period). The sample is a panel of 851 offices from 1999Q4 to 2007Q4. 
The p-value row contains the p-value of the F test for the equality between the effect of JET and marginal 
JOT effect. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Effects of Team Size on JSA – outflow from offices 
Dependent Variable: Log (Total Outflow) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  JSA JSA JSA 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤+  0.0399*** 0.0470*** 
(Marginal effect of JOT 
policy by district team size) (0.0058) (0.0128) 
 
 
  7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤5+  -0.0095 
(Marginal effect of JOT 
policy by own office size) (0.0207) 
 
  
 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡  0.0444** -0.1230*** -0.1466*** 
(Marginal effect of JOT 
policy) (0.0187) (0.0271) (0.0297) 
 
   7<6  -0.0172*** -0.0207*** -0.0206*** 
(Baseline JET policy effect) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0068) 
 
   7<6 ∗ ¢£	$¤+  -0.0147** -0.0267* 
(0.0066) (0.0145) 7<6 ∗ ¢£	$¤5+  0.0104 -0.0145 
(0.0087) (0.0150) 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤+  0.0233 
(0.0208) 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤5+  0.0364 
-0.0238 
N 53,729 53,729 53,729 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a quarter-year in an office. All 
regressions control for office by age fixed effects and age by time fixed effects, as well as, for the stock of JSA 
in the previous quarter. en  is a dummy which switches on in a district when the previous JET policy was 
introduced. en ∗   is a dummy that switches on in a district when JOT was introduced (this was 
introduced only in those areas that had switched to JET and at a later time period). The sample is a panel of 851 
offices from 1999Q4 to 2007Q4. The size variable, Q, used in these regressions is the total number of 
employees in a district and / refers to the number of employees in a particular office. The p-value row contains 
the p-value of the F test for the equality between the effect of JET and total effect of JOT. Standard errors are 
clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Pre-treatment Trends in Benefit Outflow 
Dependent Variable: Log(Total Outflow) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  JSA JSA IB IB 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡  0.0258** 0.0530*** -0.0104 -0.0034 
(Marginal effect of JOT 
policy) (0.0103) (0.0179) (0.0132) (0.0154) 
 
    7<6  -0.0118* -0.0153** 0.0161 0.0177* 
(Baseline JET policy effect) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0098) (0.0099) 
 
    7@<6 ∗ 7@ ¡   0.0092 0.0081 
(0.0065) (0.0202) 7?<6 ∗ 7? ¡   0.0098 0.0113 
(0.0066) (0.0185) 7><6 ∗ 7> ¡   0.0072 0.0104 
(0.0078) (0.0217) 7=<6 ∗ 7= ¡   0.0124* 0.0125 
(0.0075) (0.0202) 9:;<7=  0.6379*** 0.7561*** 0.3546*** 0.3235*** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0109) (0.0345) (0.0457) 9:;<′7=  0.0247** -0.0964*** 0.0379 0.1008*** 
 
(0.0108) (0.0125) (0.0261) (0.0378) 
N 22,109 22,109 20,416 20,416 
p-value   0.367   0.963 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a quarter-year. All regressions control 
for district by age fixed effects and age by time fixed effects. en  is a dummy which switches on in a district 
when the previous JET policy was introduced. en ∗   is a dummy that switches on in a district when JOT 
was introduced (this was introduced only in those areas that had switched to JET and at a later time period). The 
sample is a panel of 338 districts from 1999Q4 to 2007Q4. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is log 
(outflow) for JSA in an age group and district in a particular quarter t. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent 
variable is log (outflow) for IB in an age group and district in a particular quarter t. The p-value row contains the 
p-value for the F-test of the joint significance of the pre-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the 
district level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Endogeneity of Office Size  
Dependent Variable: Number of Employees in an Office 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Levels Levels Logs Logs 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡   289.5959  -0.0149 
(Marginal effect of JOT 
policy)  (430.8118)  (0.8699) 
     7<6  283.6716 265.1177 0.4922 0.4931 
(Baseline JET policy effect) (388.5852) (371.7877) (0.3523) (0.3340) 
     
N 1,571 1,571 1,571 1,571 
Office FE YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of employees in an office. en  is a dummy which switches 
on in a district when the previous JET policy was introduced. en ∗   is a dummy that switches on 
in a district when JOT was introduced (this was introduced only in those areas that had switched to JET 
and at a later time period). The sample is a panel of 851 offices for the years 2004 and 2007. In columns 1 
and 2, the dependent variable is the absolute number of employees in an office.  In columns 3 and 4, the 
dependent variable is the log (number of employees) in an office. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: District Characteristics correlated with Team Size in a District 
Dependent Variable: Number of Employees in a District 
  (1) (2) 
  Level Logs 
Percentage of working age population 56.2616*** 0.1421*** 
(17.7970) (0.0521) 
Total Lone Parent Families -0.0053 -0.0000 
(0.0105) (0.0000) 
Percentage of Active Working Age population -0.0014 0.0000*** 
 
(0.0018) (0.0000) 
Percentage of fulltime employed 15.4307 -0.1194 
(28.6752) (0.0837) 
Percentage of part-time employed -1.4997 -0.0162 
(34.2117) (0.0998) 
Percentage of self employed 46.8351 -0.1645* 
(30.9013) (0.0902) 
Percentage of unemployed 62.6983* 0.1808* 
(37.2059) (0.1088) 
Historical JSA caseload 0.0820** -0.0000 
(0.0343) (0.0001) 
Historical IB caseload 0.0114 0.0001* 
(0.0112) (0.0000) 
Population Density -1.3171 0.0072 
(2.5966) (0.0076) 
Percentage of Males 78.4820* -0.1787 
  (44.1164) (0.1289) 
N 338 338 
Note: The dependent variable is the total number of employees in a district. en  is a dummy which 
switches on in a district when the previous JET policy was introduced. en ∗   is a dummy that 
switches on in a district when JOT was introduced (this was introduced only in those areas that had 
switched to JET and at a later time period). The sample is a cross-section of 338 districts in 2001. The 
district variables are based on data from the Census 2001. In column 1, the dependent variable is the total 
number of employees in a district. In column 2, the dependent variable is the log (number of employees) 
in a district. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Robustness to District Demographic Characteristics  
Dependent Variable: Log (Total Outflow) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  JSA JSA IB IB 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤+  0.0145*** 0.0167** -0.0115** -0.0253*** 
(Marginal effect of JOT policy 
by team size) (0.0052) (0.0082) (0.0057) (0.0094) 
 
    7<6 ∗ 7 ¡  -0.0436* -0.7794*** 0.0444 0.1057 
(Marginal effect of JOT policy) (0.0248) (0.2573) (0.0300) (0.1825) 
 
    7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗¢£	$¦5§¨8:©ª©+  0.0111*** -0.0022 
(0.0039) (0.0034) 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$ª«78¬+  -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$;:­®+  0.0144*** 0.0180* 
(0.0054) (0.0103) 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤9H­®+  0.0088*** 0.0025 
(0.0031) (0.0034) 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗¢£	$GK«9<8­<:7+  0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 9:;<7=  0.6388*** 0.6291*** 0.3499*** 0.3662*** 
(0.0117) (0.0125) (0.0349) (0.0396) 9:;<7=  0.0256** 0.0134 0.0328 0.0440 
(0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0265) (0.0291) 
N 22,109 20,129 20,416 17,994 
Note: The size variable,  , used in these regressions is the total number of employees in a district. The 
dependent variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a quarter-year. All regressions control for 
district by age fixed effects and age by time fixed effects. en  is a dummy which switches on in a district when 
the previous JET policy was introduced. en ∗   is a dummy that switches on in a district when JOT was 
introduced (this was introduced only in those areas that had switched to JET and at a later time period). The 
sample is a panel of 338 districts from 1999Q4 to 2007Q4. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is log 
(outflow) for JSA in an age group and district in a particular quarter t and includes controls for the stock of JSA 
in the previous quarter. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is log (outflow) for IB in an age group and 
district in a particular quarter t and includes controls for the stock of IB in the previous quarter. The district 
variables are based on data from the Census 2001. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Appendix A – Tables and Figures 
 
Figure A1: Distribution of Offices in Districts
 
Note: This histogram plots the distribution of the number of offices per district in the 338 districts.  
 
Figure A2: Distribution of Employees in Districts
 
Note: This histogram plots the distribution of the number of employees per district in the 338 districts.  
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Figure A3: Distribution of number of employees across Offices 
 
Note: This histogram plots the distribution of the number of employees per office in the 851 offices.  
 
 
 
Table A1: Job Entry Target points – Introduced in 2001 
Client Group Points Awarded 
Disabled People and inactive benefits (IB) 12 
Lone Parents (LP) 12 
New Deal 50+, 25+, Young People 8 
Other long term JSA 8 
Short term unemployed JSA 4 
Employed job-entries 1 
Area-based points 1 
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Table A2: Robustness to Monthly Frequency Data for JSA 
Dependent Variable: Log (Total Outflow) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  JSA JSA JSA 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤+  0.0171*** 
(Marginal effect of JOT policy 
by team size) (0.0038) 
 
  
 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡  0.0543*** 0.0088 
(Marginal effect of JOT policy) (0.0075) (0.0181) 
 
 
  7<6  -0.0334*** -0.0600*** -0.0609*** 
(Baseline JET policy effect) (0.0052) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
    7<6 ∗ ¢£	$¤+  -0.0084*** 
(Baseline JET policy effect by 
team size) (0.0019) 
 
  
 7 ¡ ∗ ¢£	$¤+  -0.0018 
(0.0026) 9:;<7=  0.6551*** 0.6360*** 0.6496*** 
(0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0147) 9:;<7=  0.0789*** 0.0903*** 0.0782*** 
(0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0111) 
N 66,086 66,086 66,086 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the outflow from JSA during a month-year. All regressions control 
for district by age fixed effects and age by time fixed effects. en  is a dummy which switches on in a district 
when the previous JET policy was introduced. en ∗   is a dummy that switches on in a district when JOT 
was introduced (this was introduced only in those areas that had switched to JET and at a later time period). 
The sample is a panel of 338 districts from September 1999 to December 2007. Standard errors are clustered at 
the district level. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3: Pre-treatment Trends in Benefit Outflow – Outflow from offices 
Dependent Variable: Log (Total Outflow) 
  (1) (2) 
  JSA JSA 7<6 ∗ 7 ¡  0.0444** 0.0535** 
(Marginal effect of JOT policy) (0.0187) (0.0247) 
   7<6  -0.0172*** -0.0187*** 
(Baseline JET policy effect) (0.0066) (0.0065) 
   7@<6 ∗ 7@ ¡   -0.0245* 
(0.0127) 7?<6 ∗ 7? ¡   -0.0000 
(0.0220) 7><6 ∗ 7> ¡   0.0148 
(0.0194) 7=<6 ∗ 7= ¡   0.0332 
(0.0249) 9:;<57=  0.8039*** 0.8037*** 
(0.0232) (0.0232) 9:;<′57=  0.1322*** 0.1319*** 
(0.0217) (0.0217) 
N 53,729 53,729 
p-value   0.233 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the outflow from benefit during a quarter-year. All regressions 
control for office by age fixed effects and age by time fixed effects. en  is a dummy which switches on in a 
district when the previous JET policy was introduced. en ∗   is a dummy that switches on in a district 
when JOT was introduced (this was introduced only in those areas that had switched to JET and at a later time 
period). The sample is a panel of 851 offices from 1999Q4 to 2007Q4. The p-value row contains the p-value for 
the F-test of the joint significance of the pre-treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the district 
level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B – Model 
The output in a district is given by a concave production function: P$V+ = fVg  
where e is the effort chosen by team members, 0 < W < 1 and A is a positive 
constant representing technology. The only input into the production function is the 
effort of the N employees in the team; V = ∑ Va . The cost of effort is represented 
by a quadratic function: k$V+ = np¯ . 
 
Consider a district with S benefit offices in its jurisdiction. Each office has a different 
number of employees, given by &, &… .&e. The total number of employees across 
the S offices is N i.e.& = & + &… .+&e . In other words, the total team size in the 
district is N. 
 
B.1 Case of One Office (S=1) 
The office social planner maximizes:  
qrsnuu,nup….nuvu 	&& fwxV
au
 {
g
−xV2
au
  
Since there is a single office, & = &. The First Order Condition w.r.t V is given 
by: 
fW wxVau {
g
− V = 0 
fW$&V+g − V = 0  (by symmetric V′O) 
V∗ = $fW+ g	&gg 
P$V+ = f g	W gg	& gg 
And, $n+au > 0. 
 
B.2 Case of Two Offices (S=2) 
Suppose the district now has two offices, each with size & and &. Therefore, & = & + &. 
Employees in the first office choose effort levels V as the solution to the 
maximization problem facing its social planner:  
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qrsnuu,nup….nu u 	&& fwxV
au
 +xV
ap
 {
g
−xV2
au
  
The social planner takes the effort choices of employees in the other office (V′O) as 
exogenous in its decision-making process. The First Order Condition w.r.t V is 
given by: 
&& fW wxV
au
 +xV
ap
 {
g
− V = 0 
l∑ Vau + ∑ Vap m = V u±²u 	³ aau!g´
u±²u
             (B1) 
 
 
The maximization problem facing the social planner of the second office is: 
qrsnpu,npp….npvp 	&& fwxV
au
 +xV
ap
 {
g
−xV2
ap
  
The social planner takes the effort choices of employees in the other office (V′O) as 
exogenous in its decision-making process.  The First Order Condition w.r.t V is 
given by: 
&& fW wxV
au
 +xV
ap
 {
g
− V = 0 
l∑ Vau + ∑ Vap m = V u±²u 	³ aap!g´
u±²u
             (B2) 
 
 
Solving equations B1 and B2 yields V = apau 	V . Substituting this into equation B1 
gives equilibrium effort choice of V:  
V∗ = & |fW& }
g $& + &+gg 
Using V = apau 	V, yields the equilibrium effort choice of V: 
V∗ = & |fW& }
g $& +&+gg 
Equilibrium production in the district is: 
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P$V∗+ = & +&& 
gg f g 	W gg 
 
 
Next, I compute the comparative statics of the output w.r.t. & , given a total team 
size of &.  P$V+Q& = P$V+	³ W2 − W´  4& − 2&$& + $& − &++ 
Now, $n+at ≥ 0	if	$4& − 2&+ ≥ 0 i.e. & ≥ a. Thus, output is increasing the more 
the larger offices grow i.e. the more concentrated office size becomes. 
 
Example 
To get the intuition behind the impact of office size concentration, let me illustrate 
using the case of two districts – A and B - with just 2 offices.  Suppose they both 
have the same average size 1 = a .  
However, District A has two identical sized offices, each with 1 employees. Then, 
P$V∗+! = |&2}
gg f g	W gg 
And, district B has one large office with &$> &+ employees, such that the mean 
office size in the district is still 1 employees. To get the equilibrium output in district 
B, let & = 21, where B>1. Equilibrium output was: 
P$V∗+ = & + $& − &+& 
gg f g	W gg 
 
P$V∗+ = $21+ + $21 − 21+21 
gg f g	W gg 
Now P$V∗+ ≥ 	P$V∗+! if µ$¶+p$¶¶+p¶ · ≥ 1 i.e. if B>1, which is true. Thus, 
output is higher in the more concentrated district B. 
 
B.3 General Case of S Offices 
Suppose the district now has S benefit offices in its jurisdiction. Each office has a 
different number of employees, given by &, &… .&e. The total number of 
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employees across the S offices is N i.e.& = & + &… .+&e . In other words, the 
total team size in the district is N. 
 
Employees in the first office choose effort levels V as the solution to the 
maximization problem facing its social planner:  
qrsnuu ,nup….nuvu 	&& fwxV
au
 + x xV
ay

a
ayau;zau
{
g
−xV2
au
  
The social planner takes the effort choices of employees in the other office as 
exogenous in its decision-making process. The First Order Condition w.r.t V is 
given by: 
&& fW wxV
au
 + x xV
ay

a
ayau;zau
{
g
− V = 0 
l∑ Vau + ∑ ∑ Vayaayau;zau m = V u±²u 	³ aau!g´
u±²u
             (B3) 
 
 
The maximization problem facing the social planner of the second office is: 
qrsnpu ,npp….npvp 	&& fwxV
ap
 + x xV
ay

a
ayau;zap
{
g
−xV2
ap
  
The social planner takes the effort choices of employees in the other office as 
exogenous in its decision-making process.  The First Order Condition w.r.t V is 
given by: 
&& fW wxV
ap
 + x xV
ay

a
ayau;zap
{
g
− V = 0 
l∑ Vap +∑ ∑ Vayaayau;zap m = V u±²u 	³ aap!g´
u±²u
             (B4) 
 
 
Similarly, in office k with &" employees, the maximization problem facing the social 
planner of the ¹º office is: 
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qrsntu,ntp….nvt 	&"& fwxV"
at
 + x xV
ay

a
ayau;zat
{
g
−xV"2
at
  
The First Order Condition w.r.t V" is given by: 
&"& fW wxV"
a"u
 + x xV
ay

a
ayau;zat
{
g
− V" = 0 
l∑ V"at + ∑ ∑ Vayaayau;zat m = V" u±²u 	³ aap!g´
u±²u
                            (B5) 
   
 
Solving equations B3, B4 and similarly for all the k offices, V" = atau 	V . 
Substituting this into equation B3 gives equilibrium effort choice of V:  
V"∗ = &" |fW& }
g $& + & +⋯ .+&e+gg 
And, the equilibrium total output in the district is: 
P$V∗+ = & + & +⋯ .+&e& 
gg f g	W gg 
 
The ratio aupapp⋯.apa = & ∗ »aupap + appap +⋯ . .+ apap¼	where  »aupap + appap +⋯ . . + apap¼ =
V½PbQrℎ	%QVs . Thus, P$V∗+ = . ∗ $& ∗ %+ ±p²±, where P is a positive constant.  
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Chapter 4: Fiscal consolidation during a 
depression 
 
 
 
Abstract: In 2009-10, the UK's budget deficit was about 11 per cent of GDP. A 
credible plan for fiscal consolidation was introduced in the UK over the fiscal years 
2011-12 to 2016-17. In this chapter, we assess the impact of the scale and timing of 
this fiscal consolidation programme on output and unemployment in the UK. During 
a prolonged period of depression when unemployment is well above most estimates 
of the NAIRU, the impact of fiscal tightening may be different from that in normal 
times. We contrast three scenarios: the consolidation plan implemented during a 
depression; the same plan, but with implementation delayed for three years when the 
economy has recovered; and no consolidation at all. The modelling confirms that 
doing nothing was not an option and would have led to unsustainable debt ratios. 
Under both our "immediate consolidation" scenario and the "delayed consolidation", 
the necessary increases in taxes and reductions in spending reduce growth and 
increase unemployment, as expected. But our estimates indicate that the impact 
would have been substantially less, and less long-lasting, if consolidation had been 
delayed until more normal times. The impact is partly driven by the heightened 
magnitude of fiscal multipliers, and exacerbated by the prolongation of their impact 
due to hysteresis effects. The cumulative loss of output over the period 2011-21 
amounts to about £239 billion in 2010 prices, or about 16 per cent of 2010 GDP. And 
unemployment is considerably higher for longer - still 1 percentage point higher even 
in 2019.  
 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Simon Kirby, who provided the details of 
the UK budget plans in Table 1 that underlie all the scenarios in this note, as well as 
the UK forecast baseline reported in Figures 9-11.  
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The financial crisis and resulting recession led to sharp rises in government deficits in 
almost all major industrialized countries, primarily because of falls in tax receipts. This 
was further increased by fiscal stimulus packages and emergency financial sector 
support. This in turn has led to a sharp rise in global government debt, giving rise to 
concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability. Despite this, long-term interest rates 
remain low in virtually all major developed economies outside the Euro Area, 
reflecting the fact that growth is weak and short-term interest rates are expected to 
remain low. However, many of the major economies have introduced fiscal tightening 
measures in recent years despite the widespread slowdown in GDP growth, and a level 
of GDP that remains well below that of 2007. The IMF estimates that the overall 
global fiscal position tightened by 1 per cent of GDP in 2011 (IMF, 2012a). 
Meanwhile, in the Euro Area, where countries can neither finance their deficits 
through quantitative easing nor adjust via the exchange rate, market pressures on some 
countries have been intense, and austerity programs have been introduced in a number 
of countries in an attempt to stem the rise in sovereign debt and ease the pressure on 
bond yields. 
Although the long-term government borrowing rates are at historic lows in the 
UK, it is clearly the case that over the medium to long term fiscal consolidation is 
essential for debt sustainability. The UK has announced fiscal consolidation measures 
amounting to a total of 7.4 per cent of GDP over the fiscal years 2011–12 to 2016–17. 
Table 1 details the current plans by period and instrument. 
In this chapter we assess the impact of the scale and timing of this fiscal 
consolidation programme on output and unemployment in the UK. We begin by 
using the National Institute’s model, NiGEM, to analyze the impact of the ongoing 
policy on the UK economy using the standard version of the model, which would 
reflect the impact in ‘normal’ times. However, we do not appear to be in ‘normal’ 
times but in a prolonged period of depression, which we define as a period when 
output is depressed below its previous peak. As Delong and Summers (2012), 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and others point out, the impact of fiscal 
tightening during a depression may be different from that in normal times.  
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Table 1: Fiscal consolidation plans    
Ex-ante, % of GDP 
 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 Cumulative 
Spending        
Consumption -0.44 -0.76 -0.46 -0.78 -0.81 -0.34 -3.58 
Investment -0.27 -0.28 -0.36 -0.04 -0.22 0.00 -1.16 
Transfers to households -0.09 -0.20 -0.37 -0.19 -0.03 0.02 -0.85 
Subsidies -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 
Revenue        
Direct tax, households 0.10 0.40 0.20 0.33 -0.11 0.01 0.92 
Direct tax, business 0.15 0.01 0.04 -0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.08 
Indirect tax 0.70 0.00 0.09 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.76 
        
Total 1.80 1.64 1.54 1.24 0.87 0.33 7.42 
Note: Here we define the fiscal impulse as the ex-ante expected change in revenue/spending (as a % of GDP) as a result of announced policy changes. Tax credit 
policy changes are classified as changes to direct taxes in this analysis. The impact on GDP will depend on the fiscal multipliers in each country, and cannot be read 
directly from this table. The ex-post impact on government balances will depend on the response of GDP and the endogenous response of government interest 
payments, and so also cannot be read directly from this table. 
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There are a number of channels that the differences may feed through; for each we 
modify NiGEM to take account of the differential impacts. First, there is the interest 
rate response. Under normal circumstances a tightening in fiscal policy can be 
expected to be accommodated by a relaxation in monetary policy. However, with 
interest rates already at exceptionally low levels, further tightening of fiscal policy is 
unlikely to result in such an offsetting monetary policy reaction. While quantitative 
easing/credit easing measures have been introduced, the effects of these measures are 
also limited by low interest rates on ‘risk-free’ assets. It is less clear that monetary 
easing measures have a significant impact on the risk premia attached to assets that 
bear a greater risk of default.  
Second, during a downturn, when unemployment is high and job security 
low, a greater percentage of households and firms are likely to find themselves 
liquidity constrained. This is likely to be particularly acute when the downturn is 
driven by an impaired banking system, as lending conditions will tighten beyond 
what would be expected in a normal downturn. There is less scope to smooth 
consumption in response to short-term income losses through an adjustment in 
savings.  
Finally, long spells of depressed output and high unemployment can lead to 
‘hysteresis’ which keeps the productive capacity of the economy persistently or even 
permanently lower (for example through the ‘scarring’ effect of unemployment 
which we discuss below). The economy may converge to the steady state levels of 
output and employment in the very long run, but in the medium term output levels 
could be substantially lower due to hysteresis effects. The time the economy takes to 
converge to the long-run steady state is also prolonged.   
In this note we consider the potential impact on the economy, both in the short 
and long term, of postponing the planned consolidation measures that were introduced 
from 2011–12 onwards until the UK economy has emerged from the current period of 
depression and the output gap has narrowed significantly. While our analysis is not 
strictly dependent on the length of this delay, NiGEM-based estimates suggest that, in 
the absence of fiscal tightening, the output gap in the UK would be approaching 
balance by 2014. In the absence of deeper and more prolonged financial distress driven 
by events in the Euro Area, we would then have anticipated a ‘normal’ response to the 
fiscal consolidation measures after 2014, rather than the rather larger response that 
may result in the current period of depressed output and high unemployment.  
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In order to decompose the channels of transmission, we present four separate 
scenarios. In the first scenario, we illustrate the expected impact on output and 
employment of the fiscal programme detailed in table 1, had it been introduced in 
normal times, rather than during a period of depression. We then consider, one at a 
time, three channels that may differ during a period of depression: the impacts of an 
impaired interest rate channel; the impacts of heightened liquidity constraints; and 
the impacts of hysteresis, all of which exacerbate the impact of the consolidation 
programme on output and unemployment. In the final section, we construct a 
combined scenario that cumulates the effects of all three channels, and illustrates our 
estimate of the impact of the consolidation programme as it has been put forward, 
during a period of depression with limited downward flexibility in interest rates, 
heightened liquidity constraints and rising levels of long-term unemployment. We 
compare this to a scenario with no fiscal consolidation, and one where the same 
consolidation programme is introduced with a delay (2014–20), when the economy is 
expected to have returned to normal conditions. This allows us to estimate the 
cumulative impact that may be associated with the early introduction of the 
consolidation programme.  
 
1 Scenario I - Impact of fiscal programme in normal times  
Fiscal multipliers37 are not uniform either across countries (e.g. Ilzetzki et al., 2010), 
across time or across instruments (e.g. tax vs. spending). Barrell et al. (2012) 
provides an overview of NiGEM and compares estimates of fiscal multipliers across 
instruments for a set of seventeen OECD economies. In general, spending multipliers 
tend to be larger than tax multipliers in the first year, as tax adjustments are partially 
offset through savings and feed in more gradually. For the UK, they find a direct 
spending multiplier of about 0.5–0.7 per cent in the first year, while tax multipliers 
averaged about 0.1–0.2 per cent38. Much of the current consolidation plan is 
spending based, and so can be expected to have a more significant impact on GDP in 
the short term.  
                                                 
37
 The fiscal multiplier is generally defined as the expected impact on output in the first year, 
following a policy innovation that raises spending or cuts taxes by 1 per cent of GDP (ex ante). 
38
 
Fiscal multipliers tend to be less than 1, primarily due to import leakages, the anticipated 
monetary policy response, and an offset through the consumption channel through savings. 
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In Figure 1, we illustrate the impact on the level of GDP and the 
unemployment rate that we would expect in response to the current fiscal programme 
outlined in table 1, were it introduced in ‘normal’ times, e.g. when the output gap is 
close to balance and unemployment is close to its equilibrium level. We hold the 
exchange rate fixed in this scenario, as exchange rate behavior depends not just on the 
policy adopted in the UK, but on the relative stance of UK fiscal policy in a global 
context. Where many major economies are consolidating simultaneously, the 
assumption of a neutral impact on the exchange rate is probably justified. If the UK is 
tightening relatively more than its trading partners, we would expect to see a modest 
depreciation of the exchange rate, whereas if it is tightening relatively less than its 
partners the exchange rate would appreciate, holding all other risk factors constant.  
 
Figure 1: Impact of fiscal consolidation in normal times 
 
Note: Impact of policies described in table 1 on the level of GDP and the unemployment rate, if 
introduced when the output gap is close to 0 and the unemployment rate is close to its long-run 
equilibrium.   
Source: NiGEM simulations 
 
We would expect the level of output to decline by 0.4 per cent relative to the baseline 
in the first year, reaching a peak of 2.3 per cent below base after six years. Over the 
longer term, we would expect both GDP and unemployment to return to levels that 
would have been anticipated in the absence of fiscal consolidation. The normal 
cyclical behavior of the model suggests that output would rise slightly above base 
and unemployment fall slightly below base after year 11, although these effects 
would not persist over the longer term. The loss of government investment can be 
expected to have a negative impact on the productive capacity of the economy in the 
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longer term, but these effects are relatively small. Unemployment is brought back 
towards base levels as output recovers, and through an adjustment in real wages. 
In general, a fiscal tightening can be expected to be accompanied by a monetary 
loosening, as an inflation targeting central bank maintains a given inflation target with 
lower rates of interest. However, not all fiscal instruments have the same impact on 
inflation. One of the instruments employed in the fiscal consolidation programme 
outlined in table 1 is the indirect tax, or VAT, rate. A rise in the VAT rate will initially 
put upward pressure on inflation, as it is a direct shock to the price level. This may 
induce an inflation targeting central bank to raise interest rates in the short term. After 
the first year or so, the jump in the price level would fall out of the inflation rate, and we 
would expect inflation to be somewhat below what it would have been in the absence of 
the VAT rise, allowing a lower interest rate over the medium term.  
Our preliminary scenario reflecting the response in ‘normal’ times allows an 
endogenous response in short-term interest rates39. In normal times, the fiscal 
programme described in table 1 would initially put upward pressure on interest rates, 
as the indirect tax rate rises by 250 basis points, with a direct impact on inflation in 
the first year of the shock. As the effects of the VAT rise dissipate, this is followed 
by an extended period of short-term policy interest rates below base. With forward-
looking financial markets, the long-term interest rate, which determines the 
borrowing costs of firms for investment, is driven by the expected path of short-term 
interest rates over a 10-year forward horizon. As such, despite the initial rise in the 
short-term rates, long-term interest rates fall immediately, stimulating investment and 
offsetting part of the fiscal contraction. The expected impact on short-term and long-
term interest rates in response to the policy, were it to be introduced during ‘normal’ 
times, is illustrated in Figure 2. Long-term interest rates would be expected to fall by 
about 150 basis points for an extended period, allowing a strong boost to investment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 The policy rule followed is the standard two-pillar rule in NiGEM, which is described in Barrell et 
al. (2012). 
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Figure 2: Impact of fiscal consolidation on interest rates in normal times 
 
Note: Impact of policies described in Table 1 on interest rates, if introduced in ‘normal’ times. Short-
term interest rates are determined by a central bank policy rule that targets inflation; long-term interest 
rates allow for ‘rational’ or out-turn consistent expectations in financial markets.  
Source: NiGEM simulations 
 
2 Scenario II - Impact of fiscal programme in a depressed 
economy (Impaired interest rate channel) 
In the previous section we considered the impact of a fiscal consolidation in normal 
times, and demonstrated that, under normal circumstances, the consolidation 
programme detailed in table 1 would be expected to reduce long-term interest rates 
by about 150 basis points for several years. However, when interest rates are close to 
zero, their downward flexibility may be restricted (the ‘zero lower bound’). With no 
offsetting stimulus from lower interest rates, the impact of the fiscal consolidation 
programme on GDP would be somewhat higher. Ten-year government bond yields in 
the UK are not at zero, but are exceptionally low, suggesting that there may be little 
scope for further reductions. If we hold long-term interest rates fixed, rather than 
allowing them to decline as in the first scenario, the negative effects on output and 
unemployment would be amplified. Figures 3 and 4 compare the impact on GDP and 
the unemployment rate under normal times with an endogenous interest rate 
response, to the same consolidation programme in an environment where there is no 
downward flexibility of interest rates. The impact on GDP would be about 1½ per 
cent greater after four years if the interest rate adjustment channel is impaired, while 
the unemployment rate would be expected to rise by a further ¾ percentage point. 
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Figure 3: Impact of an impaired interest rate adjustment on GDP 
 
Note: Impact on the level of GDP from Figure 1 and under the same scenario with the interest rate 
adjustment impaired.   
Source: NiGEM simulations 
 
 
Figure 4: Impact of an impaired interest rate adjustment on unemployment rate 
 
Note: Impact on the unemployment rate from Figure 1 and under the same scenario with the interest 
rate adjustment impaired. 
Source: NiGEM simulations 
 
3 Scenario III - Heightened liquidity constraints 
In the presence of perfect capital markets and forward-looking consumers with 
perfect foresight, households will smooth their consumption path over time, and 
consumer spending will be largely invariant to the state of the economy or temporary 
fiscal innovations. In the extreme example of a fully Ricardian world, the fiscal 
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multiplier is effectively zero, as fiscal policy will simply be offset by private sector 
adjustments to savings behavior. However, at any given time, some fraction of the 
population and of firms is liquidity constrained; that is, they have little or no access 
to borrowing, so that their current spending is largely restrained by their current 
income. In the first scenario, we make the assumption that savings behavior and the 
number of liquidity constrained consumers and businesses are as in normal times. 
However, in a prolonged period of depressed activity, this is unlikely to be the case, 
especially when the downturn has at its roots an impaired banking system. In this 
section we consider the effects of an increase in the share of consumers and firms 
that are liquidity constrained. We operationalize this effect in the NiGEM model 
through an adjustment to the short-term income elasticity of consumption and 
investment. If liquidity constraints are not important, households and firms can 
borrow when incomes or profits are low in order to smooth their spending path. In 
this case, the path of consumption and investment will be less sensitive to short-term 
fluctuations in income or profits. However, when liquidity constraints are high, there 
is less scope to borrow to smooth spending, and consumption and investment will be 
much more reliant on current revenue streams. A detailed illustration of the 
sensitivity of the scenarios to assumptions on the short-term income elasticity 
parameters is given in the Appendix.   
In the standard version of NiGEM, the short-term income elasticity of 
consumption in the UK is given by 0.17, suggesting a relatively low level of liquidity 
constraints. Barrell, Holland and Hurst (2012) put this into an internationally 
comparative context, which suggests that UK liquidity constraints are on the low 
side, but not out of line with other advanced economies. The short-term elasticity of 
investment to GDP is between 1 and 2 per cent, with business investment more 
sensitive to the state of the economy than housing investment.  
We now consider the impact on output and unemployment that we would 
expect when liquidity constraints are heightened. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the 
expected impact on output and the unemployment rate of the consolidation 
programme detailed in table 1 if it were introduced in ‘normal’ times (scenario 1), 
and compares this to a scenario with moderately heightened liquidity constraints 
(model 4 in the Appendix) and high liquidity constraints (model 7 in Appendix table 
A1). The moderate scenario can be interpreted as representing an environment where 
the number of liquidity constrained consumers is roughly double that in normal 
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times, while the high liquidity constraints scenario reflects an environment where the 
number of liquidity constrained consumers is twice that in the moderate scenario. In 
all three scenarios we allow an endogenous adjustment of both short-term and long-
term interest rates. Under high liquidity constraints, we would expect output to 
decline by ½ per cent more in the first year than it would in normal times. The 
unemployment rate can be expected to increase by 0.25 percentage points more in 
the first year compared to the first normal times scenario. By year 7, the differences 
between the three scenarios are largely eliminated. 
 
 
Figure 5: Impact of liquidity constraints on GDP 
 
Note: Impact of policies described in table 1 on GDP, if introduced in ‘normal’ times, and with 
heightened liquidity constraints. See models 4 and 7 in the Appendix for details on the parameter 
assumptions. 
Source: NiGEM simulations 
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Figure 6: Impact of liquidity constraints on unemployment rate 
 
Note: Impact of policies described in table 1 on unemployment rate, if introduced in ‘normal’ times, 
and with heightened liquidity constraints. See models 4 and 7 in the Appendix for details on the 
parameter assumptions. 
Source: NiGEM simulations 
 
4 Scenario IV - Presence of hysteresis  
Extended periods of depressed output and high unemployment can have long-term 
implications for the productive capacity of the economy. A host of mechanisms 
could be responsible for these hysteresis effects. These include reduced capital 
investment, premature capital scrapping, reduced labor force attachment on the part 
of the long-term unemployed resulting in lower wage pressures, scarring effects on 
young workers who have trouble beginning their careers and changes in managerial 
attitudes. In particular, the incidence of long-term unemployment may reduce the 
downward pressure on wages exerted by a high general unemployment rate and thus 
lead to unemployment hysteresis or persistence long after the shocks have dissipated. 
We focus on this labor market channel of hysteresis in this chapter. This does not 
mean that the other potential channels of hysteresis are unimportant40.  
A potential explanation of hysteresis effects is that a decrease in aggregate 
demand initially causes a rise in short-term unemployment, but this turns into long-
term unemployment if the depression continues. As the survival rate (in 
                                                 
40
 IMF’s recent report, ‘United Kingdom 2012 Article IV Consultation’, IMF Country Report No. 
12/190, also focuses on the labor market channel of hysteresis to explain changes in the NAIRU. It 
stresses a slightly different channel, namely, labor employment protection laws as the driver of 
hysteresis impacts. 
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unemployment) for the long-term unemployed is higher41, they put less downward 
pressure on wages and inflation and so can contribute to the persistence of 
unemployment into the medium term. Machin and Manning (1999) model this in an 
efficiency wage framework. Similar results are found in Blanchard and Diamond 
(1994) in a matching model context, Calmfors and Lang (1995) and Manning (1993) 
in the context of a union bargaining model. Thus, high long-term unemployment has 
been argued to be a cause of high unemployment itself. However, it is still possible 
that the unemployment rate returns to its steady state NAIRU in the very long run. 
Alternatively, it is highly likely that the long-term unemployed may cease to 
participate in the labor market altogether. There is sparse evidence on the decline in 
participation rate of those who have been unemployed for a prolonged period. More 
recently, it has been observed that in the US, the labor force participation rate 
plummeted during the Great Recession. It declined from a peak of 66.5 per cent in 
2007 to 62 per cent in 201242. The demographic trend relating to the retirement of the 
‘baby boom’ generation, which has been ongoing since the turn of the century, is a 
slow-moving generational trend and cannot explain this substantial recent decline. This 
seems to suggest that this decline is at least in part a result of the labor market 
pressures arising from the 2008 crisis43. By contrast, in the UK, labor force 
participation has held up relatively well compared with previous recessions, although 
long-term unemployment has risen sharply. 
The standard model for wages within NiGEM is based around a profit 
maximizing condition that sets the marginal product of labor equal to the real wage. 
The price and wage equations are determined by the first order profit maximizing 
conditions. Using a CES-style of production function, this can be described as: 
 
 ³¿À´ = W + Á  ³ÂÃÀÄ ´ − ÁÁ XVkℎ                             (1) 
 
                                                 
41
 Comparing the short-term and long-term unemployed, evidence shows that the outflow rates for the 
long-term unemployed have always been lower than that for the short-term unemployed. The lower 
outflow rate for the long-term unemployed, compared to the short-term unemployed, is called 
negative duration dependence. The most natural interpretation is that the long-term unemployed have 
a lower chance of finding a job. 
42
 Authors’ calculations based on data from The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
 
43
 Holland (2012) assesses the impact of labour force withdrawal in the US on potential output. 
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where ¿À  is the real wage, kr0 is potential capacity output,  is labour input, XVkℎ is 
labour augmenting technical progress, Å is the elasticity of substitution between 
labour and capital, and, W is a constant term.  
This forms the long-run relationship and the firm side of the wage bargain. The 
unemployment rate acts as the bargaining instrument to bring labor demand in line with 
labor supply. We embed this into a dynamic equation of the form: 
 
∆ ln$Æ+ = Ç + Ç È ³¿À´ − Á  ³ÂÃÀÄ ´ + ÁÁ XVkℎÉ + Ç∆ ln$0+ +$1 − Ç+∆ ln$0n+ + ÇL$+                                         (2) 
 
where  is the unemployment rate, ∆	is the difference operator, Ç − ÇL are 
parameters and superscript e denotes expectations.  
 
When the unemployment rate rises, this puts downward pressure on real wage 
growth. Firms can then afford to employ more workers, which brings labor demand 
in line with labor supply, and pushes unemployment back towards its equilibrium.  
Arguably, those who have been unemployed for an extended period of time 
begin to search for work less intensively, or because of ‘scarring’ effects on skills or 
motivation, may simply not be regarded as suitable potential workers by employers. 
They may thus exert less pressure on wages than those who have been unemployed 
for only a short period. A more sophisticated model would, therefore, differentiate 
the unemployed by their duration out of work, and allow the wage elasticity to 
decline as the duration rises. In order to allow for this form of hysteresis we consider 
what we define as the long-term unemployed (LTU) – those who have been 
unemployed for twelve months or longer – separately from total unemployment. 
It is difficult to identify empirically differences in the wage elasticities of 
different groups of unemployed, given the very strong correlation among the 
duration groups and unobserved heterogeneity between groups. In order to calibrate 
the differences in wage pressure, we draw on the study by Elsby and Smith (2010), 
who calculate the unemployment-to-employment transition rate by duration for the 
UK (see Figure 9, p. R35 in Elsby and Smith, 2010). Those unemployed for longer face 
markedly lower job-finding rates. Job seekers with more than twelve months duration 
find jobs at an average rate of just over 4 per cent per month, whereas the total pool of 
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unemployed find jobs at an average rate of 10 per cent per month, using a sample that 
covers 1992–2010. This would suggest that long-term unemployed exert about 60 per 
cent less pressure on wages than the total pool of unemployed.  
We, thus, construct an augmented wage equation, which incorporates wage-
bargaining that is less sensitive to the long-term unemployment rate, using an 
equation of the form: 
 
∆ ln$Æ+ = Ç + Ç È ³¿À´ − Á  ³ÂÃÀÄ ´ + ÁÁ XVkℎÉ + Ç∆ ln$0+ +$1 − Ç+∆ ln$0n+ + ÇL$+ − 0.6ÇL$(+                                        
(3) 
 
where ( is the long-term unemployment rate. We assume ÇL < 0	to reflect the 
bargaining process. 
Some older studies, for example Nickell (1987), find a somewhat stronger 
feedback from LTU to wages. The sample used for estimation in his paper covers 
1953–83, and so may be less relevant for today, given the significant changes to the 
labor market that have occurred since 1979. Nonetheless, we consider an alternative 
scenario, where the long-term unemployed have essentially stopped searching 
altogether, and so put no pressure on wages: 
 
∆ ln$Æ+ = Ç + Ç È ³¿À´ − Á  ³ÂÃÀÄ ´ + ÁÁ XVkℎÉ + Ç∆ ln$0+ +$1 − Ç+∆ ln$0n+ + ÇL$ − (+                                                
(4) 
 
This can be viewed as an upper limit to the potential effects through this channel. 
However, it should not be interpreted as an upper limit to the effects of hysteresis 
overall. Hysteresis may set in earlier than we allow for here – for example after six 
months rather than after twelve months. And the potential for labor market 
withdrawal could lead to significantly more prolonged effects on the productive 
capacity of the economy.  
The impact of LTU on wages will also depend on how we model the rate of 
long-term unemployment itself. OECD (2009) estimates a simple relationship 
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between the total unemployment rate and the long-term unemployment rate. For the 
UK, the relationship they identify is: 
 ( = 0.76	( − 0.29	( + 0.34	                 (5) 
 
We use this relationship, rewritten in error correction format, to model LTU in the 
revised NiGEM model. The equation can be written as: 
 ∆( = 0.29	∆( + 0.34	∆ − 0.53	Î( − 0.6	Ï               (6) 
 
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the expected impact on output and the unemployment rate 
in the presence of labor market hysteresis effects, and compares our ‘normal times’ 
scenario to the two augmented wage equations discussed above – where the long-
term unemployed exert 60 per cent less pressure on wages than shorter-term 
unemployed, and where the long-term unemployed exert no pressure on wages. In 
order to decompose the effects, we assume the interest rate channel is not impaired 
and liquidity constraints are not important. An important point of comparison with 
the baseline (scenario 1) is the much slower speed with which output returns to 
supply equilibrium; in other words, hysteresis not only magnifies the negative 
impacts of fiscal consolidation on output and employment, but means that they are 
much more long-lasting.  
 
Figure 7: Impact on GDP 
 
Note: Impact of policies described in table 1 on GDP, if introduced in ‘normal’ times under the 
standard version of NiGEM and with the augmented wage equations (3) and (4) described above. 
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Source: NiGEM simulations 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Impact on unemployment rate 
 
Note: Impact of policies described in table 1 on unemployment rate, if introduced in ‘normal’ times 
under the standard version of NiGEM and with the augmented wage equations (3) and (4) described 
above. 
Source: NiGEM simulations 
 
 
By introducing tightening during a period of high unemployment and large output 
gap, the negative impacts of the consolidation programme can be expected to persist 
for 2–4 years longer than they would have if the policy had been postponed until the 
level of unemployment had reverted to its long-run equilibrium.  
 
5 Cumulative impacts 
Based on the results of the scenarios presented above, we can calibrate an estimate of 
the cumulative impacts on the economy from introducing fiscal tightening starting in 
2011, rather than postponing the measures until output and unemployment had 
recovered from the downturn. The impact is partly driven by the heightened 
magnitude of fiscal multipliers, and exacerbated by the prolongation of their impact 
due to hysteresis effects. As an illustrative scenario, we assume that the interest rate 
response is impaired, with no adjustment in the long-term interest rate. We allow for 
moderately high liquidity constraints, so assume that the number of liquidity 
constrained agents is roughly double what it is in normal times (model 4 in the 
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Appendix), and model wages as in equation 3 above, with the long-term unemployed 
exerting 60 per cent less pressure on wages than total unemployment. Changing this 
set of assumptions could lead to a stronger or weaker impact on the economy than 
shown here, as demonstrated by the sensitivity of the results to the scenarios reported 
above.  
Figures 9–11 illustrate projections for GDP growth, the unemployment rate 
and government debt as a ratio to GDP that we would anticipate under three different 
scenarios. The first reflects our assessment of the fiscal consolidation programme for 
2011–17 as reported in table 1, introduced during the current environment of a 
depressed economy with moderately high liquidity constraints. This is consistent 
with the baseline forecast for the UK presented in this Review, and we designate this 
scenario as ‘consolidate during a depression’. The second scenario illustrates the path 
that we would have expected had the consolidation programme been delayed until 
economic recovery was well underway, which model-based estimates suggest would 
have been by about 2014 in the absence of early fiscal tightening. The programme 
detailed in table 1 is implemented, but the timing is shifted so that it is enacted over 
the period 2014–20, with no consolidation measures introduced 2011–14. We 
designate this scenario as ‘consolidate during normal times’. Finally we illustrate a 
scenario that shows the economic path that would have been expected in the absence 
of any consolidation programme, which we designate as ‘no consolidation’.  
Scenarios 2 and 3 are identical for the first three years.  
 
Figure 9: GDP growth under three consolidation scenarios 
 
Note: Consolidation starting in 2011 during a depression, consolidation starting in 2014 when the 
economy has returned to ‘normal’, no consolidation.  
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Source: NiGEM simulations 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Unemployment rate under three consolidation scenarios 
 
Note: Consolidation starting in 2011 during a depression, consolidation starting in 2014 when the 
economy has returned to ‘normal’, no consolidation. 
Source: NiGEM simulations 
 
Figure 11: Government debt under three consolidation scenarios 
 
Note: Consolidation starting in 2011 during a depression, consolidation starting in 2014 when the 
economy has returned to ‘normal’, no consolidation. 
Source: NiGEM simulations 
 
 
A number of studies have looked at the links between the risk premium on 
government borrowing and fiscal sustainability, captured by current or expected 
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
pe
r 
ce
n
t
Consolidate during a depression Consolidate in normal times No consolidation
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
pe
r 
ce
n
t o
f G
D
P
Consolidate during a depression Consolidate in normal times
No consolidation
147 
 
values of the general government deficit or the stock of government debt (Laubach, 
2009; Baldacci and Kumar, 2010; Schuknect et al, 2010; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012 
and others). These studies suggest that rising government debt is likely eventually to 
put upward pressure on interest rates, so that fiscal tightening is likely to be 
necessary at some point. Figure 11 indeed illustrates that in the absence of any fiscal 
tightening, the stock of government debt would have been on a steadily rising and 
almost certainly unsustainable path over the next decade. The option not to 
consolidate at all, therefore, was and is not a viable one. However, the differences 
between the debt profiles reflecting early consolidation and delayed consolidation are 
relatively modest, and the likely impact on interest rates is therefore small. Empirical 
estimates, on average, point to a 2–4 basis point rise in interest rates for a 1 per cent 
of GDP rise in the government debt to GDP ratio. A 10 percentage point differential, 
therefore, would be expected to induce at most a 40 basis point rise in borrowing 
costs. Even this may overstate the impacts for non-Euro Area countries. IMF (2012b) 
points out that, “fiscal indicators such as deficit and debt levels appear to be weakly 
related to government bond yields for advanced economies with monetary 
independence”.    
The scenarios suggest that the recession in 2012 could have been avoided had 
fiscal tightening measures been delayed. Table 2 details the differences between the 
two scenarios in level terms. Our estimates indicate that the cumulative loss of output 
from early consolidation accumulated over the period 2011–21 amounts to £239 
billion in constant 2010 prices. This is equivalent to 16½ per cent of 2010 GDP (or 
about 1.3 per cent of total output over the entire period). These losses are sustained 
despite the fact that the growth rate of GDP is expected to be higher after 2016 under 
the early consolidation scenario compared to the delayed consolidation scenario, as 
consolidation measures in the latter are ongoing until 2020. In the long run, the level 
of GDP in the three scenarios should converge to a common level. Figure 1 indicates 
that the negative impact on output of the fiscal consolidation programme initiated in 
normal times can be expected to dissipate by eleven years after the onset of the 
programme, so that by 2025 the growth rate of GDP should converge in all three 
scenarios. A substantial permanent deadweight loss associated with the early 
consolidation programme will persist, as the amplified losses in the early years will 
not be fully offset by amplified gains once recovery sets in.      
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Similarly, the unemployment rate is expected to be higher until 2018 
under the early consolidation programme than it would have been with a delayed 
fiscal tightening, as shown in Figure 10. In the long run, the level of the 
unemployment rate can be expected to converge to the same level in all three 
scenarios. It may take 10–11 years for these effects to feed through. The 
‘consolidate in a depression’ scenario sees the unemployment rate falling below 
that of the ‘consolidation in normal times’ scenario over the period 2019–21. This 
reflects the fact that the delayed consolidation programme comes to an end only 
in 2020, whereas in the early consolidation scenario the recovery has been 
ongoing for three years, and the differences can be expected to dissipate by 2024. 
More importantly, the unemployment rate in the delayed scenario would never be 
expected to exceed 7 per cent.    
 
Table 2: GDP in £billion, 2010 prices under two scenarios 
 
Consolidate 
during a 
depression 
Consolidate 
in normal 
times Difference % 2010 GDP 
2011 1478 1489 11 0.8 
2012 1476 1505 29 2.0 
2013 1495 1535 40 2.7 
2014 1531 1575 44 3.0 
2015 1572 1622 49 3.4 
2016 1614 1660 45 3.1 
2017 1654 1686 33 2.2 
2018 1694 1708 14 1.0 
2019 1738 1737 -1 -0.1 
2020 1785 1775 -10 -0.7 
2021 1832 1817 -15 -1.1 
Sum 2011-2021 17869 18109 239 16.3 
Source: NiGEM simulations 
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6 Conclusion 
The concern today is that the Great Recession starting in 2008 and the consequent 
early fiscal tightening policies may lead to significant losses in output and a 
protracted period of high unemployment. The analysis presented in this note 
indicates that these concerns are well-founded. Under current policy plans the 
unemployment rate is expected to remain above 7 per cent until 2016. Had tightening 
measures been delayed until economic recovery was well underway, cumulative 
output on the period 2011–21 would have been significantly higher, and the 
unemployment rate would have been expected to rise no higher than 7 per cent over 
the next decade. In light of the above results, it can be argued that fiscal policy 
choices have to be considered in the light of the monetary policy response function. 
When monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on interest rates, the 
impact of fiscal policy (the fiscal multiplier) will be magnified compared to normal 
times. The health of the banking sector is also an important determining factor. When 
unemployment is high or job security low, a greater percentage of households and 
firms are likely to find themselves liquidity constrained. This is likely to be 
particularly acute when the downturn is driven by an impaired banking system, as 
lending conditions will tighten beyond what would be expected in an ordinary 
downturn. Heightened liquidity constraints amplify the effects of any contractionary 
policy on output and unemployment. 
This study is necessarily narrow, and does not take into account a number of 
factors that may also cause the impacts of a policy innovation introduced in normal 
times to differ from that observed during a prolonged downturn. For example, there 
may be additional effects on savings behavior, hysteresis effects may also be deeper 
and more prolonged, and interest rates may respond more significantly if the link 
between the magnitude of government debt and government borrowing premia is 
important.  
Ball (1996) finds that inadequate responses to recessions have contributed to 
hysteresis in some countries. A corollary conclusion is that policies of deficit 
reduction in the presence of substantial output shortfalls will have adverse impacts in 
both the short and long run. The standard policy prescription – to delay deficit 
reduction until after recovery is clearly under way and the output shortfall 
significantly reduced – remains valid. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Fiscal multipliers and liquidity constraints  
In this appendix we illustrate the sensitivity of the estimated fiscal multipliers to 
assumptions on the short-term income elasticity of consumption and investment. In 
the presence of perfect capital markets and forward-looking consumers with perfect 
foresight, households will smooth their consumption path over time, and consumer 
spending will be largely invariant to the state of the economy or temporary fiscal 
innovations. However, some fraction of the population at any given time is liquidity 
constrained with little or no access to borrowing, so that their current consumption is 
largely restrained by their current income. The share of the population that is 
liquidity constrained will affect the short-term income elasticity of consumption, 
given by parameter b1 from equation (A1) below: 
 ∆ ln$Ð+ = Îln$Ð+ − [r + Ñ, ln$f*+ + $1 − Ñ,+ln	$3.
%+]Ï +Ñ∆ ln$3.
%+ + Ñ∆ ln$&*+ + Ñ∆ ln$*+              (A1) 
 
Where Ð is consumption, f* is total asset wealth, which is the sum of net financial 
wealth $&*+ and tangible wealth	$*+, 3.
% is real personal disposable income, ∆ 
is the difference operator, and the remaining symbols are parameters.  
Cross-country differences in the average short-term income elasticity of 
consumption have a strong correlation with the tax multipliers, as highlighted by 
Barrell, Holland and Hurst (2012). However, access to credit is dependent both on 
credit history and on current income, and so is necessarily sensitive to the state of the 
economy. As unemployment rises, a greater share of the population will be unable to 
access credit at reasonable rates of interest – at precisely the moment when they are 
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in need of borrowing to smooth their consumption path. This means that 
consumption is likely to be cyclical, and that b1 is likely to be time varying and 
dependent on the position in the cycle. Following a banking crisis the effects can be 
expected to be particularly acute, as banks tighten lending criteria, as discussed by 
Barrell, Fic and Liadze (2009). This also suggests that fiscal multipliers are 
dependent on the state of the economy – especially tax innovation multipliers – and 
this is consistent with recent studies such as Delong and Summers (2012) and 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). 
Investment is always more cyclically sensitive than consumer spending, but 
these effects may be particularly amplified when the banking system is impaired. We 
model investment as an adjustment towards a desired capital stock. The stock of 
capital is one of the factors of production underlying the supply-side of the economy, 
and a profit maximizing condition that sets the marginal product of capital equal to 
its price (the user cost of capital) leads to the following long-run relationship: 
 
 ³ #ÂÃÀ´ = W − Å	ln	$NOV½+                           (A2) 
where K is the capital stock, kr0 is potential GDP, NOV½ is the tax adjusted user 
cost of capital and Å is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital.  
 
Embedded within a dynamic framework, the standard equation to model capital 
demand in NiGEM is given by: 
 ∆ ln$Ò+ =  − [ln$Ò+ − ln$kr0+ + Å ln$NOV½+] + 	∆ ln$Ò+ +L∆ ln$+ + M	∆ ln$+                               (A3) 
 
where  is real GDP. 
 
From this we determine investment through the identity relationship: 
% = Ò − $1 − QV0+Ò                  (A4) 
 
where % is gross investment and QV0 is the depreciation rate.  
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We distinguish between housing and business investment as the dynamics of 
behavior are significantly different for the two. The parameters L and M may be 
sensitive to the position of the cycle and particularly to the health of the banking 
sector.  
In order to assess the sensitivity of fiscal multipliers to the magnitude of 
liquidity constraints, we run our consolidation scenario under a series of eleven 
different models, allowing the parameters	Ñ, L and M to rise incrementally. The 
models allow Ñ to rise from 0, which implies perfect capital markets with no 
liquidity constraints, to 1, which implies that all current income is spent on 
consumption, with no scope for saving and smoothing consumption. In our standard 
model, the estimated parameter for Ñ is given by 0.17056, suggesting a relatively 
low level of liquidity constraints historically. Barrell, Holland and Hurst (2012) put 
this into an internationally comparative context, which suggests that UK liquidity 
constraints are on the low side, but not out of line with other advanced economies. 
Choosing appropriate values for L and M is somewhat less straightforward, as a 1 
per cent increase in the capital stock is equivalent to a 50–100 per cent increase in 
the investment flow. The estimated parameters of the standard NiGEM model are 
0.042 (L) and 0.013 (M) for business capital and 0.015 (Lº) and 0.01 (Mº+ for 
housing capital. We calibrate the parameters by centering so that the NiGEM 
standard model is between model 2 and 3 in the table below. The M	parameters are 
set to maintain the ratio of 	L/M in the standard version of NiGEM. 
The estimated impact on GDP of the consolidation scenario, under different 
assumptions on the short-run income elasticity of consumption and investment are 
reported in table A1 below.  With no liquidity constraints, we would expect the 
policy to reduce output by just 0.2 per cent in the first year, while with no options for 
borrowing to smooth consumption we would expect output to decline by 1.4 per cent. 
Our standard model predicts that the fiscal policy would reduce output by 0.4 per 
cent in the first year, under normal conditions with limited liquidity constraints. 
Differences between the different models dissipate by year 7.  
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Table A1: Impact of consolidation programme on UK GDP, under different short-term income elasticities of consumption and investment 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Short-run income elasticity of consumption (Ñ) 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Short-run capital-output elasticity (business) (L) 0.035 0.042 0.049 0.057 0.064 0.071 0.078 0.086 0.093 0.100 0.107 
Short-run capital-output elasticity (housing) (Lº) 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.020 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.031 0.034 0.037 0.040 
Year 1 -0.22 -0.30 -0.39 -0.48 -0.58 -0.68 -0.80 -0.92 -1.05 -1.20 -1.36 
Year 2 -0.44 -0.51 -0.59 -0.67 -0.76 -0.84 -0.93 -1.01 -1.10 -1.18 -1.27 
Year 3 -0.77 -0.84 -0.90 -0.97 -1.03 -1.09 -1.14 -1.19 -1.23 -1.25 -1.26 
Year 4 -1.20 -1.29 -1.39 -1.48 -1.58 -1.67 -1.77 -1.87 -1.97 -2.08 -2.19 
Year 5 -1.80 -1.90 -2.00 -2.10 -2.19 -2.29 -2.39 -2.49 -2.59 -2.69 -2.79 
Year 6 -2.13 -2.21 -2.29 -2.36 -2.43 -2.49 -2.56 -2.62 -2.67 -2.72 -2.76 
Year 7 -2.04 -2.06 -2.08 -2.09 -2.09 -2.08 -2.07 -2.04 -2.00 -1.95 -1.89 
Year 8 -1.66 -1.66 -1.65 -1.64 -1.61 -1.58 -1.54 -1.49 -1.43 -1.36 -1.28 
Year 9 -1.16 -1.16 -1.15 -1.14 -1.12 -1.11 -1.09 -1.07 -1.05 -1.04 -1.03 
Year 10 -0.63 -0.63 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.66 -0.67 -0.70 -0.74 -0.80 
Year 11 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.18 -0.20 -0.23 -0.27 -0.32 -0.38 -0.47 
Year 12 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.02 -0.08 
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Chapter 5: Human Capital and Growth - A 
Focus on Primary and Secondary Education in 
the UK 
 
                                                                      
 
Abstract: Economic theory and evidence shows that in the long-run human capital is 
the critical input for growth. While indicators of average educational outcomes at the 
secondary level, in the UK, tend to show significant improvements over time, they 
mask the fact that the UK has a long tail of poor (secondary) education performance 
compared to other countries. This holds back growth and social mobility. The 
incentives for schools to focus on the performance of children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds are weak. Dissemination of high quality teaching through the school 
system depends fundamentally on school incentives - performance measures, 
autonomy and competition. We propose a flexible system for education, which gives 
schools greater autonomy and the ability to grow within a national accountability 
framework that places a premium on radically raising the standards of the bottom 
ability group. Together with improved choice for parents, better quality information 
(across the entire distribution of achievement) and more effective incentives for 
teachers and schools, this will improve the quality of teaching. 
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1 Human Capital in the UK 
 
School spending per UK pupil has risen sharply over the last ten years. While 
national indicators of average educational outcomes show significant improvements, 
these indicators mask the fact that the UK is performing poorly at the lower end of 
the educational distribution. 
 
1.1 Educational Expenditure in the UK 
Figure 1 tracks education spending per pupil in real terms in the UK since 1950. Real 
spending levels have increased steadily from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s. After 
this period of continuous increase –the longest so far - spending fell during the 
periods 1976-77 and 1979-80. The first half of the 1980s was characterized by flat 
levels of real spending, and mid-1970s levels of expenditure were only returned to in 
the late 1980s. As Figure 1 shows the largest annual increases occurred during the 
2000s. The real increase in the 11 years to 2010-11 was just over two-thirds (Bolton, 
2012). 
 
Figure 1: UK Real Public Expenditure on Education, £ 2011-12 prices 
 
Note: Between 1950-66 the series used is the 'Consolidated current and capital expenditure by the 
public sector'. It excludes spending on school meals and milk. Between 1960-86 the series used is the 
Education in the UK series 'Education and related expenditure by public authorities'. This series 
includes expenditure on teacher training and the youth service. Between 1980-current, the series used 
are the General Government Expenditure (until 1982-83), Total Managed Expenditure (until 1987-
88); expenditure is calculated on a resource basis from 2000-01. 
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Looking closely at the primary and secondary school sectors in Figure 2, we find that 
real spending per pupil in these sectors in the UK has increased by 4.8 per cent per 
annum between 1997-98 and 2009-10, leaving spending per pupil significantly above 
the OECD average. As Figure 2 shows, since 2000, total real school spending has 
increased by about 40 per cent in real terms for both primary and secondary schools. 
 
Figure 2: Education Expenditure by Sector in England 
 
Source: OECD (2012) 
 
 
1.2 Educational outcomes in the UK 
In this section, we document the level of educational attainment in the UK in the 
recent years. Outcomes of different groups within the UK are compared – 
specifically, the educational attainment of disadvantaged children is compared to that 
of their wealthier counterparts. In addition, we benchmark to international 
comparators where possible. 
Secondary education performance in UK is commonly measured by the 
percentage of pupils attaining five or more GCSEs (Key Stage 4) at grades A*-C at 
the end of compulsory schooling. Taken at face value, national indicators suggest 
that performance in GCSEs has been improving. However, there is a concern that at 
least some of this could be due to students taking easier subjects, grade inflation or 
‘teaching to the test’. This prompts us to look at how UK performs internationally. 
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There are three international tests for evaluating performance in education44: 
Progress International Reading Literacy (PIRLS) that is available for the years 2001 
and 2006 for pupils of about 10 years old; the Programme for the International 
Student Assessment (PISA- which measures cognitive skills of 15-year olds), 
conducted in 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009; and Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study (TIMSS) available in 1999, 2003 and 2007 for pupils of about age 
10 and age 14 (that is, years 5 and 9 in England).The latest 2009 PIRLS results put 
England significantly above the international average of 10 year olds in terms of their 
reading abilities. But England’s performance is below some major European 
countries (including Italy and Germany) and it has worsened since 2001.The PISA 
study places the UK close to the OECD average, behind strong performers such as 
Finland and the Netherlands in 2009.  
With regards to measures of secondary school performance, TIMSS is closer 
to what is checked in national key stage tests and more curriculum-based, while 
PISA measures the application of knowledge in everyday situations. In TIMSS, 
England is one of the highest performers and there has been an increase in test scores 
over time. Thus, international tests attest the improvement in overall performance at 
the secondary school level in the UK. 
 
1.2.1 The UK’s long tail of poor achievement 
One of the most striking features of educational outcomes in the UK is the high 
frequency of low performers. GCSE results show a ‘long tail’ of low achievement 
amongst 16 year-olds (Figure 3). This has been a persistent feature of the UK 
education system and a continuing policy concern. The UK also does worse than 
other countries in the proportion of the population aged 24-35 with upper level 
secondary qualifications - equivalent to GCSE passes at A*- C or above (McNally, 
2012). 
                                                 
44
 A new indicator has been recently published by the Economist Intelligent Unit:  “The Learning 
Curve”. This measure is based on the existing indices but adopt a wider prospect by adding new 
criteria such as graduation rates, adult literacy and the effect of years in school on productivity. The 
new results don’t change the ranking at the top: Finland, South Korea and Hong Kong are the best 
performing countries, followed by Japan and Singapore. But other countries sharply changed their 
ranking position. Britain, for example, gained sixth place in comparison to the PISA 2011 
classification. At the same time, this result put in light the large quality gap between compulsory and 
higher education and the potential negative effect for students that would not attend universities (The 
Economist, 2013). 
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Figure 3: Key stage 4 (GCSE) results, England (2008): % with results in each 
band of total GCSE points 
 
Source: DfE. Results are for maintained (state) schools only. 
Note: Total points ‘capped’ by DCSF to show those from a pupil’s best 8 GCSE (or equivalent) 
passes at age 16. The system awards 16 points for a pass at G, 22 for an F, up to 52 for an A and 56 
for an A*. 
 
 
This distribution is confirmed by the PISA data which shows significant performance 
variability within the UK (OECD 2010). Table 1 shows the proportion of pupils at 
each level of performance compared to other countries. High-performing countries 
such as Korea and Finland have a narrower range of scores overall. The OECD finds 
that in the UK the gap between the bottom performers and middle performers is 
bigger than the gap between the middle performers and the top performers (OECD 
2010)45. In other words, there is a bigger gap created by students falling behind the 
average score than there is by students pulling away at the top. 
 
 
                                                 
45
 The gap between the 10th percentile and the median is larger than the gap between the median and 
the 90th percentile. 
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Table 1: % of students at each level of the PISA proficiency scale for reading, 
2009 
  
Below 
Level 
2 
Level 
2 
Level 
3 
Level 
4 
Level 
5 
Level 
6 
United Kingdom 18 25 29 20 7 1 
Key Competitors Average* 10 18 30 28 12 2 
OECD Average 19 24 30 21 7 1 
Note: *Key competitors defined as Australia, Canada, Finland, Korea and Singapore. These were 
chosen as countries that traditionally score well on PISA and are frequently cited in comparison to UK 
performance. 
Source: Clifton and Cook (2012) using data from OECD 2010 
 
Of particular note in this table is the sheer volume of UK students failing to achieve 
basic proficiency (level 2). Around a fifth of students failed to reach basic 
proficiency in reading and maths, which translates to around 113,000 students in 
England. This group is more than twice as big as the group of students that reached 
the top two performance levels. Unsurprisingly, high-performing countries do not 
just have lots of students at the highest levels, but also relatively few students at the 
lower levels. 
A picture therefore emerges of a large pool of ‘poor performers’ that 
contributes to UK’s relative weak performance in international rankings. The UK 
therefore faces a two-pronged challenge - both to stretch those at the top as well as to 
raise the performance of those falling behind. In terms of quantity of pupils, the latter 
is the bigger challenge, with around a fifth of pupils failing to get the basic skills 
required to succeed in life. 
 
1.2.2 The socio-economic gradient in UK educational attainment 
In this section, we discuss the extent to which the long tail discussed above is driven 
by socio-economic disadvantage. The relationship between socio-economic 
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background and educational attainment is called the socio-economic gradient of 
education. It is a well-established empirical fact that children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds are over-represented in the group of poor performers while children 
from wealthier families are over-represented in the group of high performers. 
According to the OECD PISA 2009 results (the most recently published), 14 
per cent of the variation in student performance in the UK is explained by students’ 
socio-economic background. This is in line with the OECD average but contrasts 
with Canada or Japan, where the explained variation is 9 per cent. If we consider a 
wider family context (including, for example, the immigrant background or the 
language spoken at home) differences in family background characteristics explain 
25 per cent of the differences in performance across UK students – versus 22 per cent 
in the typical OECD country and 19 per cent in Canada, Finland, Japan, and Korea. 
These numbers suggest a weaker relationship between socio-economic background 
and educational inequality in other OECD countries compared to the UK. 
The same message from a different perspective is given by Figure 4 which 
measures the impact of socio-economic background on PISA scores. It shows that 
UK has one of the highest impacts among the OECD countries. Moreover the share 
of UK students from weak socioeconomic backgrounds performing well is low: the 
average PISA score of the worst performing 10 per cent of UK students is below the 
average for the same group in other OECD countries (OECD, 2012).  
 
Figure 4: Impact of socio-economic background on PISA 2009 reading score 
 
Note: Score point difference associated with one unit increase in the PISA index of social and cultural 
status. Source: OECD (2012) 
 
The PISA study also shows the percentage of “resilient students” - those who come 
from the lower quartile of the distribution of socioeconomic background but go on to 
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score in the top quartile of PISA test results. On this measure, the UK trails both the 
OECD average and key competitors, with only 6 per cent of students meeting 
considered “resilient” according to this criteria. 
Schuetz et al. (2005) relate family background to student test scores across 
countries using TIMSS. Although the gradient is present in most countries, the 
estimated effect is higher in England than in any other country for this particular 
survey. Achievement gaps between children from rich and poor backgrounds are 
evident from a very early age and continue to widen as children grow up. As a result 
the achievement gap between rich and poor is really significant at age 16 in GCSE 
results46.  
One way to analyse this pattern is to look at the school attainment of children 
eligible for free school meals (FSM)47. In 2008, while half of all children from 
higher-income families (not eligible for free school meals) achieved five good 
GCSEs (A*–C) inclusive of English and Maths, less than a quarter of FSM children 
achieved these grades (Figure 5). However, Figure 5 also shows that this gap has 
narrowed in relative terms in recent years48. Despite the improvement, the current 
achievement gap is still large and negatively impacts on later-life income and 
earnings inequalities with the potential risk of being passed on to future generations 
(Chowdry et al, 2010). 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of children achieving 5+ GCSEs at A*–C (including 
English and Maths) by FSM eligibility 
                                                 
46
 The fact that these achievement gaps are present even before school suggests that the educational 
system cannot take sole responsibility. 
47
 Children are classified as ‘eligible’ for FSM in administrative data only if they are both eligible for 
and claiming FSM. Only families with a low income and no adults in full-time paid work are eligible 
for FSM. A priori therefore, we would expect FSM ‘eligibility’ to identify children in the lowest 
income households. 
48
 It is worth noting that only one part of this achievement reflects a real improvement in pupils’ 
performance owing to the ‘grade inflation’ phenomenon. 
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However, the problem is much broader and goes beyond FSM pupils. Indeed, there is 
a clear and consistent link between deprivation and academic achievement wherever 
you are on the scale (Figure 6). With deprivation measured at the neighbourhood 
level, those pupils living in the most disadvantaged postcodes score on average 320 
points at GCSE (or the equivalent of about eight Cs), and the results gradually 
improve as you move towards better (least disadvantaged) postcodes. Pupils living in 
the wealthiest postcodes score on average 380 points or the equivalent of just over 
eight Bs. It is therefore not possible to identify a particular indicator of deprivation at 
which performance falls. This challenges the assumption that programmes targeted 
towards pupils who are eligible for free school meals will be sufficient to close the 
gap, as the problem is much wider than just this group of pupils. 
Another striking feature of the “long tail” is the higher variability in GCSE 
results of poorer pupils compared to wealthier pupils. The highest-achieving pupils 
from disadvantaged postcodes score almost as well as the highest-achieving pupils 
from wealthier areas (about 40 points less at GCSE). However, low-achieving pupils 
from disadvantaged neighbourhoods score much worse than low-achieving pupils 
from wealthier areas (about 120 points less at GCSE). 
 
Figure 6: Capped GCSE points by postcode deprivation 
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Source: Clifton and Cook (2012) 
 
More importantly, in contrast with popular belief, disadvantaged children are not all 
concentrated in a small number of poorly performing schools (though of course, 
generally disadvantaged areas will tend to have larger shares of disadvantaged 
children than wealthier areas). Disadvantaged children are spread across the entire 
school system, and perform poorly compared to their wealthier peers in the vast 
majority of schools. Figure 7 illustrates this problem. The darker line shows the 
average point score for all pupils in each percentile of schools. The pink line shows 
the average point score only for poorer children within those schools (those living in 
the bottom fifth of households, as measured by the deprivation level of the household 
postcode). While the darker line’s slope increases rapidly, the pink one is flatter. In 
other words, the problem is not just that there are a few schools which have all the 
disadvantaged children in them performing poorly. The problem is also that 
disadvantaged children perform poorly (compared their wealthier peers) in a vast 
majority of schools. 
 
Figure 7: Attainment of poor pupils vs. (within school) average by school 
deprivation 
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Source: Cook, 2012 
 
In the next two paragraphs, we discuss what attributes can be used to identify 
disadvantaged children. Low income is the attribute of disadvantage that, over the 
years, has attracted most attention from academics, politicians and the general public. 
The simple correlation between low income and poor educational outcomes (the so-
called socio-economic gradient of education) is long established49. Income is often 
used as a measure of disadvantage for three main reasons: (i) the income gradient 
gives a measure of educational inequality in its own right; (ii) some other features of 
disadvantage discussed below are associated with income50; and (iii) the relationship 
between family income and education is one of the key drivers of intergenerational 
income mobility across time (e.g. Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan, 2007). 
A multitude of possible reasons explain why the children of low income 
families do less well at school; some of these are causal (family income actually 
influences a child’s educational attainment), while others are non-causal (for 
example, income simply acts as an indicator for many other aspects of disadvantage, 
such as parental education level or social class). Different studies51 suggest that 
sustained income shocks do impact on child educational outcomes, and that low 
                                                 
49Rowntree, 1901, Glennerster, 1995. 
50This could be because those features are a causal driver of income; are they caused by income; or 
both those features and income are commonly determined by a third factor. 
51
 E.g. Steven and Schaller (2011) and Gregg et al. (2012) analyse fathers’ job displacement; Dahl and 
Lochner (2012) examine the Earned Income Tax Credit’s introduction in the US, and Milligan and 
Stabille (2011) study the variation in child tax benefits across time and Canadian provinces. 
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household income is likely to be one of the primary drivers behind the developmental 
deficits of poor children. Adults in low income families may have characteristics that 
negatively impact on children’s’ educational achievement, such as poorer innate 
ability; a lower emphasis on educational achievement in parenting; a reduced ability 
to translate parenting time into educational development; or lower ambitions 
(Blanden and Gregg, 2004). 
 
2 The Importance of Human Capital  
A country’s educational outcome and human capital formation has an important 
bearing on economic growth. Theoretical models of economic growth have 
considered different determinants of economic growth and a range of theoretical 
approaches. The standard neoclassical growth model of Solow (1957) considers the 
output of the macro economy as a direct function of just its capital and labour (and 
technological level) in a given period. Augmented neoclassical growth theories, 
developed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), include also human capital among 
the factors of production: a change in the education level induces growth. However, 
in these models, technology, the key driver of growth rates, is exogenous. A different 
view comes from the ‘endogenous growth’ models developed by Lucas (1988), 
Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) whereby technology is now 
endogenous to the model. This literature stresses on the role of education in 
increasing the innovation capacity of the economy through developing new ideas and 
new technologies. Other macro models on technological diffusion (such as Nelson 
and Phelps (1966), Welch (1970) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)) argue that 
education and training facilitate the adoption and implementation of new 
technologies with positive effect on growth and development. 
Empirical analysis based on growth and development accounting models 
have generally shown that education accounts for a large share of economic growth 
and development. Growth accounting models such as Griliches (1970) using US 
data; Barro and Lee (1993, 2001); Mankiw et al (1992); Barro and Sala-i-Martín 
(2004) and more recently Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004); De La 
Fuente and Domenech (2006) and Cohen and Soto (2007) relate educational 
attainment to economic growth (measured as GDP or GDP per capita) while 
development accounting models seek to explain cross-country differences in income 
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levels and education’s role in this52(see for example Lagakos et all, 2012; Gennaioli 
et al 2011). 
Human capital has usually been measured as educational attainment, in terms of 
years of education. More recently, with the development of new datasets, authors 
have been able to consider different measures, such as making a distinction between 
entrepreneurs/managers and worker education (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010; 
La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Syverson, 2011); or consider the quality of education (or 
cognitive skills) using the PISA, TIMSS results (see Hanuschek and Woessmann, 
2008 for a review of these studies). These new empirical approaches confirm the 
critical role of human capital in the growth and development process of countries, 
regions and firms.  
Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) and Hanushek and Kimbo (2000) 
emphasise the positive effect of the quality of education, rather than quantity alone 
on economic growth. Hanushek and Schultz (2012) state that a one standard 
deviation difference on test performance (100 points on the PISA assessment) is 
related to a 2 percentage point difference in annual growth rates of gross domestic 
product per capita. OECD (2010b) estimated that UK would gain more than $US 6 
trillion by increasing its average performance by only 25 PISA points (or by ¼ 
standard deviation). These are obviously long-run calculations, but they do give 
some indication of the huge potential prize if the UK could attain the quality of 
education in Germany or Australia this would put us on a path that would more than 
double our income per person. Following the more ambitious goal of reaching the 
Finland’s PISA performance, the UK would record a GDP improvement of more 
than $US 7 trillion or 3 times the current GDP. 
The major criticism of these cross-country analyses is that they show 
associations between human capital and growth but not necessarily causation – i.e. 
they do not address issues of endogeneity: estimates of school attainment could 
reflect reverse causality since improved growth could lead to more schooling rather 
than the reverse (Bills and Klenow, 2000). Whether or not there is a casual 
relationship is a very important issue from a policy point of view. However, this 
problem is not easily solved by using standard econometric techniques since the 
potential instruments for education are often correlated with institutional features 
(Glaeser et al, 2004). Nonetheless, Hanusheck and Woessman (2009) and Gennaioli 
                                                 
52
 See Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) for a theoretical foundation. 
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et al (2011) have tried to account for the endogeneity problem using different 
estimation methods, although none of these approaches address all the critical issues, 
they provide some assurance that the results are not biased by any of the most 
obvious problematic issues. 
 
2.1 Human capital inequality and growth  
In addition to the overall accumulation of human capital, inequality of human capital 
within a country is important for growth. Reducing human capital inequality 
practically means to improve the educational attainments of pupils at the bottom of 
the distribution, hence focusing on worst-performing students. OECD (2010b) 
estimates how GDP would improve if OECD countries addressed education 
inequality by ensuring all students reach a level of minimal proficiency (i.e. a PISA 
score of 400). Under this scenario that brings up the bottom of the distribution, the 
present value for UK improvement is more than 6 trillion USD or 2.7 times its 
current GDP. 
Recent literature has pointed at human capital inequality and its influence on 
demographic variables to explain the negative relationship between human capital 
inequality and growth. De la Croix and Doepke (2003) and Moav (2005) study the 
link between human capital inequality and increasing fertility (with negative 
outcome on growth), while Castelló-Climent and Doménech (2008) focus on how 
human capital inequality may dampen growth by reducing life expectancy and 
investment in education.  
Some authors analyse the effect of inequality on growth under imperfect 
credit markets (e.g., Mookherjee and Ray, 2003) or at different level of country’s 
development. Galor and Zeira (1993) show that in the presence of credit market 
imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital, the initial 
distribution of wealth affects investment in education both in the short and in the 
long run. With regards to development studies, Castello-Climent (2010) shows that a 
greater degree of human capital inequality discouraged the per capita income growth 
rates in most developing countries during the period 1965–2005, where the life 
expectancy and fertility channels seem to play a prominent role. However the effect 
disappears in higher income economies.  
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2.2 Human capital inequality and social mobility  
As discussed above, disadvantaged students, on average, perform worse than pupils 
from rich families. Poor educational outcomes for disadvantaged students reduce 
social mobility later in life, which in turn perpetuates low intergenerational social 
mobility53. Two facts help us understand the size of the problem of educational 
inequality. Firstly, 24 per cent of UK disadvantaged students are resilient, in the 
sense that they come from the 25 per cent of the socio-economically most 
disadvantaged students but perform much better than expected on the base of their 
socio-economic background (31 per cent is the average in the OECD) (OECD, 
2010a). Secondly, it is also true that the odds of a young person from a family with 
low levels of parental education attaining higher education is at 0.61 in the UK, well 
above the OECD average of 0.44. This suggests that if socio-economic disadvantages 
were not allowed to hold back educational attainment, social mobility could be high 
in the UK. 
A series of reports have highlighted the UK’s low levels of social mobility, 
showing how children from poorer backgrounds struggle to gain access to university, 
enter professional jobs and earn decent wages (see Milburn 2012, Sutton Trust 2011, 
Blanden et al 2005). This, in turn, means that disadvantages can become entrenched 
across generations.  
A high level of education has become more important for getting a good job 
over the past 30 years, meaning those families which are unable to invest in 
education are left further behind (Lindley and Machin 2012). Education can provide 
access to many opportunities later in life, and schools can help to create a level 
playing field for young people as they start out (Clifton and Cook, 2012). Research 
has identified a causal relationship between high levels of education and a number of 
outcomes in later life, including higher earnings (Dickson 2009), lower teenage 
pregnancy (Black et al 2008), healthier behaviours and a lower likelihood of serving 
a prison sentence (Heckman et al 2006).  
The link between intra-generational income inequality and intergenerational 
social mobility is rather complex. Recent evidence (OECD, 2012) shows that higher 
                                                 
53
 It is important to remember that raising achievement alone is not enough. There also needs to be 
sufficient demand for these skills and qualifications in the labour market, so that young people can put 
their education to good use. Recent cuts to post-16 education, a weak youth labour market and the 
prevalence of low-quality jobs will also have to be tackled for improvements to social mobility to be 
realised (Lawton and Lanning 2012, Keep et al 2006). Other factors can also be important to social 
mobility, such as having access to social networks and inherited wealth. Raising achievement in 
schools is therefore just one piece of a much bigger jigsaw (Clifton and Cook, 2012). 
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inequality is associated with lower intergenerational mobility. First of all this can be 
explained by the fact that with higher wage dispersion allows for higher returns to 
education and this may benefit individuals whose don’t have any constraint to invest 
in education. Secondly, if income inequality increases the severity of credit 
constraints, mobility decreases. Thirdly, large differences in educational outcomes 
raise income inequality and lower intergenerational social mobility.  
Wide empirical evidence strongly supports the fact that education is one of 
the major drivers of intergenerational social mobility, particularly income mobility. 
The UK has recorded a rise in intergenerational mobility between the cohorts born at 
the end of the 1950s and those born in the 1970s. (Blanden et al, 2004). This was 
mainly due to a disproportional increase in educational opportunities biased towards 
individuals from better-off backgrounds.  
 
3 Drivers of Educational Attainment: A Review of the 
Literature  
In this section we will briefly discuss the factors that the economics of education has 
identified as driving educational attainment. A complex inter-play of factors 
contribute to and cause attainment gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged 
children.  These factors include: 
• Broad contextual drivers such as the socioeconomic background of a child (e.g. 
family income and parental education) and their knock-on effect on home learning 
environment; 
• Pupil-level factors e.g. having been in care at some stage, having English as 
another language (EAL) status, Special Educational Needs (SEN)54 status, 
mobility and ethnicity. These have a complex relationship with material 
disadvantage; 
                                                 
54SEN is a multifaceted classification which brings together children with innate cognitive/learning 
difficulties and children who are underperforming for reasons other than their innate ability (e.g. 
strong negative impact of family background and/or poor teaching quality and/or unsupportive peer 
effects).  The first sub-group is defined by a characteristic that puts it at disadvantage. The second 
sub-group is defined by its (poor) performance level, and may or may not be at disadvantage 
(depending on drivers of poor performance are family background or other factors). In that sense, 
SEN conflates discretionary inputs (e.g. teaching quality); non-discretionary inputs (e.g. unsupportive 
family background); and outputs (e.g. low attainment). 
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• School-level factors that determine the quality of the child’s formal learning 
environment such as teaching, peer composition, resources and the general 
effectiveness of individual schools in overcoming material barriers. 
 
Recent evidence (Kramarz, Machin and Ouazad, 2009) on the relative contributions 
of pupils, schools and peers shows that the variance of test scores is mostly explained 
by the pupil effect55. The standard deviation of pupil effects is between 4 to 5 times 
larger than the standard deviation of school effects56 - the second largest source of 
variance in the results. Many other studies suggest that families are much more 
important57 than schools and peers in explaining the variance in results (Teddlie and 
Reynolds, 2000; Todd and Wolpin, 2007). 
We now consider in more detail the literature on the key factors driving 
educational outcomes. We start with pupil effects, and then school and teacher 
effects, and peer effects. Finally, we consider the effects of expenditure. 
 
3.1 Pupil Effects 
The finding that pupil effects account for the majority of the variance in test scores 
implies that the influence of home environment and socioeconomic background on 
schooling outcomes is very important. 
Even before pupils start school, there is a large gap in cognitive ability between 
children from high and low socio-economic backgrounds. Feinstein (2003) finds 
significant gaps between children from a high and low socio-economic background 
in an index of development. Another way to illustrate pre-school gaps is to look at 
vocabulary skills by gender and ethnic group at the time of school entry. Table 2 
shows gaps in the vocabulary skills of five year olds in the Millennium Cohort Study 
(MCS). 
 
                                                 
55
 In this context, pupil effects consist of a range of educational experiences pupils carry with them, 
reflecting parental background, the quality of the schools previously attended, innate ability, etc. This 
research measures the relative contributions of pupils, schools and peers without restricting the 
analysis to observable proxies for peers’ characteristics or school quality. 
56However, any assessment of the relative merits of various policy alternatives (e.g. targeted at 
individual effects vs. school effects) needs to allow for that fact that school quality has an impact on 
multiple pupils. 
57This may also explain the low attainment of disadvantaged pupils in all the school without regards to 
the quality level that we highlighted above. 
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Table 2: Age 5 Differences in Vocabulary by Gender and Ethnicity, Millennium 
Cohort Study 
Ethnic Group Boys Girls 
White British 55.9 56.5 
Black, Caribbean 48.4* 51.0* 
Black, Other 44.2* 47.2* 
Bangladeshi 40.4* 41.7* 
Pakistani 40.6* 40.7* 
Indian 49.8* 50.3* 
Chinese 41.2* 55.2 
Number of Children 4,587 4,452 
Notes: Based on Table 3 of Dustmann, Machin and Schonberg (2010). The vocabulary test is 
standardised to have mean 50 and a standard deviation of 10. A * denotes statistically significant 
differences relative to White British boys or girls respectively. 
Source: McNally (2012) 
 
This illustrates that human capital acquisition is not something that begins at school 
and that inequality is evident even at an early stage. Breaking the link between 
family background and educational attainment (and improving educational 
attainment generally) seems to require policies directed at families before the start of 
formal schooling. This might involve close attention to the quality of early childcare 
and pre-school settings. However, if part of the issue is poverty and worklessness, 
then the policy solutions may also lie in other areas of social policy such as housing, 
employment benefit, childcare provision (McNally, 2012). 
As discussed in section 2, low income is the attribute of disadvantage that, 
over the years, has attracted most attention from academics, politicians and the 
general public. The simple correlation between low income and poor educational 
outcomes (the so-called income gradient of education) has been long established (see 
Appendix 1 for evidence on the relationship between family income and educational 
attainment). However, the most significant social background characteristic is 
parental education, which has been shown to account for between a quarter and two-
fifths of the deficits of low income children58. While a range of other family 
background characteristics (for example parents’ employment status or family 
                                                 
58Gregg, Propper and Washbrook (2008). Chowdry et al., 2009 also found that differences in parental 
education between young people from different socioeconomic backgrounds provide a major 
explanation for differences in their educational attainment, and some of the evidence presented points 
towards the relationship being causal. 
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structure) have occasionally been linked to child attainment, the evidence of their 
effects, conditional on other economic circumstances is still mixed. 
 
3.2 School and Teacher Effects 
It is well acknowledged in the theoretical and empirical literature that the key driver 
of school quality (defined as value added of the school) is the quality of their 
teaching staff. There are a large number of anecdotes about the positive impact of 
excellent teaching on pupil’s performance. However, trying to quantify this effect is 
difficult, principally because of the data requirements. Slater, Davies, and Burgess, 
(2009) use a unique dataset to estimate the effect of individual teachers on student 
outcomes, linking over 7000 pupils to the individual teachers who taught them in 
each of their compulsory subjects and to the results of the exams they take at age 16. 
Their results suggest that being taught by a high quality (75th percentile) rather than 
low quality (25th percentile) teacher adds 0.425 of a GCSE point59 per subject (25 
per cent of the standard deviation of GCSE points). 
Rivkin et al (2005) relate the teacher quality measure to the socioeconomic 
gap in outcomes. They measure the gap in GCSE points between a poor and non-
poor student (equal to 6.08 GCSE points) and suppose that this gap arises over 8 
subjects that they both take. If the poor student had good (75th percentile) teachers for 
all 8 subjects and the better off student had poor (25th percentile) teachers for all 8, 
this would account for 3.4 GCSE points. This is a powerful effect which is not 
typically addressed in explaining the socio-economic educational gap. 
Similar studies for the US suggest that having a teacher at the 25th percentile 
versus the 75th percentile of the quality distribution would imply a difference in 
learning attainments of roughly 0.2 standard deviations in a single year. This would 
induce a move of a student at the middle of the achievement distribution to the 59th 
percentile. The magnitude of such an effect is large relative to the estimated effects 
of a ten student reduction in class size, which is of 0.1-0.3 standard deviations 
(Hanushek and Rivkin, 2010). 
The academic literature has consequently sought markers for high quality 
teachers, looking in particular at pay, teachers’ experience and academic level. There 
is a large literature on the impact of teacher pay. One strand investigates the effect of 
teacher salaries on school performance. Although initial evidence on this was 
                                                 
59
 An increase from one grade to the next, says a B to an A, is one point. 
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mixed60 more recent work has mostly found mixed results (see Appendix 2 for a 
more detailed review of the literature). The evidence suggests that teaching staff 
respond to pecuniary and market incentives aimed at increasing their effort and 
‘output’ (i.e. learning). However, it is worth making a distinction between a general 
increase in teachers’ wages (due, for example, to a general increase in the national 
pay scheme) and an improvement in pay linked to geographical disparities in costs of 
living or teachers’ outcomes. Only the latter types of interventions seem to have a 
positive impact on teacher’s performance and pupils’ achievement (Propper and 
Britton, 2012). 
In particular evidence indicates that relative salaries in alternative 
employment opportunities are important influences on the attractiveness of teaching 
as a profession (Santiago, 2004). As OECD (2005) discussed, teachers’ salaries 
relative to those in other occupations influence: (i) the decision to become a teacher 
after graduation; (ii) the decision to return to teaching after a career interruption as 
returning rates are generally higher among those teaching subjects that provide the 
fewest opportunities for employment elsewhere; and (iii) the decision to remain a 
teacher as, in general, the higher teachers’ salaries are the fewer people leave the 
profession. McKinsey (2007) suggested that while raising salaries in line with other 
graduate salaries is important, raising them above the graduate market average level 
would not lead to substantial further increases in the quality or quantity of applicants. 
Relative earnings seem to be less important when the decision is whether to enrol in 
teacher education or another college course (Hanushek and Pace, 1995). So, relative 
salaries matter during career choice, not choice of education stream. 
Using data on university graduates in UK, Dolton (1990) showed that 
increasing teacher salaries by a small amount (10 per cent) resulted in a large rise in 
applications (30 per cent). The “wage elastic” teacher supply could be explained by 
the comparatively low level of teacher’s wages. Wolter and Denzler (2003) run a 
similar analysis for Switzerland and showed that since salaries were already high, 
further increases in salary had little impact on the number or quality of applicants to 
teaching. While starting salaries in general are high in England61, low top wages at 
higher career levels discourage the more experienced teachers from remaining in the 
profession and also deter good graduates from starting a teaching career. There is 
                                                 
60
 For example, Hanushek (1986) highlights that only nine out of sixty teacher salary studies found a 
positive effect of teacher wages on school performance 
61
 Working hours in teaching are also fairly long compared to many other OECD countries.  
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also a growing body of work investigating the impact of performance related pay. 
Whilst again there is some mixed evidence, the general consensus appears to be that 
performance pay for teachers does improve student attainment in a variety of 
settings62. 
However, a good salary is not necessarily the main or the only motivation for 
teaching. The status of the teaching profession, the career opportunities and the 
decisional power given to them are all important factors in explaining their 
performance. For example, Hoxby (2002b) provides evidence that school choice 
affects the teaching profession by increasing demand for staff with higher 
qualifications (especially in mathematics and science). 
While a strong relationship between teacher experience and performance has 
historically been established, recent studies have consistently found that the impact 
of experience is concentrated in the first one or two years of teaching with little 
impact of any additional one (Hanushek, 2008). Teachers’ education also tends not to 
be correlated with quality63. 
Given the critical role of teacher quality on pupil’s performance and evidence 
on the correlation between teachers’ education and learning, recruiting and 
maintaining the most efficient teachers should be prioritised. The issue is how to 
attract and select good teachers. This is not a straightforward process since it is 
difficult to assess ex-ante if a candidate would be a good teacher. Qualitative 
research suggests that top-performing school systems manage to attract better people 
into the teaching profession, leading to better student outcomes. They do this by 
introducing highly selective teachers training, developing effective selection 
processes for identifying the right candidates and paying good (but not great) starting 
compensation. Conversely, lower-performing school systems rarely attract the right 
people into teaching. The success in attracting talented people into teaching is linked 
to specific country features such as history, culture and status of teaching profession. 
However, there are some policies that can be implemented to attract the best 
graduates, such as effective mechanisms for selecting teachers, good teacher training 
programmes, good starting compensations and increasing professional autonomy in 
                                                 
62See Appendix 2 for a review of the literature. 
63
 However, some argue that the education system as a whole could benefit from a teacher’s higher 
education level in other forms. First, more educated teachers may increase the success of school 
autonomy, by providing better inputs in the curriculum design and in developing new teaching 
methods. Secondly, the perception of the teaching profession is linked to the anticipated level of 
education and training teachers are required to undertake to become teachers (Day et al, 2006). 
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schools. All these policies could contribute to increase the status of the teaching 
profession, the attractiveness of teaching as a career and hence attract the best 
graduates. 
 
3.3 Peer Effects 
Another driver of educational attainment is believed to be peers’ behaviour and 
characteristics. This has been documented empirically (Coleman, 1966) as well as 
theoretically (Angrist and Lang (2004), Hoxby (2000) and Lavy and Schlosser 
(2011), Gould et al. (2009)). The main rationale is that group actions or attributes 
might influence individual decisions and outcomes. However, the estimation of peer 
effects is empirically challenging. Manski (1993) highlights the pitfalls of 
endogenous peer selection and the difficulty of distinguishing between average 
school effects and peer effects.  
Recent empirical evidence based on better data and better identification 
strategies has reached consensus that to capture peer effects, analyses should not 
focus on the average students but should consider pupil distributions.  There is little 
conclusive evidence suggesting that studying with high ability peer group leads to 
better outcomes (Atkinson et al, 2008; Bradley and Taylor, 2008; Dills, 2005; 
Summers and Wolfe, 1977) for all pupils while the presence of low ability peer 
groups can decrease general outcomes (Lavy et al, 2012; Gibbons and Telhaj, 2008; 
Winston and Zimmerman, 2004; Zimmerman, 2003 and Handerson et al, 1978, 
Summers and Wolfe, 1977)64. Lavy et al (2012) show that it is only the very bottom 
5 per cent students that (negatively) affect average outcome and not “bad” peers in 
any other part of the ability distribution. They also find evidence that the presence of 
students in the top 5 per cent of the ability distribution does not impact average 
outcomes. Henderson et al (1978) show that mixing weak and strong students lowers 
educational attainment for higher achievers. Similar results are also found by Bradley 
and Taylor (2007), who use pupils moving between schools to address the problems 
inherent with estimating peer effects, and find the effects of a more able peer group 
are stronger for low ability students than for higher ability students. On the other 
hand, Betts and Shkolnik (2000) find little evidence of differential effects of ability 
grouping for high or low ability pupils. 
                                                 
64
 For a slightly different message see Carrell et al 2011. 
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The negative impact of low ability students on the outcome of other students 
has been explained by some academics by the fact that more homogeneous groups of 
students might be taught more effectively (Duflo et al, 2010) or by pointing at the 
classroom disruption and decrease in attention paid by the teachers (Lavy et al. 
2012). Some studies suggest that these general findings mask some market 
heterogeneity along the gender dimension by showing that girls are significantly 
affected from interactions with peers (Lavy et al, 2012 and Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner, 2006). 
To overcome the difficulties of endogenous peer selection, a number of 
studies use the random allocation of accommodation within higher education in the 
US. Sacerdote (2001) finds that peers have an effect on grade point average. In a 
similar framework, Zimmerman (2003) and Winston and Zimmerman (2004) find no 
credible effect on the top of the SAT ability distribution, but do find evidence of a 
negative impact on students in the middle of the SAT distribution when grouped with 
students in the bottom 15 per cent of the SAT distribution.  
Taking a step further, Carrell et al (2011) use a random experiment to 
determine whether student academic performance can indeed be improved through 
systematic sorting of students into peer groups. They design peer groups at the 
United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) and using an experimental design, sort 
the incoming college freshman cohorts at USAFA into these peer groups. The 
objective was to improve the grades of the bottom one-third of incoming students by 
academic ability. The actual outcomes from the experiment yielded unexpected 
results. For the lowest ability students there is a negative and statistically significant 
treatment effect; for the middle ability students, who were expected to be unaffected, 
there is a positive and significant treatment effect of 0.067. High ability students 
were unaffected by the treatment. 
Finally, Gibbons and Telhaj (2008) offer an alternative interpretation of the 
peer effect. They suggest that peer effects may impact other factors different from 
school attainment such as subsequent educational decisions and may provide other 
immediate and long-run benefits – such as life-time friendship networks- which 
make schools with good peer groups desirable commodities. 
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3.4 How significant is expenditure? 
Assessing the role of educational expenditure on attainment, existing research has 
struggled to show a clear causal relationship between the amount that schools spend 
and student achievement. How money is spent is typically much more important than 
how much is spent (see Hanushek, 2008 for a review of the literature). Analysing the 
effect of spending on reduced pupil–teacher ratios, most studies find no significant 
relationship with achievement. 
Levacic and Vignoles (2002) find that in the British context, the impact of 
school resources is small. Holmlund et al (2010) find that after controlling for the 
range of pupil and school-level characteristics, the estimated effect of an increase of 
£1,000 in average expenditure per pupil would raise standardised test scores by about 
5 per cent of a standard deviation. They find evidence of a consistently positive 
effect of expenditure across subjects.  
The studies looking at resource effects for primary schools (Gibbons et al, 
2011; Holmlund et. al. 2010) find that effects are substantially higher for 
economically disadvantaged students. These findings are encouraging for policy 
because they suggest that despite large imperfections, mechanisms can be designed 
to ensure that disadvantaged students benefit from increasing school resources (see 
the discussion about the pupil premium in the UK in section 4.4). This provides some 
support to the recommendation for increasing targeted resources for the 
disadvantaged.  
There is also evidence to suggest that targeted investments, which address 
problems in specific areas or subjects and are specifically designed for pupils with 
learning disadvantages, deliver larger benefits. A case in point is the ‘Excellence in 
Cities’ programme (Machin et al, 2010) and the ‘Literacy Hour’ policy (Machin and 
McNally, 2004). 
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4 The UK Institutional Framework 
Having considered the drivers of success and failure in educational systems, we turn 
to a critical appraisal of the UK institutional framework, highlighting areas which are 
working or improving and pointing to problem areas that still need to be addressed. 
 
4.1 Accountability 
An important feature of an education system is the way in which its performance is 
held to account. A growing body of literature posits that the key to improving 
education outcomes lies in altering the incentives structure, so that it promotes strong 
schools with high quality teachers (Hanushek, 2008; Hanushek and Woesmann, 
2006, 2011a). For example, there is empirical evidence suggesting that schools that 
face external exit exams tend to have better results than schools that face no such 
exam. The same literature reports a negative link between accountability and 
autonomy – i.e. in the absence of central accountability frameworks, schools with 
greater autonomy tend to underperform (Woessman, 2012). 
The UK accountability system is based on two pillars: (i) school performance 
(or ‘league’) tables, which have traditionally focused on schools’ average GCSE 
results; and (ii) inspection reports from the statutory agency responsible for 
monitoring schools’ performance, the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted). 
Both have significant limitations. 
School performance (or ‘league’) tables are useful tools for parents and 
government to evaluate school performance and educational outcomes65. Allen and 
Burgess (2011) use seven years of pupil census to show that using the performance 
tables to select schools does on average lead to better choices than choosing at 
random. However, test scores and value-added as published in the league tables are 
not an accurate measure of school quality (Kramarz, Machin and Ouazad, 2009). 
Furthermore, league tables may encourage behavioural distortions. For 
example, in order to improve the average exam results, individual teachers would 
focus their effort more towards exam preparation (“teaching to the test”); schools 
may also decide to develop a more selective intake approach or change the mix of 
subjects offered to students so that examination success is more probable. The 
consequences of such distortions are grade inflation, focusing on the average 
                                                 
65
 The use of benchmarking is more widespread in UK than in virtually any other OECD country 
(Gonand et al, 2007). 
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student’s performance and not at the entire distribution. It also distorts funding 
allocations within the school.  
The second pillar of the accountability system is the role played by Ofsted. 
Recent empirical evidence suggests Ofsted’s inspections are effective in improving 
poor school performance (Hussein, 2012).  Allen and Burgess (2012) show that 
schools only just failing to reach the minimum standards expected by school 
inspectors do indeed see an improvement in scores over the following two to three 
years, over and above those schools that only just make it above the threshold. The 
effect size is moderate to large at around 10 per cent of a pupil-level standard 
deviation in test scores. Moreover, this improvement occurs in core compulsory 
subjects which suggest that schools are not altering their subject mix. 
The results mentioned above, however, indicate little positive impact on 
lower ability pupils, with equally large effects for those in the middle and top end of 
the ability distribution. This raises doubts about the effectiveness of the incentives 
placed upon schools to improve the performance of disadvantaged children. These 
doubts are exacerbated by the fact that the performance of disadvantaged children 
appears to be diluted in the criteria Ofsted applies while judging the overall 
effectiveness of schools. 
 
4.1.1 Floor targets and the Academies Act 
One of the government’s flagship policies to tackle poor school quality is based on 
the definition of a “floor target”. This sets an expectation that a minimum of 35 per 
cent of children at every secondary school should get five A* to C including English 
and maths. A primary school will be below the floor if less than 60 per cent of pupils 
achieve the ‘basics’ standard of level four in both English and mathematics and 
fewer pupils than average make the expected levels of progress between key stage 
one and key stage two. Schools that fail to meet this target (and a few other criteria) 
are at risk of having their management replaced (the so-called “sponsor academy” 
conversion). Where there has been long-term underperformance, little sign of 
improvement and serious Ofsted concern, the Government converts schools into 
Academies, partnering them with a strong sponsor or outstanding school. 
Unfortunately, the impact of this program on the socio-economic gradient is likely to 
be rather limited as is illustrated by figure 8 below. The blue line in the figure gives 
every 16-year-old who took GCSEs at a state school in 2010 a point score for their 
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exam performance: 8 points for an A* down to 1 point for a G. It standardises the lot, 
and divides them up by the poverty of their neighbourhoods. Children in 
disadvantaged postcodes are at the left of the graph and the richest are at right. The 
red line strips out the failing schools (according to the floor target mentioned above) 
and assumes the children who previously attended those schools are dispersed into 
the rest of the school system in a way that does not damage the performance of those 
other schools. The resulting improvement in the gradient is very limited. 
 
Figure 8: GCSE exam scores (pupil level performance) by neighborhood 
deprivation level 
 
Source: Cook, 2012 
 
This is yet another reminder of the point we highlighted in section 1.2.2: the problem 
is not that there are a few schools which have all the disadvantaged children in them 
performing poorly. The problem is that disadvantaged children perform poorly 
(compared their wealthier peers) in a vast majority of schools. 
 
4.1.2 Targeting symptoms, not causes 
Over the years,  most of central government’s policy interventions have not been 
systematically targeted at economically disadvantaged/ FSM children but have 
instead focused on a number of pupil-characteristics that are (imperfectly) associated 
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with economic disadvantage (such as Special Education Needs (SEN) 66 status; 
ethnic minorities; and low attainment)67. 
Although there are significant overlaps between these groups (see figure 9 
below), there are drawbacks to this approach. First, it leaves out a multitude of cases 
of socio-economically disadvantaged children who are not income disadvantaged. 
Second, some of these groups conflate pupil deprivation with poor teaching 
performance (low attainment could be simply driven by poor teaching). Third, it 
provides mixed messages to schools and blurs their priorities - anecdotal evidence 
suggests that schools/teachers do struggle to understand why/ how to target needs of 
Free School Meals (FSM) pupils compared to more visible types of need (e.g. SEN, 
EAL). 
Figure 9: GCSE targeting symptoms - a Venn diagram    
 
Source: Data from the 2009 National Pupil Database 
 
                                                 
66
 SEN is a multifaceted classification which brings together children with innate cognitive/learning 
difficulties and children who are underperforming for reasons other than their innate ability (e.g. 
strong negative impact of family background and/or poor teaching quality and/or unsupportive peer 
effects).  The first sub-group is defined by a characteristic that puts it at disadvantage. The second 
sub-group is defined by its (poor) performance level, and may or may not be at disadvantage. In that 
sense, SEN conflates discretionary inputs (e.g. teaching quality); non-discretionary inputs (e.g. 
unsupportive family background); and outputs (low attainment).   
67
 Under the previous government, there were only a handful of interventions designed to directly 
target disadvantaged/ FSM children [e.g. apart from additional funding, there was a two year old 
childcare pilot; extended services subsidy and an Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA)]. 
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4.1.3 Main measure of deprivation subject to substantial limitations 
Free School Meals (FSM) status is widely used as the main measure of deprivation. 
The Pupil Premium is also based on this indicator. FSM is a crude indicator of 
parental income. Hobbs et al (2010) have examined the relationship between 
children’s FSM ‘eligibility’ and equivalent net household income (Figure 10) and 
find that there is considerable overlap between the range of household incomes of 
children taking up FSM and those not taking up FSM. In other words, many children 
taking up FSM are in households with higher incomes than children not taking up 
FSM. This makes it likely that many children eligible for and claiming FSM are not 
in the lowest income households. 
 
Figure 10: Distribution of household income by children’s FSM take-up status
 
Source: Hobbs and Vignolet (2010) 
 
Other well established limitations of the FSM measure include the fact that: a) 
Dropping out of FSM category could simply mean children are not claiming FSM 
although they would be entitled to them (which is known to be particularly 
significant in the later stages of secondary education); b) Changes in FSM status may 
reflect increases in income beyond the thresholds defining the FSM category, but not 
to the extent of having meaningful impacts on attainment; c) Even if reductions in 
the proportion claiming FSM eligibility from one year to the next reflect significant 
improvements in household income, we would not expect this to lead to an instant 
improvement in pupil attainment. The effects of earlier poverty are likely to persist; 
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d) it is well established in the empirical literature that it is being eligible for FSM at 
any point in the pupil’s academic career that is most strongly associated with 
attainment rather than the number of years a pupil is eligible.  
 
4.1.4 Recent reforms 
The government has partially addressed the issue of targeting the right groups by re-
defining the target group for the Pupil Premium. From April 2012 the Pupil Premium 
was extended to include children who have been eligible for free school meals (FSM) 
at any point in the last 6 years. 
Since January 2012, the government has also started to publish new league 
tables that report GCSE results by groups of pupils (within schools) defined by their 
prior attainment at key stage 2 (KS2)). Specifically, for each school the tables will 
report the percentage of pupils attaining at least 5 A* – C grades (including English 
and maths) separately for low-attaining pupils, high attaining pupils and a middle 
group. This is a change for the better as the main differences between schools in the 
performance of different group of pupils within the school will tend to emerge from 
variation in schools’ teaching effectiveness. 
However, a particular disadvantage of the new measure is that it uses very 
broad pupil bands. The groups are defined to cover the entire pupil population: the 
low attaining group are students below the expected level (Level 4) in the KS2 tests; 
the middle attaining are those at the expected level, and the high attaining group 
comprises students above the expected level. The disadvantage is that the broad 
groups (about 45 per cent are counted to be in the middle) hide the significant 
variation in average ability within that group across schools. This implies that 
differences in league table performance between schools will still reflect differences 
in intake in addition to effectiveness - even within the group, thus partly undermining 
the aim of group-specific reports. 
 
4.2 Autonomy 
Schools are only as good as their teachers. Since it is hard to find good ex-ante 
predictors of teaching quality, it is likely to be important to give schools the tools and 
incentives to hire and reward high performing teachers, and to remove low 
performing ones. The case for giving schools more freedom is based on the notion 
186 
 
that this will allow them to take advantage of local knowledge to operate more 
efficiently and become more innovative. 
Several countries have enabled a certain proportion of state funded schools to 
operate with greater autonomy than the norm within the state system. The structure 
and rules differ between (and sometimes within) countries but they also have much 
in common – for example, ‘charter schools’ in the US; ‘free schools’ in Sweden and 
‘academies’ in England (see Appendix 3 for a detailed description of academies in 
the UK). In an international context, English schools are high up in the autonomy 
rankings, second only to the Netherlands according to OECD (2012). 
The empirical evidence (both for the UK and other countries) provides 
support for the hypothesis that increasing school autonomy can lead to improvements 
in pupil performance and might also have  positive effects on neighbourhood schools 
(see Appendix 4 for a review of the literature). In the UK, recent studies that have 
investigated the conversion of disadvantaged schools into academies have noted an 
improvement in pupils’ performance compared to pupils in similar schools. 
The important discussion for policy, though, is not so much whether 
autonomy is a good idea in general but in what spheres and contexts schools should 
be made more autonomous. Hanushek et al. (2011b) provide a good discussion on 
where ‘autonomy’ may and may not be desirable. In their view some decisions – 
such as hiring and budget allocations – require significant local knowledge and are 
more appropriately made at the school level.  In contrast, where standardisation is 
important (for example in setting course offerings and requirements) decision should 
be made at a higher level68. Furthermore, the impact of autonomy may vary with 
other elements of the schools system - for example, whether there is a strong system 
of accountability in place. 
In the UK, community schools (which still represent a large portion of the 
schools system) enjoy some autonomy69 compared to the other types of school such 
as academies and voluntary aided schools. Localising hiring and making pay 
conditions more flexible would put these schools on a more similar footing to 
                                                 
68In a cross-country analysis, Woessman (2003) found that school autonomy in setting educational 
standards and the size of the school budget was negatively related to pupil performance. The opposite 
was true of school autonomy in personnel management and process decisions, for example, hiring 
teachers and setting salaries.  
69
 The 1988 Education Reform Act gave community schools the option to become “grant-maintained” 
community schools where they were free from local authority control. The Act also gave community 
schools greater local management rights wherein schools could control their budget. 
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independent schools, academies, free schools and faith schools. It could also help 
overcome the problem of regional disparities in the real salary linked to the national 
pay scale (see Appendix 2 for a discussion of teacher’s payment in UK). 
In practice, this movement towards greater school autonomy in the UK is 
taking place through a piecemeal academisation of the schools system. In the 
Academies Act of 2010, the coalition government specified that any primary, 
secondary or special school that has been rated outstanding by the Office for 
Standards in Education (Ofsted) should be allowed to become an academy on a fast-
track route. 
From November 2010, all other primary and secondary schools that wished to 
benefit from Academy status will be able to apply to convert, provided they work in 
partnership with a high performing school that will help support improvement, or 
another sponsor – such as larger charities or small federation of schools. Over time, 
the government has taken out many of the requirements from the Academy funding 
agreement. It has removed prescriptions on curriculum and qualifications, target 
setting and the production of rigid plans.  
The share of academies is rapidly increasing. Figure11 below shows the 
number of new converters each month. 29 schools converted in the first month of the 
start of the program, September 2010. Numbers remained below 50 per month for 
each of the next two terms. More than 150 converted at the start of the summer and 
autumn terms 2011, but the peak number of 300 converted during August 2011. 
Moreover, as shown in Table 3, the phenomenon of academies’ chain is also 
emerging since some sponsors control more than one school. For example, the 
Academies Enterprise Trust (AET) is the largest sponsor and administers more than 
60 schools.  This would raise the challenging issue – both for academics and 
policymakers- to identify the optimal structure of the academies’ system.  Drawing 
from the US charter’s schools system could provide useful hints. For example, 
KIPPS one of the major US charter schools, has adapted the franchise model to 
manage its expansion. Each KIPP school pays 1 per cent of its annual revenues to the 
KIPPS foundations; teachers and school leaders are carefully selected and trained; 
KIPPS schools are subject to annual inspections on financial, academic, real estate, 
and legal personnel issues and schools who fail to maintain the system’s quality 
would lose the KIPPS brand and support. However, unlike the typical business 
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franchisor, KIPP grants its new schools considerable freedom in deciding how they 
will earn and keep the brand. However, the majority of charter management 
organisation opt for a greater control over each school and adopt a corporate-style 
growth approach that assure that each new site replicates their own standards for 
building design, staffing and programs (Bennett, 2008).  
 
Figure 11:  Schools converting to academies, by month 
 
Source: House of Common Library, SNSG/6233, July 2012 
 
Table 3: Academies’ chain in the UK 
Source: Department of Education data and Guardian Datablog. 
 
Another initiative in the direction of academisation has been the creation of Free 
Schools, which are being set up in response to real parental demand within a local 
Sponsor
Prim, 
open
Prim, 
upcoming
Sec, 
open
Sec, 
upcoming
Total, inc 
schools not 
shown
Academies Enterprise Trust (AET) 18 15 20 12 66
E-ACT 7 3 18 1 30
Oasis 3 10 11 25
United Learning Trust (ULT) 17 21
Ormiston Trust 1 18 19
School Partnership Trust 4 6 5 3 19
Kemnal Academies Trust 9 5 2 16
ARK schools 3 1 7 1 15
Harris Federation 2 1 11 1 15
Greenwood Dale Foundation Trust 4 1 5 11
Academies Transformation Trust (ATT) 1 4 5 10
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area for a greater variety of schools. The first such schools opened in September 
2011. Free schools are non-profit making, independent, state-funded schools. The 
model is flexible: free schools may be primary or secondary schools; located in 
traditional school buildings or appropriate community spaces; and may be set up by a 
wide range of proposers. 
Like academies, Free Schools are to be funded on a comparable basis to other 
state-funded schools. The groups running these schools cannot make a profit, and are 
subject to the same Ofsted inspections as state schools. Free Schools cannot be 
academically selective and must take part in their local coordinated admissions 
process. 
However, free schools have additional freedoms compared to academies, a 
key example being that teachers in Free Schools do not necessarily need to have 
Qualified Teacher Status. 
 
4.3 School Choice and Competition 
Increasing parental choice is often one of the front-runners amongst the policies 
proposed to promote competition and improve school outcomes (e.g. OECD, 2012). 
The rationale is that as schools compete to attract students, parental demands will 
create strong incentives for schools to improve performance.  
In the UK, parents’ ability to choose schools is limited. While parents can 
(since the 1980s) apply to any state school, schools are allowed to discriminate in 
case of over-subscription according to an enforced Code of Practice. The most 
important oversubscription criterion is usually proximity to the school.  This means 
that some people have greater empowerment to exercise choice than others, and this 
tends to work against lower income families and those with difficulties in accessing 
and understanding school performance information provided through league tables 
and Ofsted reports. 
There is evidence from England and other countries that many parents act on 
available information when they are purchasing a home (for England: see Rosenthal, 
2003; Gibbons and Machin, 2003; Gibbons et al, 2013; and Burgess et al, 2009). 
Higher income parents move to locations with better schools and this is reflected in a 
high correlation between house prices and the quality of the school in the 
neighbourhood. The consequence is that parents from lower income households are 
not able to exercise meaningful choice because they cannot afford to live very close 
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to a popular school. West and Pennell (2000) also show that higher socioeconomic 
households have better information about and understanding of school performance. 
Thus, ‘school choice’ as desirable as it is, is not an effective instrument for 
addressing attainment gaps by household background (McNally 2012). 
As discussed in Section 4.2, there are some types of schools which are more 
autonomous and their admission criteria are not linked to residence criteria. These 
include faith-based schools, academies and independent schools. The ability to make 
effective choices is thus highly influenced by whether families can afford 
independent schools, have access to faith-based schooling, have children with 
specific aptitudes, or are able to move close to attractive maintained schools 
(Braconier, 2012). 
International evidence on choice and competition is voluminous but its 
findings are still mixed. Evidence on competition and choice focusing specifically on 
the UK is very limited70, and mainly focused on secondary education. Gibbons, 
Silva, and Machin (2008) are the first (pupil-level) analysis that investigates the 
effects of choice and competition on academic achievement in primary schools in 
England. The study reports little evidence of a causal link between either choice or 
competition and achievement. Encouragingly, they find some positive effects of 
competition for children in the tail of the performance distribution, in primary 
schools. 
 
4.4 Funding System 
Central government provides additional funding per disadvantaged student to local 
authorities (equivalent to roughly £4,000 per year in 2010). Local Authorities use 
their own individual funding formulas to transfer funds to schools. In 2010, on 
average, LAs passed through roughly £3,000 per disadvantaged student to schools, 
with the difference spread across all schools within the LA. A complex funding 
system makes it difficult for LAs to understand the share of deprivation funding in 
their total grants. The partial pass through may also reflect that LAs disagree with 
central government priorities. This may be one reason why LAs sometimes do not 
express support for extensive deprivation funding. 
At the school level, where funding for deprivation is lower than the perceived 
costs, the school may engage in “cream skimming”, try to dissuade disadvantaged 
                                                 
70
 See Allen and Vignoles (2009) for a good review of the existing literature.  
191 
 
children from admission, and recruit more able students. The lag in receiving 
deprivation funding also incentivises schools not to retain disadvantaged students 
(Sibieta et al, 2008).  
The current government introduced a “pupil premium” to help mitigate these 
incentive biases and make funding directly tied to the disadvantaged (DfE, 2010). In 
2011/12 schools received a premium amounting to £488 per child entitled to free 
school meals on top of base funding and for pupils in care who had been 
continuously looked after for six months. The premium amount increased to £600 per 
pupil for 2012–13. The Premium increases central government’s notional funding for 
deprivation. But, it is still unclear whether the level of funding proposed is sufficient, 
whether schools will use the funds to tackle the performance of disadvantaged pupils, 
whether LAs will divert their grants away from deprivation funding, and whether 
schools will continue to “cream skim”. 
Recent research by the Sutton Trust also casts doubt on the impact of the 
premium. Less than 2 per cent in a survey71 of primary and secondary school 
teachers said it would be used to improve feedback between teachers and pupils and 
less than 1 per cent said they will introduce peer-to-peer tutoring schemes. The Trust 
argues that these two schemes, if implemented well, could indeed boost recipients’ 
performance by the equivalent of an extra eight or nine months in a school year.  
Similar results are obtained in a recent Ofsted survey72 that aimed at 
identifying how schools were using the pupil premium to raise achievement and 
improve outcomes for its recipients. The qualitative survey found that in the more 
disadvantaged areas, only one in 10 school leaders thought it had significantly 
changed the way they worked. Schools often failed to disentangle the pupil premium 
from their main budget, and said that they were not using the funding to put in place 
new activity. The pupil premium funding was most commonly used to pay for 
teaching assistants. In summary, there seems to be a significant risk that the pupil 
premium will not benefit the students who need it most, and that it will be used to 
fund existing programmes with no real impact in terms of additionality.  
Ways of alleviating this problem include making schools directly accountable 
for the achievement of pupil premium recipients. One particular policy option is to 
                                                 
71
 NFER Omnibus Survey February 2012. 
72
 The survey, conducted by Ofsted, is based on the views of 262 school leaders gathered from 
additional survey questions during routine inspections and telephone interviews. 
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publish school level information on the attainment of pupils eligible for the pupil 
premium. This transparency and accountability may incentivise schools to use the 
funding to improve the attainment of the target group. The coalition government has 
recently taken steps in that direction, by requiring schools to publish how they spend 
the pupil premium on their websites and by asking Ofsted to survey how the money 
is spent, and introducing the performance of pupil premium eligible students in 
performance tables of schools. Although these initiatives are arguably going in the 
right direction, it is doubtful they will be strong enough to counteract the bias in 
incentives created by the complexity and opacity of the way in which schools are 
funded in the UK. 
 
4.5 Teacher Recruitment and Training 
In the UK, the prestige (or lack thereof) of the teaching profession is reflected by the 
fact that only 3.7 per cent of graduates enter teaching; the average from Russell 
Group universities was 2.7 per cent, and for Cambridge, Bristol, Imperial College, 
UCL and LSE it was less than 2 per cent, with Oxford only just over 2 per cent.  
Teachers are not civil servants in the UK, but are employed directly by the 
individual school. In order to teach in maintained schools, teachers must hold 
Qualified Teacher Status (QTS). There are a number of different routes available. 
Initial Teacher Training is a complex system, involving both undergraduate and 
postgraduate programmes in university-led, school-centred and employment-based 
provision. The question is how should this be set up to produce the most effective 
teachers who will have the greatest impact on pupil progress? 
Traditionally teachers were trained either on undergraduate (BEd or BA 
QTS) or postgraduate (PGCE) courses run by higher education institutions. From 
1994, School Centred Initial Teacher Training (SCITT) was introduced; this is a 
fulltime postgraduate training based in a school or a group of schools. Employment-
based routes into teaching were first introduced in 1990. These are designed for 
qualified mature people who needed to earn a living while they were in training. 
They included the Graduate Teacher Programme (GTP), the Registered Teacher 
Programme (RTP) and the Overseas Trained Teacher Programme.  
Initial teacher training, as a route to the teaching profession, plays two roles 
for the profession – training and selection with the emphasis typically placed on the 
former. Allen and Burgess (2012b) argue that selection seems to be the most 
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important and it should be made at the point where evidence on ability is strongest. 
According to these authors, the final decision on who can become a teacher should 
be made at a stage when there is enough evidence on the candidate’s teaching 
effectiveness i.e. after completing the training. Given that variations in teacher 
effects on pupil progress are very substantial, and that the future effectiveness of a 
potential teacher is hard to judge from their own academic record, a broader group 
(with a relatively low academic entry requirement) should be allowed to try out 
teaching. But, towards the end of the program, a much stricter probation policy 
should be enforced. 
The Coalition Government has proposed significant changes to the teacher 
training landscape wherein under the current operation of selection in ITT, the 
selection is tight at the beginning but negligible thereafter. The current 
policy73direction of tightening of academic entry requirements into teaching is not 
helpful: it will restrict the quantity of recruits and have no impact at all on average 
teaching effectiveness. The key decision on final certification should be made after a 
significant probation period (e.g. three years), and ideally, the probation should 
involve classes of varying ability and year group (Allen and Burgess, 2012a).  
One of the successful recruitment routes has been the Teach First Program 
started in 2003 in London. Teach First is a charitable organisation. Teach First 
introduced a training programme for graduates who can commit to teaching for two 
years in challenging London secondary schools. According to an early stage 
evaluation74 by Hutchings et al. (2006), after the first two years of its operation it had 
been successful in recruiting star graduates.  
The key attractions for potential participants were keeping career options 
open, gaining qualifications and making a social contribution and the prestige 
surrounding the programme: participants were encouraged to view themselves as a 
privileged group. They underwent both teacher training (in the first year) and a 
programme of leadership training. Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) is normally 
gained at the end of the first year. Teaching in challenging London schools gave a 
sense of mission to the graduates.  
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 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeduc/1515/1515.pdf 
74The Institute for Policy Studies in Education was commissioned by the Teacher Training Agency in 
2003 to conduct an evaluation of innovative practice on the Teach First programme, with the aim of 
ensuring that ITT as a whole is able to benefit from innovative practice developed in the programme. 
The evaluation was conducted between September 2003 and September 2005, the first two years of 
the Teach First programme when it operated only in London. 
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Once teachers have been carefully recruited and trained, mechanisms for 
teachers, schools leaders and LAs to share best practice should be more strongly 
encouraged. The ‘London Challenge’ and the more general ‘City Challenge’ 
programmes have shown how successful this could be. The ‘City Challenge’ was 
launched in April 2008 building on the success of the London Challenge 2003-08. Its 
aim was to improve the educational outcomes of young people and ‘to crack the 
associated cycle of disadvantage and underachievement’ in the Black Country, 
Greater Manchester and London’ (DfES, 2007). In particular, its goals were to 
reduce the number of underperforming schools, especially in English and maths; 
increase the number of good and outstanding schools; and improve the educational 
outcomes of disadvantaged children. City Challenge was based in a different 
approach than other government’s interventions. First of all, it was built on the belief 
that educational problems should be addressed at local level, with Local Authorities 
and schools working together. Secondly it focused on all aspects of education 
(leadership, accountability through a better data collection; pupil’s attainments; 
school-to-school collaboration) and involving all the parties (LAs, school leaders, 
teachers, parents and pupils). Thirdly it was characterized by a great flexibility that 
allowed modifying activities on the base of changing school’s needs.  Finally, there 
was not a single approach but the support package was bespoke for each school and 
agreed by schools’ leaders, LAs, civil servants and the local team of Advisors.  
Based on the findings of a mixed methods evaluation, City Challenge areas achieved 
the majority of their initial targets.  
Indeed,  London schools in each quintile of 2008 attainment improved 
significantly than in areas not included in the City Challenge programme (with the 
exception of the highest quintile of secondary schools). In Greater Manchester and 
the Black Country, the picture was less clear since only schools in the lowest 
quintiles of attainment (and in some other quintiles) improved significantly more 
than those outside City Challenge areas. The attainment of pupils eligible for Free 
School Meals (FSM) increased by more than the national figure in all areas (with the 
exception of Greater Manchester primary pupils) and the attainment gap between 
pupils eligible for FSM narrowed for London primary and secondary pupils, and 
Greater Manchester primary pupils. Also the proportion of Good and Outstanding 
schools increased in all three areas, despite the introduction of a more challenging 
Ofsted inspection framework (DfE, 2012).In addition, ‘London Challenge’, thanks to 
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the high involvement of schools and their staff in the decision and implementation 
process, had also a positive impact on inspiring teachers already in the system and 
attracting new one into the profession (Brighthouse, 2007).  
Additional evidence on the importance of teacher’s satisfaction to attract 
better teachers is provided by Green, Machin and Murphy (2008). They show an 
increasing outflow of teachers from the state to the private schools: the net annual 
flow of teachers from public to private has quadrupled over the last 15 years, rising 
from 400 in 1993 to 1,600 in2008. Moreover private schools employ more teachers 
with a postgraduate degree and the gap has grown over time. In the period since 
2000, 60 per cent of male teachers in the private sector had a higher degree compared 
with 45 per cent in the state sector. Given that the wage gap between these two 
groups of schools is negligible (at least in non ‘shortage subjects’) what really 
matters in explaining the teachers flow are the better working conditions and in 
particular the higher level of satisfaction in the private schools. 
 
4.6 Individual policies have not been properly evaluated 
Evaluating educational reforms and identifying efficient policies is often difficult. 
Firstly, evaluations of long term labour market and social outcomes cannot be 
performed immediately after the programs have been initiated. Secondly, education 
systems are very context-specific; different countries perform well under different 
institutional settings. This means that policy evaluations have to be interpreted in a 
context-specific institutional framework. 
In the UK, there has been a lack of rigorous and independent evaluation of 
policies implemented over the years. Even where they exist, they are not always 
considered in the policy-making process. The abolition of the Education 
Maintenance Allowance is a case in point. The Education Maintenance Allowance 
was launched nationally in the UK in 2004. It provided low-income 16 to 19-year-
olds with payments of up to GBP 30 per week if they stay on at school or college. 
This policy was independently and rigorously evaluated, yet that evaluation seems to 
have been ignored when the policy was scrapped in 2010. The Department for 
Education cited research by the National Foundation for Educational Research which 
showed that 90 per cent of students who receive EMA would still continue with their 
education without the payment. However, this was a gross misrepresentation of the 
evaluation evidence and research. Extensive quantitative and econometric 
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evaluations of the EMA by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) in 2005 showed that 
the scheme significantly improved both staying-on rates and qualifications for 
students from poorer backgrounds. The government had chosen to ignore this 
rigorous and independent evidence, and had instead argued that the abolition of EMA 
is justified by high levels of "deadweight". 
There are nevertheless notable exceptions. The more recent and rather 
encouraging one is the Education Endowment Foundation (EEF), established in 2010 
to look at what interventions work to overcome educational disadvantage. The EEF 
aims to build a rigorous evidence base of what works to raise the attainment of the 
lowest performing, and most disadvantaged children. It has very generous resourcing 
(Department for Education have given a grant of £125m over 10 years to the winner 
of a tender process). The creation of such an independent75 organisation is a positive 
step towards rigorous policy evaluation and a similar approach should be encouraged 
more widely to inform the debate around education policy making.  
There are many advantages to using this kind of platform, i.e. an independent, 
well -resourced organisation with a very clear remit to focus on the evidence around 
what works: (i) dedicated and focussed team without the distractions of the normal 
business of government; (ii) insulation from the demands of other government 
departments, to rule options out before they had a chance to be considered; (iii) 
insulation from “political” vetoes; iv) research continuity and strong institutional 
memory; and (v) ability to bring in multi-disciplinary expertise. 
 
5 Policy Recommendations  
5.1 Core recommendations on education 
Our proposals go with the grain of the academies movement. But the system needs to 
deal more squarely with the UK’s failure to develop the talents of disadvantaged 
pupils. We therefore propose some direct steps, particularly financial and non-
financial incentives, to address this fundamental problem. 
The ‘academisation’ of the school system should deepen into a ‘flexible 
ecology’, building on aspects of the higher education system (see below). There are 
four integral parts: greater school autonomy, strengthened central accountability 
                                                 
75
 The EEF has no one from DfE on the Board, there are no politicians on the board; it is an 
independent organisation supported by charities. 
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(transparent information and inspection), wider parental choice and more flexibility 
for successful schools and their sponsors to expand. 
To improve school governance, leadership and management, it must become 
easier for outstanding sponsored academies to grow. Ideally this operates at the 
school level by making physical expansion easier. But there may be spatial 
limitations, which is why expansion through the growth of networks of sponsored 
academies is also an important way to spread better practices. By the same token, it 
should be made easier for underperforming schools to shrink and, if they do not 
improve, to be taken over or, in extreme cases, closed down.  
 
Changes to help to develop the talent of disadvantaged pupils include: 
• Information on school performance needs to be changed to also reflect the 
performance of disadvantaged children within the school. Such changes 
should apply to league tables and targets and they should be more closely 
reflected in Ofsted’s inspection regime. Improving the performance of 
disadvantaged children should be given a central role when Ofsted awards an 
‘outstanding’ grade to a school. 
• ‘Floor targets’ must be redesigned to become effective in addressing poor 
school performance and should be aligned with the guidelines defined in the 
framework for schools inspection. This should involve moving away from 
undifferentiated average performance targets (such as the current target, 
which requires 40 per cent of A* to C passes at GCSE level). These are 
‘blind’ targets that distort schools’ incentives to target resources and support 
towards those children who can more readily be expected to reach the pre-
defined threshold.  
• Contextual value added (school exam results adjusted for intake quality) 
should be published by school for pupil premium children and for the 
medium-performing Key Stage 2 group.  
The expansion of new sponsored academies should be focused on 
underperforming schools serving disadvantaged children. The original programme 
was shown to be very successful in doing this (Machin and Vernoit, 2011). But the 
post-2010 academies are less focused on this group of schools. 
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Teacher quality needs to be improved through better conditions for both entry and 
exit. Teacher recruitment and training could be improved by:  
• Teach First (which is renowned for its outstanding track record in recruiting 
high quality graduates) should expand until it becomes one of the main routes 
into school teaching.  
• Mainstream teacher recruitment should become more concentrated in the best 
universities and schools, following a national recruitment process.  
• The probation period for teachers should be extended in length – for example, 
by doubling it from two to four years.  
• Policies that insist on grades, qualifications and backgrounds should be 
relaxed to encourage a wider range of applications to reflect the fact that 
teacher effectiveness is not highly correlated with crude background 
indicators. 
• Mechanisms for teachers and schools to share best practice should be more 
strongly encouraged. The ‘London Challenge’ programme has shown how 
successful this could be. 
Our proposed measures would, we believe, work together to increase the skills 
that are needed to make the UK economy a more competitive and dynamic place to 
do business and directly tackle the longstanding problem of poor intermediate and 
low-level skills. Together they would ensure that fewer of our children leave school 
ill-equipped to work in the competitive international environment that we now face. 
These proposals would also reduce disadvantage without compromising the 
achievements of other children. 
 
5.2 Further recommendations for schools 
To provide additional support for disadvantaged pupils, the criteria for receiving the 
pupil premium should be expanded to reflect a wider measure of disadvantage than 
simply free school meals. This need has now been acknowledged by making 
eligibility for the pupil premium dependent on whether a family has ever been 
eligible for free school meals in the last six years. But available databases could 
expand the definitions of eligibility further. 
The pupil premium is planned to increase from £600 to £900 in 2014/15. We 
recommend that part of the premium should be given in cash to the pupils and 
families to provide an individual incentive. This should be conditional on 
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improvements in performance after age 14, such as attendance and grade 
improvement beyond pre-agreed baseline expectations. This kind of ‘conditional 
cash transfer’ programme has proved to be effective in a wide variety of programmes 
(in welfare reform, for example, re-employment vouchers are usually more effective 
if the bonus is kept by the jobseeker rather than the firm). The precursor to this 
approach was the Educational Maintenance Allowance, which evaluations show was 
effective in encouraging children from disadvantaged backgrounds to remain in 
school. We recommend that the bursary scheme that replaced Educational 
Maintenance Allowance should be wrapped back into this.  
More resources should be made available for programmes that provide better 
information to low income children and parents on the economic returns to different 
subjects. In the spirit of encouraging better teaching, a more flexible system of 
rewards should be introduced for pay and promotion. This would include ending 
automatic increments; basing pay on performance and local market conditions; and 
extra rewards for teachers of core subjects in tough schools. We need swifter action 
on improved professional development and movement out of the classroom for 
underperforming teachers. Some of these changes are starting to happen and we 
expect this process to accelerate under the flexible education system that we are 
recommending, which should give head-teachers the incentives and capabilities to 
make these reforms.  
UK education policy has traditionally lacked rigorous, independent 
evaluations. Positive steps have been taken in this direction with the creation of the 
Education Endowment Foundation, but much more could be done. For example, we 
recommend piloting the release of teacher-level information on performance (in 
similar vein to NHS data available on surgeons).  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Family Income and Educational Attainment 
Blanden (2004) gives evidence of a significant impact of family income on 
educational attainment in the UK. The results suggest that a reduction of one third in 
income from the mean increases the probability of a child getting A-C GCSEs by on 
average 3 to 4 percentage points, and reduces the probability of getting a degree by a 
similar magnitude. These results imply that the probability of a young people at the 
90th percentile of the income distribution of getting a degree is 42 per cent, compared 
to 21 per cent for students at the 10th percentile. 
The result of Gregg and Macmillan (2009) show that a unit change in the log 
of income predicts a gap of over one-tenth of a standard deviation in both IQ and 
Key Stage 1 scores. In this analysis, the magnitude of this effect is much larger than 
the contributions of both adverse family structures and poor parental labour market 
outcomes, and is also double the importance of disadvantaged local neighbourhood 
for IQ. Only low parental education is a more important predictor of low income 
children’s cognitive deficits. 
Chowdry et al (2009) estimate that differences in the availability of material 
resources for educational purposes play a key role in explaining why teenagers from 
poor families tend to make less progress between Key Stage 3 and Key Stage 4 than 
teenagers from rich families. After accounting for differences in material resources, 
the gap in Key Stage 4 test scores between young people from the richest and poorest 
fifths of their sample falls by 37 per cent compared to its value after controlling for 
parental education, and demographic and other family background characteristics. 
Gregg et al (2012) have shown how, in England, a child’s educational 
progress suffered if their father lost his job in the recession of the 1980s, something 
that did not happen for children whose parents remained in work. Similar results 
have been found after spikes in job losses in the United States (Ananat et al, 2011). 
Dahl and Lochner (2012) estimated the effect of income on children's maths and 
reading achievement in the US using data from the Earned Income Tax Credit. Their 
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estimates suggest that a $1,000 increase in income raises combined maths and 
reading test scores by 6 per cent of a standard deviation in the short run. Test gains 
are larger for children from disadvantaged families. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Teachers and Headmaster’ payment incentives 
The empirical and theoretical literature on the functioning of the labour market for 
teachers (and headmasters) has increased in recent years. Overall, it suggests that 
teachers and headmasters respond to monetary and market incentives aimed at 
increasing their effort and ‘output’ (i.e. learning). Using different methodologies and 
data, Dolton and Van Der Klaauw (1999), Hanushek (2003), Murnane and Olsen 
(1989, 1990), Chevalier et al (2007) show that individuals respond to (relative) wage 
incentives in their decision to start teaching or leave the occupation. Loeb and Page 
(2000) find that teacher wages are a significant determinant of their performance and 
decision to stay in the profession - a 10 per cent increase in teacher wages would 
reduce quit rates among US teachers by 3-6 per cent. Dolton et al (2011) (using a 
panel data on 39 countries) show how both relative and absolute levels of teacher 
salaries strongly impact on pupil performance. Propper and Britton (2012) provide 
further evidence favouring the argument that teacher wages are important for school 
performance in England.  
There is also a growing body of work investigating the impact of 
performance related pay. Whilst again there is some mixed evidence, the general 
consensus appears to be that performance related pay for teachers does improve 
student attainment in a variety of settings. Examples include Lavy (2009) in Israel, 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) in India, Jackson (2010) in Texas, Bettinger 
(2010) in Ohio and Atkinson et al (2004) in England. Hanushek et al (2003) and 
Lavy (2002) show that teacher performance related pay schemes could effectively 
attract good teachers and improve their motivation with positive outcomes on pupils’ 
attainment. Woessman (2011) use cross-country data to show that the introduction of 
performance related pay is significantly associated with mathematics, science, and 
reading achievements across countries. In particular, countries that adopt this type of 
teacher compensation record about one quarter standard deviations higher scores. 
Atkinson et al (2009) evaluate the impact of a performance-related pay scheme for 
teachers in England, using teacher level data matched with pupil’s test scores and 
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value-added. They show that the introduction of a payment scheme based on pupil 
attainment improved test scores and value added, on average by about half a grade 
per pupil. They also find heterogeneity across subjects, with maths teachers showing 
no improvement. Green, Machin and Murphy (2008) show that private schools in the 
UK, that are characterized by an higher education level of their staff and attract each 
year a lot of teachers from the state school, are used to pay a premium for teaching 
shortage subjects’, such as maths or science. They use pay flexibility as an effective 
strategy to attract more and better teachers in these subjects.  
Looking at teachers’ decisions to stay in the profession, Lazear (2003) argues 
that a reduction in teacher pay in the US and Sweden has caused an adverse selection 
and induces highest quality teachers leaving the job; the author further suggests that 
linking compensation to performance would improve teacher quality and school 
effectiveness. Clotfelter et al (2006) report that a monetary bonus given to qualified 
teachers in North Carolina greatly reduced their probability of leaving high-poverty 
schools. This incentive was especially effective for teachers with more years of 
experience, who are usually associated with better pupil outcomes (Hanushek et al, 
2005).  
With regards to headmasters, Besley and Machin (2008) investigate the link 
between the pay and performance of school principals. They show that, in line with 
the evidence on pay and performance of private sector CEOs, school principals’ 
payment is linked to publicly observable performance measures and poorly 
performing principals face a higher chance of being replaced. The results of Branch, 
Rivkin, and Hanushek (2013) show that highly effective principals increase the 
performance of a typical student by between two and seven months of learning in a 
single school year; ineffective principals lower achievement by the same amount. 
 
Appendix 3: What are Academies in the UK? 
Academies are publicly-funded independent schools. They benefit from greater 
freedoms to innovate and raise standards. These include: a) freedom from local 
authority control; b) the ability to set their own pay and conditions for staff; c) 
freedoms around the delivery of the curriculum; and d) the ability to change the 
lengths of terms and school days. Head teachers are given the freedom to innovate 
with the curriculum, pay staff more, extend school hours and develop a personal 
approach to every pupil. Academy schools enjoying direct funding and full 
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independence from central and local bureaucracy. The principles of governance are 
the same in academies as in maintained schools, but the governing body has greater 
autonomy. Academies are required to have at least two parent governors. 
 
Funding: Academies cannot charge fees and receive the same level of funding per 
pupil from the local authority as a maintained school, plus additions to cover the 
services that are no longer provided for them by the local authority. However, 
academies have greater freedom over how they use their budgets. Funding comes 
directly from the Education Funding Agency (EFA) rather than from local 
authorities. 
 
Staffing: When a school converts from a local authority (LA) maintained school to a 
new academy, staff from the predecessor school must be transferred to the new 
Academy school under the 1981 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) or TUPE regulations in which case their existing terms and conditions 
of employment are upheld. Once open, the academy trust may consult with staff and 
their union representatives on changes to these terms and conditions, for example to 
enable the academy to operate over different term times or change the length of the 
school day. Thus, the governing body is able to authorize changes to the terms and 
conditions of employment and approve personnel practices regarding staff 
development and discipline.  
 
Admission: Academies are also required to give priority to children ‘who are wholly 
or mainly drawn from the area’ in which the school is located. This means that the 
majority of pupils admitted must live close to the school. All schools, whether 
maintained or academy are required to comply with the ‘Greenwich Judgement’ 
which requires schools to not treat pupils living outside the LA area less favourably 
than those living in the same LA. To simplify, the LA boundary cannot be used as 
the admission catchment area. Academies will need to take part in their local 
coordinated admissions process, and so parents apply for places for their child in the 
same way as any other local school. Maintained schools which have  previously 
selected some or all of their pupils by ability are able to continue this practice when 
they become academies, but schools becoming academies cannot decide to become 
selective schools if not previously selective. Independent selective schools joining 
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the academies sector are not legally able to continue to select by ability. However, 
any school with a relevant specialism can select 10 per cent of its intake by aptitude 
in sport, modern foreign languages, visual arts or performing arts. 
 
Expansion: While they were earlier restricted in their scope of expansion, a little-
known reform in 2011 allowed academy and voluntary aided schools to expand in 
size without the permission of the local authority. 
 
Appendix 4: School Autonomy and Educational Outcomes 
Machin and Wilson (2009) provide some early evidence on academies, comparing 
the impact on GCSE performance for schools that turn into academies with a 
comparison group of similar schools. There was an improvement in the GCSE 
performance of schools that became academies, but it was no different from the 
improvement for schools in the comparison group. Wilson (2010) finds that intake 
into academies over the period 1997 to 2007, has consisted of a lower proportion of 
pupils from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds (measured by those FSM). 
Machin and Vernoit (2011) evaluate the schools that became academies up to 
2008/09. Their main findings were:  Firstly, schools that became academies started to 
attract higher ability students. Secondly, there was an overall improvement in 
performance at GCSE exams. These results were strongest for schools that have been 
academies for longer and for those who experienced the largest increase in their 
school autonomy. Thirdly, schools in the neighbourhood of academies started to 
perform better as well. This might either be due to more competition or the sharing 
of school facilities and expertise with the local community.  
Gibbons and Silva (2008) investigate the effects of the emergence of the 
private sector in education on the performance of public-sector schools and find no 
evidence that a higher concentration of privately managed schools improves the 
performance of neighbouring public-sector schools in England. However, the authors 
find that certain types of state-schools (Voluntary Aided schools) which have 
autonomous governance and admission procedures react positively to greater 
competition with local schools- their students’ value-added attainment score 
improves by about 1.6 points for each additional competitor. 
The evidence for other countries is in line with the UK. Bohlmark and 
Lindahl (2008) look at the long-term as well as short-term effects of academies in 
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Sweden. They find evidence of only small positive effects in the short-term, which 
do not persist. Other studies adopting non-experimental methods tend to produce 
more mixed results. 
In the US, there are charter schools that are similar in mandate and autonomy 
to Academies in the UK. In the US, some charter schools use lotteries to allocate 
places when the school is oversubscribed. Abdulkadiroglu et al (2011) exploit this 
randomisation to estimate the impact of charter attendance on student achievement in 
Boston. They find that charter school attendance leads to significant increases in 
pupils’ English language and maths scores compared to students not attending 
charter schools. Interestingly, they find that the highest achievement gains are for 
students who performed poorly before they attended the charter school. 
Similarly, using data from New York City, Hoxby and Murarka (2009) find 
that pupils who won the lottery to attend charter schools experience significant 
improvements in both maths and reading scores between the third and eighth grade, 
compared to those pupils who lost the lottery and remain in traditional public 
schools. 
Angrist et al (2010) evaluate the impact of a specific Charter School that is 
targeted at low income students that qualify for free school meals. They find 
significant increases in the math and reading scores in students who attend this 
Academy - increasing by 0.35 standard deviations and 0.12 standard deviations 
respectively for each year they spent enrolled at the Academy, compared to pupils 
not attending the Academy. Most importantly, they find that pupils with limited 
English proficiency, special educational needs or lower baseline scores achieve the 
highest gains in both scores.  
The spill-over effects of charter schools in the US has been studied by 
Bettinger (2005) who looks at the spill-over impact of charter schools in Michigan, 
Hoxby (2002a) who evaluates the effect of charter schools in Michigan as well as 
Arizona and Booker et al. (2007) who look at the impact of charter schools in Texas. 
All three studies find improvements in the traditional public schools that can be 
attributed to the introduction of charter schools. 
 
 
